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This thesis aims to examine the final years of missionary activity in China, with 
particular reference to the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS).  It argues that, contrary 
to existing narratives, the Society was committed, from the beginning of its work in 
China, to placing responsibility for evangelism, church organisation and leadership 
in the hands of Chinese Christians, but that this plan was undone by events in China 
between 1937 and 1952.  The missionary departure from the province of Shandong, 
planned to take place in 1942, was delayed when members of the Chinese church 
found themselves obliged to seek additional help from the BMS in order to cope with 
the destruction occasioned first by the War of Resistance against Japan, and later by 
the Civil War. 
The thesis explores the contrasting experience of work during this period in three 
different North China provinces, Shandong, Shanxi and Shaanxi.  It examines the 
way the BMS dealt with the new developments, and the impact on individual 
missionaries and their families of working in this rapidly-changing environment.   
When Baptist missionaries eventually left, their departure was no longer in keeping 
with the systematic plan of withdrawal devised earlier, but was precipitated by 
political developments following the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949.  Relationships with Chinese colleagues had to be abruptly terminated, 
and strident public criticisms were levied against missionaries and other foreigners.  
The shock of this unplanned and painful departure led missionaries and missionary 
societies to reflect critically on the whole past history of their work in China.  This 
negative emphasis has got in the way of a more nuanced assessment of the 
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Note on language 
All Chinese personal and place names used in the text are written in pinyin, with the 
exception of Chiang Kai-shek, a name already familiar to Western readers in that 
form.  Extracts from the archive are quoted using their original Wade Giles 
transliteration.  The first time the name of a place or person occurs thus, the modern 
pinyin form is given in brackets.  Thereafter it appears as in the original document.   
In addition, Chinese characters are given in brackets for less-familiar personal and 
place names on the first usage where these are known.  
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On the night of 9-10 September 1940, at the height of the London bombing, a high 
explosive bomb fell on 19 Furnival Street, headquarters of the Baptist Missionary 
Society (BMS).  The library and several offices were destroyed and many mission 
records were lost.1  News of the bombing reached missionaries in China some weeks 
later.  Handley Stockley, a medical missionary based in the BMS hospital in Xi’an, 
wrote to the Medical Secretary in London, conveying his sympathy regarding this 
event, but saying he had ‘very few regrets’ about the loss of the mission records. 
[I]n many ways I’m glad they are gone beyond recall!  I 
acknowledge we have great debts we owe to the past.  But we 
live in a different era from our forefathers [...].  It may mean 
God wants us not to be anchored to the past, but to be free to 
sail into the unknown future with him.2 
For Baptist missionaries working in China in 1941, the future must have seemed, 
more than ever, ‘unknown’.  Not only was Europe engulfed in a ferocious war, but, 
since 1937, another war, the War of Resistance against Japan, had been tearing China 
apart.  There were huge immediate practical consequences for missionary work in 
China, but there were also significant longer-term policy questions of which Stockley 
must have been aware when he wrote. 
Since the late 1920s, the BMS had been engaged in painstaking discussions as to 
how it might wind down its missionary work in China.  The early part of the century 
had seen unprecedented growth in missionary numbers and in the establishment of 
new missionary schools, colleges and hospitals.  In the context of a growing Chinese 
anti-foreign movement, the scale and splendour of these new institutions seemed out 
of place.  C.E. Wilson, BMS Foreign Secretary, who toured China in 1929, expressed 
himself ‘very sceptical and disquieted as to the effect of all this display of wealth to 
the Chinese’.3  The ‘display of wealth’ must have seemed particularly incongruous to 
Wilson in view of the fact that the Missionary Society itself was heavily in debt.  In 
July 1927, the Finance Committee had announced a gross deficit of over £41,000, 
                                                
1 Brian Stanley, The History of the Baptist Missionary Society, 1792-1992 (Edinburgh, 1992), 391.   
2 BMSA, CH/65, Stockley to Chesterman, 16.January.1941. 
3 Stanley, History, 315, citing BMSA, CH/12, Duplicate Book of C.E. Wilson, 28-30, 97; Diary of 
China Deputation Tour for April 1929. 
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equivalent to more than £2,200,000 in twenty-first century terms, a daunting sum to a 
small organisation financed by voluntary contributions.4 
The state of BMS finances, and the political environment in China, were not the only 
reasons for the Society to be thinking about how it might disengage itself from its 
work there.  The professed goal of the Baptist missionary movement had from the 
first been to achieve its own dissolution, to render itself unnecessary, to build mature 
indigenous churches in countries overseas which were capable of maintaining and 
reproducing themselves without foreign support.  The recognised formula for 
describing these mature indigenous churches was ‘three-self churches’: self-
governing, self-supporting and self-propagating.5 
It is a commonplace of missionary history that missionary societies, although 
supportive in theory of the three-self movement, were slow to adopt its principles in 
practice.6  At the World Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh in 1910, it became 
apparent that the goal of building independent self-supporting churches in Africa and 
Asia was a very long way from realisation.  It was evident that even in China, which 
by many measures was considered to have implemented the three-self principles to a 
greater extent than elsewhere, ‘the confidence expressed […] that Chinese 
Christianity was about to achieve complete financial and administrative 
independence was somewhat misplaced’.7  Brian Stanley has drawn attention to the 
‘multiple ambiguities’ which had occurred in attempts by missionary societies to 
implement the three-self principle, and suggests that   
What scholars have yet to attempt is a more comprehensive 
survey of how far, and with regional or denominational 
                                                
4 BMSA, General Committee Minutes, Vol.25, 20.July.1927.  See Daily Mail financial website, 
historic inflation calculator, accessed 1.December.2014, www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-
1633409/Historic-inflation-calculator-value-money-changed-1900.html. 
5 C. Peter Williams, The Ideal of the Self-governing church: a study of Victorian Missionary strategy, 
(Leiden, 1990), 1. 
6 Ibid; Paul W Harris, Nothing but Christ: Rufus Anderson and the ideology of Protestant Foreign 
Missions, (New York, London, 1999). 
7 Brian Stanley, World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910 (Grand Rapids, Michigan; 
Cambridge, 2009), 149. 
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variations, the three-self principle was translated into practice 
over a longer period of time.8 
This research aims to throw light on the attempts of British Baptists, working in 
China in the mid-twentieth century, to translate the principles into practice.   
The conventional narrative holds that missionaries were keen to stay in China as long 
as they could retain a foothold, and eventually left only because they were ‘expelled’ 
by the Communists after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).9  On the contrary, the Baptist archive demonstrates that the missionary 
departure was delayed by events in China, rather than brought on prematurely by 
them.  This thesis argues that the BMS plan for handing over all responsibility for 
Church leadership, finance and growth to members of the Chinese Church began to 
come undone in July 1937 when China found itself forced into war with Japan. 
A conference of all BMS missionaries in China, held in Qingzhou (青州) in February 
1927, recorded in its minutes the conviction that the BMS had ‘always regarded itself 
as a temporary organisation […] prepared at any time to surrender its task’. The 
minute went further, stating that henceforth devolution should be regarded ‘as a 
practical working policy, towards the success of which every activity of the foreign 
missionary should be directed and adjusted.’  In other words, finding ways to bring 
their work in China to an end was to be the first priority for all missionaries working 
there.  There was a qualification to the policy, however: the task was to be 
surrendered only ‘as soon as an indigenous Chinese church [was] able and willing to 
assume the responsibility’.10 
The BMS had initiated its China mission in Shandong province, where the earliest 
pioneers had settled, early in 1863.  Leaders with exceptional energy and vision, 
including Timothy Richard and Alfred Jones, had established an indigenous 
                                                
8 Brian Stanley, “The Church of the three selves: a perspective from the World Missionary 
Conference, Edinburgh, 1910”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.36.(3) 
(September 2008), 436. 
9 Missionaries ‘were of course expelled from China by the Communists after 1949’.  See Rana Mitter, 
“Imperialism, transnationalism, and the reconstruction of post-war China: UNRRA in China, 1944-7”, 
Past and Present, Supplement 8, 2013, 65.   
10 BMSA, CH/23 Shantung Secretariat, Minutes of the English Baptist Mission Inter-Provincial 
Conference at Tsingchow (Qingzhou), 7-12.February.1927.   
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Christian church in Shandong which from the first had shown a character and vitality 
of its own.  Work in two further provinces, Shanxi and Shaanxi, had come later, had 
taken off more slowly, and had encountered several formidable setbacks.  In the late 
1920s, the BMS judged that only Shandong had a Chinese church ‘able and willing 
to assume responsibility’.11   
Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石; Jiang Jieshi) establishment of the Nationalist state in 
Nanjing in 1928, and his conversion to Christianity in 1929, encouraged missionary 
societies to believe a climate might be created in which an indigenous Chinese 
church would thrive.12  It seemed that here might be a man who could influence his 
country to an appreciation of the Christian message.  Chiang’s fight to extinguish the 
growing Communist threat led to three years of intense brutality and violence, but 
towards the end of 1931 China appeared to be entering a period of relative military 
and political stability during which plans for national reconstruction began to be 
formed.13  
Accordingly, early in 1932 the BMS announced its decision to withdraw completely 
from Shandong.  A conference of BMS missionaries working in China at the time 
requested a transitional period of fifteen years.  The London-based General 
Committee felt this was too long, and in July 1932 decided ‘to reduce its allocation 
to Shandong by ten per cent annually, thus setting the goal of withdrawal by 1942’. 
Missionaries on the field continued to argue that this timescale was too short, and as 
a consequence the period of devolution was extended to fifteen years, taking the end 
date to 1947.14   
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He Lost (London, 2003), 191; See 
also, for example, BMSA, CH/68, A.K.Bryan, “The status of the Missionary in the Chinese Church”, 
1943, 6, ‘What was of even greater significance for the Chinese church, China’s new national leader 
became a professing Christian and joined the church.  This latter event had a big effect in causing a 
more friendly attitude towards Christianity and the Church.’; Daniel H. Bays, A New History of 
Christianity in China (Oxford, 2012), 125; George A. Young, The Living Christ in Modern China 
(London, 1947), 53.   
13 Hans J. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945 (London and New York, 2003), 130. 
14 Stanley, History, 318, citing BMSA, General Committee Minutes, Vol.25, 3.February.1932, 
20.July.1932; Vol.26, 6.February.1934. 
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Hopes for lasting peace in China were destroyed by the expansionist goals of 
Japan.15  During the years 1937 to 1948, members of the Chinese church in 
Shandong found themselves obliged on repeated occasions to seek additional help 
from the BMS in order to cope with the destruction occasioned first by the War of 
Resistance against Japan, and then by the Civil War.  The BMS remained committed 
in principle to ‘surrendering the task’, to empowering Chinese Christians to take 
responsibility and control, but felt unable to do so in the face of these repeated 
requests.16  
The thesis differs from other studies of this subject and period in another important 
respect.  Its subject is not the BMS in China, but British Baptist missionaries in 
China.  The focus is not primarily on policies introduced and pursued by an 
organisation, but on the experiences of individual men and women given the job of 
working out those policies in a challenging and rapidly-changing environment, and 
of the way in which these experiences impacted on their relationships with Chinese 
Christians.  H.B. Cavalcanti has noted the general disregard in sociological studies of 
religion of the way human agency contributes to the diffusion of religion:  
Religious organisations provide the structural component for 
diffusion: organisational resources, doctrinal boundaries, 
internal power structures, sanctioned recruiting strategies, 
and long-term goals.  But it is the personal approach of 
missionaries that sets the fine print for the process of 
religious diffusion.17 
This is not a sociological study of religion, but argues that only by considering ‘the 
personal approach’ of the individuals involved can ‘the fine print’ of Baptist 
missionary activity in China be measured against the Society’s professed goals.  
What evidence is there that individual missionaries were really committed to 
enabling their Chinese colleagues to be given total responsibility for the work then 
being undertaken by the Mission?  To begin to unravel this question requires an 
understanding of the wider context of the missionaries’ lives, the claims on them 
                                                
15 Van de Ven, War and Nationalism, 197.  
16 Tsingchow Conference 1927. 
17 H.B. Cavalcanti, “Human Agency in Mission Work: Missionary Styles and their Political 
Consequences”, Sociology of Religion, Vol.66(4) (Winter, 2005), 381. 
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from their families, and their attitudes to what was happening both in China and on 
the ‘home front’. 
Missionaries, in China and elsewhere, often attracted hostile comment from 
contemporaries. Pearl Buck shocked the members of the American Presbyterian 
Mission Board at the Astor Hotel in New York in 1932 by declaring that the 
missionaries she had encountered during many years in China were:  
so lacking in sympathy for the people they were supposed to 
be saving, so scornful of any civilization except their own, so 
harsh in their judgments upon one another, so coarse and 
insensitive among a sensitive and cultivated people that my 
heart has fairly bled with shame.18 
Although the harshness of Buck’s judgment caused general alarm and distress 
amongst her church-going audience, the sentiments she expressed had long been 
commonplace among observers outwith the church.  Even one twentieth-century 
Baptist missionary recruit, Harry Wyatt, recalled that ‘When I came out first there 
was one thing which I own I did dread a little, and that was the missionaries’.  It 
should be noted that Wyatt went on to add, ‘but I know now at first hand what 
homely, kind-hearted people they are, and I am not afraid of them any more’.19  
Robert Bickers has shown that more realistic understandings and closer working 
relationships had gradually evolved between Chinese Christians and modernising 
missionaries in the years following the Nationalist revolution.20  This thesis provides 
important new understandings of these relationships. 
‘It is dangerous to sit in judgment’, declares Oiki Ling at the outset of her book on 
this phase of mission history, but she goes on to repeat many earlier criticisms of 
missionaries, without reference to Bickers’s findings.21  She is critical of 
missionaries’ personal behaviour in their relations with the Chinese people. 
‘Missionary action was said to be motivated by the constraining love of Christ, but 
                                                
18 Cited in Hilary Spurling, Burying the Bones (London, 2010), 228. 
19 Ernest A. Payne, Harry Wyatt of Shansi, 1895-1938 (London, 1939), 57.   
20 Robert A. Bickers, “Changing British Attitudes to China and the Chinese, 1928-1931”, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of London, 1992, 225-245. 
21 Oiki Ling, The Changing Role of the British Protestant Missionaries in China, 1945-1952 (Madison 
N.J., 1999), 12.   
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their love degenerated into condescending and patronising charity.’22  This research 
offers a critical evaluation of such arguments, by giving examples which help show 
the attitudes of individual BMS missionaries to their work and the ways in which 
they interacted with Chinese nationals, during this turbulent phase of Chinese 
history.  Indeed, these individual experiences make a major revisionist argument 
about the relationship between Baptist missionaries and the Chinese Church, and 
about the approach of the Baptists, as an example of Protestant missionaries, to the 
China field as a whole. 
The decision to concentrate on the work of one society, the BMS, is a by-product of 
the argument that it is necessary to look at the records of individual missionaries in 
order to form conclusions about their work and attitudes, including their commitment 
to an independent Chinese Church.  For this purpose, the BMS provides a significant 
sample.  During the period covered by this research, the Society employed 
approximately one hundred missionaries, working in three provinces in north China, 
Shandong, Shanxi and Shaanxi.  Political and social conditions differed significantly 
between these three provinces, and this provides opportunities for productive 
comparisons without widening the research to include other societies.  In 1937 
Shandong and Shanxi came under Japanese occupation, while Shaanxi, though under 
sustained attack right up to 1945, was never occupied.  After the Second World War, 
Shandong was immediately affected by widespread and heavy fighting between 
Nationalists and Communists, whereas Shaanxi was less generally contested; parts of 
Shandong came under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) domination more than a year 
earlier than Shaanxi, and this also had a major impact on the foreign missionary 
Societies.  Information from and about Shanxi became almost non-existent from 
1939 to 1945, and again from 1947 onwards, and this makes comparisons with that 
province more difficult, but the consequences of those differences, where they are 
apparent, form part of the argument of this thesis.  
                                                
22 Ibid, 320. 
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Figure 1: Map showing Japanese occupation, 194023 
 
In addition to the differences arising from the missionaries’ geographical dispersal 
over the three provinces, the work undertaken by the BMS fell into three broad areas, 
evangelical, educational and medical.  The way that each of these fared, and the 
different issues they faced, all provide scope for comparison.  Church communities, 
schools and hospitals each encountered different problems.  The challenges involved 
in retaining a Christian ethos, responding to government requirements, meeting 
financial demands and maintaining suitable staffing were not the same in the three 
categories.  Exploration of these varied challenges and tensions demonstrates the 
diversity which existed within the one missionary society. 
The thesis deals with several major periods of transition and a wide subject area.  
Because it centres on how missionaries responded to changing conditions in China, 
recent developments in the interpretation of Chinese history have been important.  
                                                
23 Source: ‘China Civil War, 1900-1949: Japanese Occupation, 1940’, Department of History, United 
States Military Academy, accessed 31.October.2014, 
www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/Chinese%20Civil%20War/ChineseCivilWar05.gif.   
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Also relevant has been consideration of literature dealing with the missionary 
contribution, especially the missionary enterprise in China.  Thirdly, focus on the 
missionaries themselves, and their relationships with their families and home 
environment, has required consideration of twentieth-century British social history. 
Recently released archival materials, and a greater openness to alternative 
interpretations of twentieth-century Chinese history within the PRC, have given fresh 
impetus to research amongst both Chinese and Western scholars into the significance 
of the years in China from 1937 to 1952, and the transitions which took place at that 
time.  The period embraces the last years of the Nationalist government, the social 
and military disruption of the war against Japan, the political uncertainties of the 
Civil War and the first years of the PRC, each having generated its own substantial 
and often controversial literature.  The interest of Western historians is demonstrated 
in many recent publications and a wide range of secondary sources is available to 
offer fresh interpretations of all these developments.  The new historiographical 
trends help to set the missionary experience within a wider framework.   
Lloyd Eastman’s analysis of the achievements and limitations of the Nationalist 
regime remains relevant, but has been succeeded by further examination of the extent 
of those achievements.24  Mitter’s recent account of the war with Japan explores the 
contributions of the three major Chinese players in the war, the Nationalists, the 
Communists and the collaborators, and points to continuities between their war-time 
and post-war roles.25  Amongst the burgeoning literature on specialised or localised 
aspects of the war with Japan, the edited volumes by Barrett and Shyu, as well as 
Mackinnon and Lary’s work, add new dimensions to the understanding of the 
meaning of the war to the Chinese people.26  Only recently has interest been kindled 
                                                
24 Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, 
MA, 1974) and The Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949 
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in the difficulties experienced by those in occupied China, who had to find a morally-
acceptable means of self-preservation.  Pepper and Westad’s work on the Chinese 
Civil War 1946-49 provide contextual understanding of the conditions with which 
missionaries and Chinese Christians were contending.27   
‘For the most part different people study the pre- and post-1949 periods’ wrote Paul 
Cohen in 1988, ‘They ask different questions, rely on different sources, read different 
books and often attend different conferences.’28  Historians in the 1980s and 1990s 
rejected the hitherto fixed barrier at 1949 and began to explore the continuities as 
well as the divide between the Republican and the Communist eras.29  Ten years 
later, scholarly interest turned to the years immediately following 1949, when Cohen 
demonstrated that many of the changes introduced by the CCP had their roots in 
long-established Guomindang (GMD) or Nationalist objectives.30.  In this context, 
missionary expectations of continuity into the new PRC appear less far-fetched than 
earlier critics have claimed.31   
Brown and Pickowicz’s edited volume on the early years of the PRC throws light on 
the diversity and complexity of the years in China from 1949 to 1952, and on the 
reality that ‘the era was many different things for different people in different 
places’.32  Exploring this variety and fluidity helps to explain the conflicting reports 
from missionaries working in different parts of China during this period.  Frank 
Dikötter’s recent publication reveals evidence from CCP archives of the terrible 
pressures brought to bear on large numbers of Chinese citizens in the first years of 
                                                                                                                                     
Diana Lary The Chinese People at War: human suffering and social transformation, 1937-1945 (NY, 
2010). 
27 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, the Political Struggle 1945-1949 (Oxford, 1999); Odd Arne 
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Volume 47(3) (August 1988), 519. 
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31 Ling, Changing Role, 145. 
32 Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz, Dilemmas of Victory, the Early Years of the People’s 
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the Communist state.33  Though Dikötter has been criticised for his ‘moralistic and 
emotive language’, and for some of the conclusions he draws, the factual basis of his 
material has not been disputed and is relevant for the evidence it gives of the gravity 
of situations faced by Chinese Christians at this time.34 
The relationship between the British and Chinese governments played an important 
part in the experience of missionaries in China, and a number of publications which 
appeared towards the end of the twentieth century focus on the diplomatic and 
political history of the period.35  China’s wartime and post-war relations with the 
Western world are examined in Westad’s recent and broadly based study.36  
European and American scholars are also engaged in work on the colonial presence 
in China, illustrated, for example, in Bickers’ examination of the growth of the 
foreign settlements during the late Qing Empire and their subsequent impact on Sino-
foreign relations.37   
The experience of British civilians in China during the war with Japan, 1937-1945, 
has escaped substantial historical analysis.  Many memoirs recount experience of 
occupation and internment, but few address the political or ethical questions 
involved.  Jocelyn Chatterton’s thesis on Protestant medical missionaries in Hubei 
province, 1937-1945, addresses issues facing medical missions in the context of the 
war with Japan, some of these also applicable to other aspects of missionary work.38  
She argues that the competence shown by Chinese medical staff during the war years 
called into question the need for western governance of mission hospitals, and 
suggests that ‘[w]hat also became difficult to defend was the foreign medical 
                                                
33 Frank Dikötter, The Tragedy of Liberation: a history of the Chinese revolution, 1945-59 (London, 
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missionary presence itself’.39  This is in contrast to the findings of this research, and 
serves as a useful illustration of the significant variations in practice and experience 
in different parts of China and between missionary societies.40   
The apparently shamefaced departure of foreigners at the time of the establishment 
of the PRC has perhaps been a factor in the comparative lack of attention to the 
subject.  Western firms were frozen out, and foreign businessmen could no longer 
make money; missionaries had been discredited and were no longer welcome.  There 
were plenty of nostalgic memoirs by those who had made China their home and now 
found themselves dispossessed, but little academic scrutiny of the fate of British 
businesses and commercial interests.41  Hooper examines China’s fresh stance with 
regard to the West, and Brady includes the early days of the PRC in her work on the 
way the CCP conducts its relationships with foreign bodies.42  Bickers, and the 
chapters in the edited volume by Bickers and Henriot, both examine the interaction 
between personal and social issues and commercial and political ones, but neither are 
much concerned with the final years of the foreign presence.43   
Howlett’s recent research into the departure of foreign businesses from Shanghai has 
relevance for the end of the missionary era.44  Using Chinese archives, he analyses 
the CCP approach to British businesses in the first months of the PRC, and 
demonstrates the mixture of pragmatism and ideological conviction with which the 
CCP went about dismembering them. This understanding of the CCP approach to 
foreign commercial interests is helpful in trying to separate the issues of ‘foreign-
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ness’ from issues of religious belief when considering the CCP attitude to the 
missionary presence. 
A fresh look at the missionary contribution is called for in the light of the many new 
interpretations of twentieth-century Chinese history.  Mitter has argued the case for 
bringing the imperial presence back into Chinese history, and suggests that 
intellectual originality is called for to make a fresh approach possible. 
The challenge for the new historiography of China has been 
to bring the imperial presence into the narrative of Chinese 
history, avoiding both a black-and-white condemnation of the 
imperial presence simply as depradation and plunder, and the 
complacent position that imperialism was essentially a 
‘helping hand’ in bringing China to modernity.45 
Just as there is a case for bringing back the imperial presence, so there is also a case 
for bringing missionaries back into Chinese history.  Missionaries have a place, not 
simply as religious propagandists, misguided or otherwise, and not simply as ‘foreign 
devils’, robbing China of its cultural heritage or standing in the way of its growth to 
independent nationhood, but as a formative influence on China’s twentieth-century 
development.  Many of China’s political leaders, both during the Republican and 
Communist eras, received their education in Christian schools or colleges, and the 
influence of the Christian colleges on the development of modern sciences in China 
was seminal.46  Mission hospitals cannot be legitimately omitted from a study of 
China’s health provision. 
Foundational to the secondary literature on the work of the BMS in China are the 
contributions of H.R. Williamson, and Brian Stanley.47  The first of these is 
comprehensive in its account, from the viewpoint of the Missionary Society, of all its 
activities and achievements in China from its beginnings in 1845 to the departure of 
the missionaries in 1952.  The second puts the Society’s work in China into the 
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context of its work world-wide, and of the practical and theological problems with 
which it was faced. 
Studies written in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal of foreign missionary 
societies in the late 1940s and early 1950s, were greatly preoccupied with the 
significance of the missionary withdrawal and with the criticisms of the missions 
which were voiced at the time by leading Chinese Christians.  The substantial 
generalist literature which was produced divided broadly into two main streams.  
There were writers who believed that criticisms of the missions could be explained 
by the CCP’s manipulative use of the Chinese church as a political tool.  They wrote 
so that ‘the facts should be made crystal clear’, through the ‘propaganda 
smokescreen which the Chinese authorities have ingeniously put up’. 
The missionary movement made many mistakes […]  But 
these were not of deliberate or malicious intent.  The motives 
of the Christian missionaries were from the first pure […] 
They were friends to all and offered their services in the 
realm of education and medicine with no ulterior motives 
whatever.48 
Criticism from Chinese Christians, however, prompted many missionaries and ex-
missionaries to harrowing self-examination about failures in the whole history of 
foreign missionary work in China, about relationships between missionaries and 
Chinese Christians, and about allegations of an integral association between missions 
and imperialism.  This coincided with a period when scholars and churchmen were 
preoccupied with questions about the significance and validity of the missionary 
enterprise worldwide.49  Along with a number of personal accounts, these concerns 
dominated the literature of the 1950s and 1960s.  By the early 1970s the spate of 
personal memoirs, and accounts directed at a Christian readership, had died down. 
In 1971 Lutz introduced fresh perspectives with her account of foreign missionary 
institutions caught up in the complexity of Chinese politics, from their beginnings in 
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1850 to the missionary withdrawal under the Communists in 1950.  This is relevant 
for its analysis of many of the issues which confronted the missionary movement in 
China in the mid-twentieth century.50  While Lutz recognises the active and positive 
participation of the Christian Colleges in the Chinese nationalist movements of the 
1930s and 1940s, and the significant contribution the colleges made to the total 
number of college-educated Chinese, she argues that they ‘became more important as 
contributors to the disintegration of the Chinese heritage than as agents of Christian 
evangelism’.51  They were Western institutions transported to China and ‘their 
Western administration, support and curricula, their general atmosphere made them 
mediators of western civilization’.52 
Two academic works published in the 1990s focus on withdrawal of British 
Protestant missionaries from China after 1945.53  Both Ling and Hood address the 
way in which the missionary societies dealt with changing political conditions in 
China and the circumstances leading to the eventual exodus of all foreign 
missionaries.  Both also examine criticisms emanating from early PRC publications 
of missions as tools of imperialism. 
Oiki Ling sets out to analyse whether Protestant missionaries working in China 
during those years adapted their style and practice in recognition of altered 
conditions in China and the developing independence of the Chinese church.54  She 
concludes, somewhat contradictorily, both that they did not adapt, and that they were 
naïve not to see that, even if they had adapted, there was no place for them in 
Communist China.  She does not distinguish between different societies and different 
approaches.  When the PRC was declared on 1 October 1949, 109 Western Protestant 
missionary bodies were active in China.55  The Lutheran church alone was 
responsible for no less than twelve different missionary societies, each of which had 
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its own organisational structure and theological perspective.56  Fourteen of the 
societies active in 1949 were British.57  Even within the different societies, individual 
missionaries experienced widely varying conditions and, at times, held conflicting 
views.  Ling’s undifferentiated approach to the distinctions between the different 
societies, and her dependence on such generalisations as ‘missionaries were of the 
opinion’, ‘missionaries were appalled’, ‘missionaries found’, ‘missionaries realised’, 
renders her conclusions less than convincing.58  
Hood’s perspective is that of the Mission Boards in London, Edinburgh, Belfast and 
Dublin, informed by their own, largely British, staff and supporters at home and in 
China.  He differentiates between the various missionary bodies and the problems 
each encountered, takes account of the political and theological issues faced by the 
Mission Boards, and sets out in detail the way these were dealt with.59  In an earlier 
work, Hood explores the extent to which missions reached their goal of handing over 
control to the Chinese Church, concentrating on the English Presbyterian Mission in 
Lingtung (嶺東; Lingdong) from the beginnings of missionary work in China, 
including some observations on the years up to 1989 after missionaries had left.60 
Since Hood’s accounts, there has been little work on the history of foreign 
missionaries in China after 1937, and none that take account of the fresh 
understandings of the Chinese and international context generated by recent research. 
Amongst Western scholars of Christianity in China, there has been a new interest and 
new emphasis on the development of Chinese Christianity, until recently an area 
which took a poor second place to studies of the missionary contribution.  Father 
Jean-Pierre Charbonnier’s substantial account covers mainly Catholic Chinese 
Christians, while Daniel Bays’ more recent book is predominantly, but not 
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exclusively, concerned with Chinese Protestantism.61  Bays’ fine summary of the 
development of an indigenous Chinese church ranges from the Nestorian age to the 
early twenty-first century, and draws significantly on the work of Chinese scholars, 
both within and outwith the PRC, of the past twenty five years.   
Timothy Brook’s chapter on Christianity under the Japanese occupation, in Bays’ 
edited volume, argues that the Japanese approach to managing the Chinese Church 
paved the way for the subsequent development of Christianity under Communism.62  
The almost complete absence of Westerners from occupied China during this period, 
and a shortage of Chinese documentary evidence, has meant that the experience of 
the Chinese Church under occupation has remained largely uncharted territory.  
Other recent works which focus on Chinese Christianity are those of Wickeri and 
Lian Xi.63  The former traces the development of Chinese Christianity through the 
life story of K.H.Ting (丁光训: Ding Guangxun), one-time Anglican Bishop of 
Zhejiang, who made it his life’s work to achieve reform from within, rather than 
against, established political structures.64  Lian Xi’s focus is on the charismatic 
indigenous sects which, from the late nineteenth century, grew up outside the 
mission-led mainstream Protestant church.  He argues that it is these that are at the 
root of the phenomenal growth of Christianity in late twentieth-century China. 
The health of the missionary movement was bound up with the health of the British 
churches.  Precise dating of the decline of Christianity remains a focus of scholarly 
debate.  One view is that ‘by the 1920s the principal intellectual (if not as yet social) 
orthodoxy was not any form of Christianity, but a confident agnosticism’.65  Others 
suggest that the Second World War was a watershed moment for organised religion 
in Britain. Field’s analysis of ‘religious believing and belonging’ during the war 
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years remains one of the few studies which uses the quantitative data derived from 
church statistics and social surveys to investigate whether the Second World War 
was a significant factor.66   He argues that the war was not a major milestone in 
Britain’s secularisation history.  By the 1950s, however, Britain and the United 
States were deemed to be ‘secular countries’, ‘where the place of religion was 
jeopardised by large scale indifference to religion, significant hostility to the 
churches, and the declining institutional strength of religion in state and civil 
affairs’.67  One consequence of the decline in the churches was the financial crises 
experienced by the missionary societies throughout the twentieth century, and these, 
in the case of post-war China, coincided with demands for substantial investment to 
make good the losses experienced during the war.   
In order to explore the research goals established for this thesis, extensive use has 
been made of the BMS archives held in the Angus Library at Regent’s Park College, 
Oxford.  Use has also been made of papers relating to the China Inland Mission 
(CIM), Methodist Missionary Society, the Council for World Mission, Conference of 
British Missionary Societies (CBMS), the International Missionary Council and the 
China Association, housed in the Special Collections Reading Room at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).  British Parliamentary records and reports and 
papers from the Foreign Office have been consulted, along with the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and British Red Cross archives.  Contextual 
information relating to the work of the BMS has been taken from contemporary 
newspapers and journals, including The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Herald, 
the monthly journal of the BMS.  The former was an English-language ecumenical 
missionary magazine, published monthly in Shanghai from 1867.  It ceased 
publication in 1941, but reflects the issues and activities which engaged missionaries 
in China over almost a hundred years.  Generalist newspapers have been used for the 
insights they provide into the social and political context.   
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Language limitations meant that it was not possible to access Chinese primary 
sources, and this was an important factor in guiding the direction of the research.  For 
the development of the Chinese church after the Communists came to power, some 
relevant documents are available in translation including the writings of Mao Zedong 
and Zhou Enlai, the Documents of the Three-Self Movement: source materials for the 
study of the Protestant Church in Communist China and the Collected Writings of 
K.H. Ting.  In addition, a small number of Chinese letters and private publications 
have been accessed and used in translation. 
The writer's original intention had been to work from sources accessible in Britain.  
When the opportunity arose for a visit to China in 2013, interviews were arranged 
with senior members of staff in the former BMS hospitals in Jinan and Qingzhou.  
This was possible through the agency of Gao Yan (高艳), the daughter of a Chinese 
doctor who received his medical training under the auspices of BMS missionaries at 
Qilu University (齐鲁大学) in the late 1940s.  By chance, through the Internet, 
contact was made with the daughter and son of a family who had been living in 
Zhoucun at the time of the Japanese occupation, and who had been associated both 
with the BMS staff and the Chinese church.  Now in their early eighties, they were 
both interviewed, in Beijing and Jinan respectively.  Gao Yan also set up an 
interview in Jinan with historians at Shandong University who had an interest in the 
history of Christianity in the province, and she acted as interpreter throughout the 
meetings.  In Qingzhou, Song Hong, a Chinese national who was known to the writer 
through her studies at the University of Abertay, acted as interpreter.   
No personal contacts were available in either Shanxi or Shaanxi, but with the help of 
Han Jie (韩结), a PhD graduate of the University of St Andrews, the former BMS 
hospital and high school in Xi’an were located, and an impromptu meeting set up 
with the hospital President, at which Han Jie interpreted.  Each of those acting as 
interpreters had excellent English language skills, which greatly facilitated 
discussion. 
The BMS archives are open to any reader on application.  Those consulted include 
the Minutes of the General Committee, and China, Finance, General Purposes and 
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Staffing Sub-Committees, the Annual Reports, the Baptist Yearbooks, and the 
Manual for missionaries.68  The Annual Reports include financial statements, a 
directory of missionaries and details of contributions from each church.  Although 
the financial statements give details of allocations to each mission field, and the 
Finance Sub-Committee notes estimates for major projects overseas, translating such 
sums into their spending power in China is complicated by varying exchange rates 
and inflation, and by ‘unusual monetary developments’ in China between 1937 and 
1949.69  Each of the three governments which occupied China during this period, 
Nationalist, Japanese and Communist, issued its own currency; some warlords issued 
their own currency, and at times subsidiary currencies existed within Nationalist 
areas.70  Where, and at what date, British allocations were changed into Chinese 
currency, had an instant effect on the funds available to missionaries.  Sometimes it 
was altogether impossible to access funds from abroad. 
This research differs from previous studies in that use has been made of the 
substantial personal files in the BMS archives for each individual missionary.  They 
mostly contain correspondence between the missionaries and the Mission’s Home 
Secretaries, with the occasional inclusion of minutes of meetings taking place in, or 
documents originating from, the mission field itself.  It is unusual for details of 
personal circumstances to be included in the correspondence, though this does occur, 
and, occasionally, relationships between the missionaries and the Home staff 
developed a level of intimacy which produced interchanges of a personal nature 
within the official correspondence.   
Almost all the correspondence files contain examples of ‘circular’ letters written in 
generalised terms to friends and supporters at home.  These were one of the 
obligations of the missionary in the field, and the reader can sense different levels of 
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enthusiasm for writing them in different missionaries’ hands.  One missionary hinted 
at the stereotypical style expected when she apologised for the inadequacy of her 
own early efforts: 
I fear my letters are very lacking those little mission 
anecdotes which delight the heart of missionary secretaries.  
But the life of a language student […] just consists of 
language study from morning till night and I don’t even seem 
to produce humorous language howlers.71 
In addition to the content of the letters, the letter writers’ style sometimes reveals 
information about the missionaries as individuals: the careful precision of one senior 
missionary, shown in his enthusiasm for formal reports, and numbered headings and 
subheadings; the exuberant thoroughness of another, his evident efficiency softened 
by his humour and enthusiasm for his work; the cheerful individualism of a third, 
with her readiness to say the bold and unorthodox.  The use of different typewriters, 
different types of paper, different forms of address and different ways of signing off 
are also illuminating, one sending typewritten accounts on elegantly illustrated and 
transparent Chinese writing paper; another writing page after page apparently hastily 
in a liberal and almost indecipherable scrawl.  
Some of the letters in the correspondence files which reveal most about the personal 
problems faced by the missionaries are those to the members of the Home Board 
from members of missionaries’ families in Britain, seeking help with a difficulty 
caused by the absence of a spouse, parent, son or daughter overseas; pleading a 
relative’s case; or passing on urgent information which they were unable to send 
directly to their family member abroad. The mother and sister of a prospective 
missionary bride sent poignant letters expressing their concern at the insistence of the 
Mission Board that the wedding be postponed for a year or more until her 
prospective husband had completed his language studies.72  One schoolboy wrote 
anxiously to request assistance in arranging for his exam results to be sent to his 
guardian in England rather than to his parents in China, as the examination Board 
required.73  Had the results been sent to China in the summer of 1940, it would have 
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been many months, if not years, before the results reached the boy himself.  A 
missionary’s sister asked the Secretaries how she could let her sister in China know 
about the death in a cycling accident of their thirteen-year old niece, when normal 
correspondence was impossible because of Communist restrictions.74 
As part of this research, oral interviews were held with the only two surviving 
Baptist missionaries who worked in China before 1952, and seventeen of the close 
relatives of Baptist missionaries.75  It was hoped that these might have provided 
material on missionary attitudes to Chinese people and the impact of mission work 
on family life.  This proved less productive than had been hoped, partly due to the 
limitations of memory or experience, and partly because the main emphasis of the 
research subsequently followed other directions.  It did, however, provide access to 
some valuable written resources such as personal correspondence and the 
unpublished memoirs of a number of missionaries.  A large number of personal 
memoirs have also been published relating to this period in China, some written very 
shortly after the events concerned and some written some thirty or more years later, 
when the authors were aware of the passage of time and anxious that their early 
experiences should not be lost to history.76 
Although much recent scholarship dealing with China’s modern history is being 
informed by access to previously inaccessible Chinese archives, material relating to 
the missionary presence may be less likely to come to light in this way.  Systematic 
destruction of such documents took place first in the early 1950s and then again 
during the Cultural Revolution, when evidence of association with the foreign 
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presence was likely to prove grounds for persecution.  Peter Nelson, one of the last 
British Baptist missionaries to leave Shandong in 1950, when interviewed in 2010 
emphasised more than once that before his departure he was urgently charged with 
destroying all the BMS records held in Jinan, including ‘much interesting material 
relating to the local workings of the mission, its missionaries, Chinese staff and 
congregations’.   
On the advice of local church leaders, we did not wish to 
leave papers which might count against them in the eyes of 
the new regime, so I also destroyed them.77  
Likewise, Gao Yan recalled the hasty preparations her family made for the visit of a 
group of Red Guards to their home in 1967.  Any papers written in English, and any 
photographs that might have associated them with foreigners, were burned, including 
her parents’ wedding photos where they were wearing Western dress.  She had been 
eight years old in 1967, but the memory was a powerful one.78 
Large quantities of private and institutional records are likely to have been lost in this 
way.  Although CCP municipal records of foreigners living within their areas are 
likely to have been preserved within Chinese local archives, without the necessary 
language skills it has not been possible to pursue this avenue of research.  Assistance 
from contacts in China has, however, provided some access to Chinese sources (see 
below), and these have made it possible to glimpse a more rounded picture.  
Many institutions founded by British missionary societies are currently reaching 
anniversaries of one hundred or more years old.  Keen to take advantage of the 
prestige associated with such early foundations, many of them have engaged in 
centenary celebrations or have published histories.  In the current ‘less heated 
political climate’79, it has become acceptable and even desirable to acknowledge the 
foreign origins of their institutions, and it is now common for Chinese researchers 
interested in the history of the missionary presence to come to Britain to access the 
archives held in British libraries.  A recent short film shown on a Shandong 
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television network described an incident which occurred while setting up an 
exhibition to celebrate the centenary of the Guangbei School (广北学校) in Zhoucun 
(周村), founded by the BMS in 1910.  A photograph was discovered of the school 
governors, taken in 1947, but no-one in Zhoucun knew the names or designation of 
anyone pictured.  By coincidence a copy of the same photo was sent from the UK as 
a contribution to the exhibition.  It had been in the private collection of a former 
BMS missionary, and, to the delight of the Zhoucun staff, the missionary had 
carefully recorded, on the back, the names and designations of everyone in the 
picture when it was taken in 1947.80 
Preparing this thesis has brought the writer very close to events in her own life.  Her 
father served with the BMS in China from 1935 to 1949.  With her family, she 
experienced at first-hand the early years of the Japanese occupation of Shandong, 
and was interned with other missionary families in Shanghai when the Western 
Allies joined the war against Japan, the period explored in Chapter Two.  Her father 
was in Shandong from 1946 to 1948, during the most bitter years of the Civil War, 
discussed in Chapter Five.  On the plus side, contacts which derive from these 
experiences have given her access to some sources not otherwise available, both in 
Britain and in China.  It has also meant, however, that it has been important to be 
vigilant in guarding against bias in reaching conclusions.  Wide and close reading in 
the BMS archive, together with careful consideration of other contemporary accounts, 
including government documents, has been essential. 
The research method employed in this study is similar to that of Lloyd Eastman, who 
compares his research strategy to ‘that of a geologist studying an earth formation’.  
Rather than merely describing the surface features, and rather 
than taking the impossible task of excavating the whole 
formation layer by layer, the geologist takes a series of core 
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samples, of the subterranean strata.  These provide sufficient 
data to form a hypothesis.81 
One hundred BMS missionaries, working in mission stations, schools, colleges and 
hospitals, in three different provinces, were engaged in diverse and multiple activities 
in China between 1937 and 1952.  It is not possible in this research to reflect all their 
different concerns, styles and attitudes.  A sampling method has therefore been 
adopted, similar to Eastman’s, with a view to putting together ‘sufficient data to 
provide a hypothesis’ relating to the research goals.  In the following chapters, 
samples are provided from the different types of missionary work, and different time 
periods, rather than attempting to reflect the whole spectrum of BMS activity during 
these years.  In Chapter Two, the focus is on the work of the Chinese church in 
Shandong between 1937 and 1942; in Chapter Three, a school in Shaanxi between 
1941 and 1945; in Chapter Four, branching into a new partnership with the Church of 
Christ in China in the outlying Border Regions in 1946 and 1947; in Chapter Five, a 
mission station in Shandong and a hospital in Shaanxi, in 1947 and 1948, and, in 
Chapter Six, aspects of the response to the CCP takeover in Shandong and Shaanxi 
between 1949 and 1952. 
The thesis works to a ‘bottom-up’ approach.  Its main focus is not on missionary 
organisations and mission policy, but on the perspective and the contributions of 
individual missionaries.  A methodological problem, therefore, lies in the 
comparative absence of genuinely private and independent commentary from or 
about missionaries, which could have thrown light on the missionaries’ personal 
views of the work in which they were engaged.  Most of the materials refer only 
obliquely to attitudes at variance with the officially approved sentiments or policies 
of the missionary society.  One way of dealing with this problem has been to include 
in the text of the thesis more direct quotations from missionary letters than would 
perhaps otherwise have been the case.  This allows readers to come closer to the 
letter-writers’ mood and attitudes than would an interpreted précis. 
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Chapter One argues that aspects of Baptist denominational organisation and belief, 
and the influence of pioneer missionaries in the China field, led the BMS to be 
committed from the outset of its work in China to putting into practice the principles 
of the three-self movement.  Funding and organising the work of the Mission, and 
the demands made on individual missionaries and their families, are also explored in 
the chapter, in order to identify issues which might support or interfere with the 
ability of the Mission and its staff to put its ideals into practice.  The concluding 
section of the chapter outlines the history of BMS activity in China and its 
composition there in 1937. 
Chapter Two sets the experience of BMS missionaries and of the Chinese church into 
the context of the war with Japan.  It explores the impact of the war and occupation 
on the capacity of members of the Shandong Baptist church to take over authority 
and responsibility from the Mission.  Analysing the correspondence between Zhang 
Sijing (张思敬), president of the Shandong Baptist Union (SBU) and 
H.R.Williamson, Foreign Secretary in London, demonstrates that the three aspects of 
devolution (self-government, self-support and self-propagation) were all undermined 
by the pressures of war, despite strenuous efforts on the part of Zhang to resist these 
pressures.  Attention is drawn to the new situation created for Chinese Christians 
when foreign nationals, including all missionary personnel, were removed from 
Shandong when Britain entered the war against Japan in 1941, and by pressures from 
the Japanese for Chinese Christians to become part of a united Pan-Asian church, 
independent of Western influence.  Some historians have argued that both these new 
situations had the effect of weaning Chinese Christians from dependence on 
missionary support, but this research suggests that Chinese Christians in the 
Shandong Baptist church found themselves more reliant on foreign staff and funds 
than they were before the outbreak of the Japanese war.82 
The chapter also considers the position of missionaries during the occupation, 
exploring the practical and ethical dilemmas which confronted them.  At different 
stages of the war, British missionaries were categorised first as third-party nationals 
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and then as enemy aliens, while at the same time taking on roles as humanitarian aid 
workers.  Maintaining positions that were simultaneously politically acceptable and 
appropriately compassionate created real difficulties.  In this context, the chapter 
explores the concept of collaboration and the position of British missionaries in 
relation to it.  While recent studies of collaboration have focussed on the fact that for 
many Chinese people the moral issues were far from straightforward, the position of 
third party nationals has not been widely explored.83  The two elements of the 
chapter are brought together by considering the impact of these very different 
experiences during the war on relationships between British missionaries and their 
Chinese colleagues, and on their understandings of each other.   
The experience of the Japanese war in unoccupied China took a different form from 
that in the occupied provinces, and this is the focus of Chapter Three.  Missionaries 
in Shaanxi were faced with the need to reconcile the conflicting claims of the 
emerging Red Army with those of the established national government.  Maintaining 
relationships with both parties proved attractive to the missionaries themselves, but 
they were prevented from pursuing this option by the Society’s policy of conforming 
strictly to British Government policy.  BMS missionaries in Shaanxi were the first 
British Baptists to experience the impact of the abrogation in 1943 of the nineteenth-
century treaties which had authorised the missionary presence in China.  
Theoretically they welcomed this development, but were unprepared for the 
vulnerability to which this exposed them.  The chapter explores what were new 
aspects of missionaries’ relationships with the civic authorities and with their 
Chinese colleagues.   
The initial sections of Chapter Four concentrate on identifying the changes brought 
about by world war in China and Britain which affected British missionaries and 
their ability to carry out their work.  At home, Britons faced material and 
psychological consequences, while, nationally, political and economic adjustments 
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were being made.  There were indications that the new social environment in China 
might be more welcoming to missionaries, but the political uncertainties made it 
difficult to make plans for future work there.  At the same time, fresh military 
manoeuvring on the part of the Communists and the Nationalists pointed to a threat 
of civil war.  The chapter brings to light the part played in policy decisions by 
personal factors, such as H.R. Williamson’s pre-war relationships with Nationalist 
leaders and with the charismatic W.B. Djang (张伯怀: Zhang Bohuai).  It is 
suggested that Williamson’s role as BMS Foreign Secretary in London was 
undermined by his absence from China during most of the pivotal years of the 
Japanese war.  The extent to which church and medical work in Shandong and 
Shanxi had been set back during the last years of the war created a tension between 
the enthusiasm of the missionaries to rebuild and their commitment to the goal of 
withdrawal. 
Chapter Five addresses particularly the issue of how well BMS missionaries and 
their British supporters were attuned to the thinking and aspirations of their Chinese 
colleagues.  The chapter focuses on the Civil War years, 1946 to 1948, when life for 
most ordinary Chinese people was precarious, and when the goal of a settled 
government and freedom from bloodshed was a primary concern.  The issues are 
explored by means of two case studies, chosen for the light they throw both on long-
standing dilemmas in the relationships between foreigners and Chinese and on 
newly-developing tensions.  The first deals with Wang Juntang (王均堂), a leading 
member of the Chinese Baptist church in Qingzhou, Shandong, with a proven record 
of loyalty to the BMS.  Comparing details of how he was seen by the foreign 
missionaries and how his activity appears in Communist records, during the most 
turbulent period of the Civil War, raises some interesting questions about how well 
the foreign missionaries really understood their Chinese colleagues, and how far 
historic records are open to re-interpretation.  The second case study centres on the 
rebuilding in 1948 of the war damaged missionary hospital in Xi’an.  It explores the 
way the decision to rebuild was reached, and how it was funded.  The gift of a 
substantial sum of money from members of a Baptist congregation in Hitchin 
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illustrates the sensitivities associated with both giving and receiving donations in the 
context of missionary work. 
The impact of the establishment of the PRC is the focus of Chapter Six.  Missionary 
accounts of these years are less comprehensive than those which deal with earlier 
periods, because missionaries feared that written information might put Chinese 
Christians at risk.  There were times, too, when they were themselves unable to 
interpret what was going on, and so could only report tentatively.  The chapter traces 
initial missionary experiences of the CCP, and efforts by both missionaries and 
Chinese Christians in Shandong and Shaanxi to work in partnership with the new 
authorities, while remaining true to their Christian purpose.  Ironically, it was 
missionaries’ alleged failures to implement the ‘three self’ principles which were 
used by the CCP to prompt attacks on missionaries by Christian supporters of the 
new regime. 
The BMS was committed, from the outset of its work in China to building an 
independent Chinese Church, led, funded and developed by Chinese Christians.  
Movement towards this goal proceeded at a different pace in the three provinces in 
which the Society had taken up work.  This thesis traces the varied experiences of 
BMS missionaries during the War of Resistance to Japan, the Second World War and 
the Civil War and concludes with an exploration of the factors which led to their 
departure from China.  It suggests that the factors of enemy occupation and civil war 
would have distorted all personal relationships and therefore makes an interpretation 
of the relationship between foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians particularly 
complex.  It is necessary to look at the period in detail and from a variety of angles to 
get beyond the generalisations of much of the literature, and this will be one of the 
principal purposes of this study. 
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Chapter One: Characteristics of the Baptist 
Missionary Society and its China Missionaries  
‘I shall never rest until I see the native church self-governing, self-
supporting and free from every kind of foreign influence which 
tends to hinder its free native natural development and 
extension.’84 
This chapter will outline the factors which shaped the way the BMS worked in 
China, and describe the Society’s position there when war broke out in 1937.  It will 
cover the goals which launched the Society; the experience and thinking of the first 
BMS pioneers; fundamental aspects of Baptist belief which governed the way the 
missionaries went about their work; the Society’s organisation, structure and 
expectations of its staff; and events in China which had an impact on the ways in 
which they were received.  All these factors had an effect on the activities and 
expectations of BMS missionaries working in China in the mid-twentieth century.  
Some preliminary comments will also be made on the background of the 
missionaries themselves and the ways in which they saw their work.  They 
demonstrate that there was a strong drive from BMS pioneers towards building an 
independent indigenous church, and that, in Shandong particularly, Chinese 
Christians responded with initiative and enthusiasm to this way of working. 
Origins, early influences and founding principles 
The primary purpose of the Baptist missionary movement was ‘the diffusion of the 
knowledge of the religion of Jesus Christ throughout the whole world beyond the 
British Isles’.85  The early pioneers were concerned that, without their personal 
endeavours, millions of men and women all over the world would die without having 
had the opportunity to hear the Christian message.  Following its formation in 1792, 
the BMS first sent missionaries to India, and then to the West Indies and Ceylon.  
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One of the founders of the Society, and its first missionary, William Carey, arrived in 
Bengal in November 1793.86  He and the single colleague who accompanied him 
were faced immediately with questions as to how to organise their work and their 
living arrangements, questions which had taken second place to theological debate 
when the Society was set up in England.  Carey decided that the ideal would be to 
create a ‘colony of seven or eight families, supporting itself by agriculture, and living 
according to a common rule’.  He hoped that ‘converted Indians would join the 
community, and be treated on the same basis as European missionaries’.87  It was a 
plan which envisaged indigenous converts and foreign missionaries living and 
working together on a completely equal basis, supporting themselves by the labours 
of their own hands.  Carey did not envisage being financed by supporters thousands 
of miles overseas.   
Viewed in retrospect, this seemingly attractive plan did not take sufficient account of 
practical realities or social and cultural differences, and, for a number of reasons, 
foundered quite quickly.  Although it has been argued that Carey’s vision ‘was never 
fulfilled in every detail’, it is still held to have exerted ‘a consistent and profound 
influence’ on the policy of the Society’s first pioneers in India.88  Just how profound 
that influence was on their work in China is illustrated later by proposals for a 
Christian Service Centre, set up in the Shandong town of Zhoucun to co-ordinate 
Christian activities after the introduction of the communist regime in 1949.89 The 
related and critical issue with regard to how the mission should be funded will be 
considered later in this chapter. 
William Ward followed Carey to Bengal in 1799.90  In 1802, he recorded in his 
personal journal the conviction that he was ‘ready to doubt whether Europeans will 
ever be extensively useful in converting souls by preaching in this country’.91  He 
believed that fundamental linguistic and cultural barriers stood between him and his 
would-be converts.  Evangelism was likely to be most effective, he considered, when 
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carried out by native evangelists rather than by foreign missionaries.  This had an 
immediate and lasting impact on BMS policy.  A pattern of work developed which 
relied on responsibility being handed over at the earliest opportunity to newly-
converted native Christians.  The concept of ‘self-propagation’ was thus early 
regarded as fundamental. 
As well as establishing the practice of depending on the efforts of indigenous 
evangelists, this belief had other consequences for mission policy.  If new Christians 
were to take a key role in evangelism, it was essential that they should be able to read 
and understand the Bible in their own language.  The efforts made by early 
missionaries to translate the Bible into local languages were remarkable: William 
Carey himself completed six entire and twenty-nine partial translations of the 
Bible.92  By 1823, another BMS missionary based in India, Joshua Marshman, 
confident that missionary work would eventually be initiated in China, had 
completed a translation of the whole Bible into Chinese.93  In due course, the Society 
made a practice of opening schools to teach children to read, and adult classes to 
introduce biblical studies.  
Another of Ward’s views influenced the development of BMS policy.  He realised 
that social habits practised in England were not necessarily considered desirable by 
people in other parts of the world.  In fact, elsewhere they might be thought impolite 
or even repulsive.  There was a limit, Ward thought, to how much ‘any Englishman 
could distance himself from “those parts of English manners” which were naturally 
offensive to an Indian audience’ (although he does not identify specific examples).  
He made it clear that it was not the job of the missionary to change personal habits, 
or other practices which could be regarded as ‘the innocent usages of mankind’.94  
The essential Christian message, he declared, was not about manners, personal habits 
or lifestyle, and it was not the business of the missionary to intervene in such matters. 
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Two eminent scholars of the missionary movement in China, Brian Stanley and 
Daniel Bays, have both expressed the view that the great majority of Western 
missionaries believed, whether consciously or unconsciously, that the gospel and 
civilisation were necessarily linked: that, with Christianity, they took to Africa and 
Asia the trappings of the West – Western values and culture, Western organisational 
structures, Western forms of worship, and Westernised church buildings.  Stanley 
considers that ‘with very few exceptions, British Christians accepted that non-
Christian societies stood in need of comprehensive regeneration’.95  Bays, like 
Stanley, allows for rare exceptions, but maintained that the ‘Protestant mission 
community’ throughout the nineteenth century was united in its conviction ‘that 
China needed not only Christ, but the norms of Western culture as well.’96  As 
discussed later in this chapter, William Ward’s realisation that this was not only 
undesirable but positively harmful was strongly echoed in the thinking of the first 
British Baptists working in China. 
Missionary interest in China was widely stimulated following the treaties which 
concluded the two opium wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60.  Under the provisions of the 
first of these, British subjects were allowed to live and trade in a number of Chinese 
ports and, under the second series of treaties, foreigners were allowed to travel 
inland, and to preach Christianity throughout the Chinese Empire. The treaties 
guaranteed official protection to foreign missionaries and to Chinese Christians.  The 
BMS was one of thirty missionary societies to take advantage of the new 
opportunity, and from 1860 to 1905 missions in China experienced a period of 
outstanding growth.  By 1905 there were 3,445 Protestant missionaries, including 
wives and 300 medical specialists, in China.97   
The same treaties which legalised the trade in opium, and were the result of 
aggressive military action and a humiliating Chinese defeat, were also the ones 
which opened the door for the spread of Christianity.  Some Christians in Britain 
strongly disapproved of the opium trade and had been unhappy about taking 
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advantage of the treaties.  Their scruples were over-ridden by the conviction of a 
majority of British church-goers that this was a God-given opportunity to preach the 
gospel in China. The membership of the Baptist denomination was generally in 
support of this view.  The BMS General Committee, meeting on 20 April 1859, 
referred to ‘the great providential fact’ that China was now ‘open to the instruction of 
the gospel’, and that this constituted ‘an urgent call upon the churches of Christ to 
send missionaries to that great country’.98  ‘It is the prerogative of God,’ wrote Dr 
Edward Steane in the Baptist Magazine:  
out of evils which nations inflict upon another, to bring forth 
their greater good. […]  In the present instance, the issue to 
which events have led exhibits unmistakable evidence of His 
over-ruling hand, nor less clearly indicates His will.99  
From the very beginning, therefore, a connection was firmly cemented in the minds 
of many Chinese people between Christianity, foreign aggression and the opium 
trade.  Later some missionaries reported ‘occasions when they attempted to preach 
only to be shouted down by cries of “Who brought opium to China?” ’100  This was a 
difficult beginning which had far-reaching implications for the future of foreign 
missions in China.   
Between 1840 and 1870, and at much the same time as missionaries were first 
beginning to enter China, Henry Venn of the Church Missionary Society, and Rufus 
Anderson, Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 
were developing the concept of ‘three-self’ churches on the mission field: churches 
which were self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating.101  As Williams 
points out, the earliest proponents of the ideas were members of the BMS mission in 
Serampore102 and the principles were adopted with enthusiasm by Rev. Richard 
Laughton, one of the first BMS missionaries to China.  In a letter home in 1869 
Laughton wrote:  
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I shall never rest until I see the native church self-governing, 
self-supporting and free from every kind of foreign influence 
which tends to hinder its free native natural development and 
extension.103 
Laughton had established an ideal for Baptist work in China, which aimed to be 
consistent with local cultural norms, and in keeping with indigenous styles of 
expression.  Realisation of the ideal in practice was a continuing challenge. 
All Baptist missionaries, and all those responsible for leading the BMS in Britain, 
were expected to be members of the Baptist denomination, admitted to membership 
by profession of faith and through the practice of believers’ baptism. Two 
fundamental Baptist principles had a direct bearing on the thinking of individual 
missionaries and on the nature of the church that the BMS established overseas.  The 
first of these principles is that there is no hierarchy of membership within the 
denomination: 
The Church is one Body in Christ, and all its members 
occupy the same relation to Him, whatever their special gift 
or office. […] There are no priests as distinct from people; all 
alike, in fact, are priests.104 
The principle extended to all baptised believers, whether members of the missionary 
society or of the native Christian church.  Andrew Fuller, the first secretary of the 
BMS, set the tone for the Mission when he wrote, ‘We do not consider ourselves as 
legislators for our brethren; but merely as co-workers with them.’105  While the 
Society consisted on the home front of a variety of organisers and committees, and, 
on the mission field, of missionaries with administrative responsibilities or long 
years of experience, and of newly converted Chinese Christians, in the eyes of the 
Baptist membership the contribution of all was equally valid and equally valuable.  
The second, closely related, principle is that of freedom of belief.  In his history of 
the Free Churches, Herbert Skeats wrote:  
It is the singular and distinguished honour of the Baptists to 
have repudiated from their earliest history, all coercive power 
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over the consciences and the actions of men with reference to 
religion.106 
The principle was reiterated in the declaration of the Baptist World Congress held at 
Atlanta, Georgia, in 1939:  ‘In continuance of our consistent Baptist practice, we are 
imperatively constrained to insist upon the full maintenance of absolute religious 
liberty for every man of every faith and no faith’.107  The responsibility of the 
missionary was to make the Christian message known to those who had not heard it, 
or, in the words of the Society’s Manual ‘the diffusion of the knowledge of the 
religion of Jesus Christ’.108  Having made every effort to do so, however, it was not 
the duty of the missionary to cajole or exert pressure on those who did not choose to 
accept it.  On the contrary, missionaries should accept the views of those who, 
having understood the options, elected to live with no religious faith.  This is a 
principle which played itself out in the way BMS missionaries related to members of 
the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and CCP in their early encounters with them in 
the 1940s.109   
Difficult decisions on matters of conscience confronted every individual missionary 
working in China in the mid-twentieth century.  These involved not just questions 
about the freedom of the Chinese people to choose or reject Christianity, but also 
questions about the missionaries’ own freedom of action.  In Lord Acton’s opinion, 
liberty meant ‘that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty 
against the influence of authority, and majorities, custom, and opinion’.110  For 
missionaries, these matters of conscience included whether to continue working 
under Japanese occupation in 1937; how to respond to the national call-up to military 
service in Europe in 1939; and whether to remain in China working under the 
Communist government after 1949.  Besides such general questions, individual 
missionaries were frequently called upon to exercise their consciences in resolving 
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matters of a personal nature, including particularly how to balance the needs of their 
families against the needs of the Missionary Society.  Meanwhile, members of the 
London-based BMS Home Committees had to find an appropriate line to tread 
between allowing for freedom of conscience and exercising proper managerial 
control of the staff they were employing to work overseas.  
Baptist beliefs about church organisation and church government were also 
important factors in determining the nature of church governance in newly 
established churches in China.  Baptists believe that every local church has the right 
to be self-governing, answerable to no authority but Jesus Christ.  There is therefore 
no formal centralised linking of congregations.  From the first, the gathered 
congregations of Christian converts overseas were expected to be independent and to 
take responsibility for their own affairs, accountable neither to individual 
missionaries nor to the BMS, and this belief lent itself well to the development of 
self-governed churches on the mission field.111  The principle of self-government 
was thus fundamental to churches founded by the BMS in the 1880s.  By 1910, the 
Shandong Baptist Union (SBU), a union of Chinese Baptist congregations within 
Shandong province, was ‘in full operation’, administratively independent of the 
missionary society.112  
Organisational structure, terms of service and 
funding 
The BMS was separate from the Baptist Unions of England, Scotland and Wales.  It 
consisted of a central organisation with a secretariat and network of committees in 
London, a body of missionaries working overseas for whom it was responsible, and 
supporters from amongst the churches or the individual church members who were 
committed to missionary work.  All regular subscribers to the BMS theoretically had 
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both authority and opportunity to contribute to its policy formation and decision-
making by means of the week-long Annual General Meeting, when the Annual 
Report, including the statement of accounts, was made public.  In practice, from the 
late nineteenth century these events chiefly provided opportunities for enthusiastic 
members of the denomination ‘to socialise and engage publicly in conspicuous 
religious activity’.113  Nevertheless the fact that the central organisation and the 
missionaries themselves were accountable to a substantial body of individual 
members had a continuing influence on policy formation and on the decisions of 
missionaries. 
The permanent staff at the Mission headquarters in London undertook the essential 
work of planning and organisation, acting under the authority of a hierarchy of 
committees.  Three members of staff oversaw the work in China during the years 
covered by this research: the Women’s Secretary, Eleanor Bowser (from 1925), the 
Medical Secretary, Clement Chesterman (from 1936) and the Foreign Secretary, 
(from 1939), Raymond (H.R.) Williamson.  Two had first-hand experience of 
working as missionaries overseas, Williamson in China, from 1908 to 1939, and 
Chesterman, a qualified doctor, in Congo from 1920 to 1936.  Ellen Clow and Victor 
Hayward, both with experience of working in China, succeeded Williamson as 
Foreign Secretary from 1948 and 1951 respectively.  As can be conjectured, the 
division of responsibility between the three staff members with particular 
responsibility for China was not always straightforward.   
The BMS General Committee had overall responsibility for work in all the countries 
where the Society was active: in 1937, India and Ceylon, the West Indies, China, and 
Congo.  All matters involving China also came before the China Sub-Committee, but 
might additionally have to be considered by the Finance Committee, Women’s 
Committee, the General Purposes Sub-Committee, the Staffing Sub-Committee, the 
Medical Sub-Committee, or any of a number of special Sub-Committees convened to 
consider particular issues.  The Committees were made up of ministers or retired 
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missionaries, and members of the denomination with a particular interest in 
missionary work.  Membership of most of the Committees was very large, and it was 
not uncommon for thirty-five or more members to be present at the quarterly 
meetings of the China Sub-Committee. 
Each Committee and Sub-Committee generated voluminous Minute Books in which 
all official decisions were recorded, carefully but ‘in brief, factual language sheared 
of most illuminating explanatory detail’.114  Not only were the records brief but, as 
Steven Maughan observed, ‘differences of opinion and scandals in committee were 
generally disguised and concealed as much as possible’, lest any publicly aired 
conflict should undermine the Society’s basis of community support. Within the 
denomination it was expected that those who were involved in the missionary 
movement were Christian colleagues who would behave with tolerance and 
generosity towards each other.  This expectation is neatly if not entirely realistically 
encapsulated in one comment by a member of the committee set up to review 
working relationships between the committees:  
The Society is a living fellowship, delicately constructed, 
with traditions and habits of working slowly formed and not 
easily answered… [O]ur task was not so much the drawing of 
the neat blue-print of an efficient machine, as the suggesting 
of ways in which a group of friends may happily and 
effectively discharge their common tasks.115   
The correspondence between the Mission Secretaries at home and missionaries on 
the field tends at first sight to confirm this impression of  ‘a group of friends’ 
discharging common tasks.  There are a good many expressions indicating warmth 
and personal familiarity on the part of the letter-writers.  During the years when 
Eleanor Bowser was Women’s Secretary, the correspondence between her and the 
single women who became missionaries, or were preparing for marriage to a 
missionary, contains expressions which today would be considered excessively 
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affectionate, and inadvisable.116  She habitually addressed them as ‘dearest’ and 
signed off ‘with love and best wishes, yours affectionately’.117 
In practice, the warm tone of the letters did not detract from the fact that staff in the 
Mission House exercised a formidable degree of control over the lives of 
missionaries in the field.  Edward Phillips went out to China in 1924, anticipating 
that his fiancée would follow him there.   When the time came for their marriage, the 
BMS China secretary had other ideas.  
It is not practicable to send your bride to China, you should 
arrange to meet her in Ceylon, […] your marriage should take 
place […] at Colombo […] and, as your “honeymoon” you 
should proceed to temporary service in Bengal.118 
The daughter of another China missionary recalled that when her father proposed 
marriage, her mother, already an employee of the BMS in her own right, responded 
at once by asking, ‘What would Miss Bowser say?’.  She was half-joking, but was 
aware that the approval of the Women’s Secretary at the Mission House was a sine 
qua non.119  At other times, the genial tone of the correspondence did little to conceal 
a hard-hitting message.  One woman at home in England wrote to the London-based 
China secretary to ask that her missionary husband might be given leave to return 
from China, during the anxious days shortly after the Communist take-over.  She 
received a flinty response:  
I do feel very sincere sympathy with all China missionaries 
today, but, as you are fully aware there are a number of 
missionaries [sic] wives who have been managing without 
their husbands and perhaps I may say that no real harm has 
befallen them!!120 
Emily Manktelow’s study of missionary families traces the ad hoc way the London 
Missionary Society (LMS) was forced to develop policies to meet the personal needs 
of missionaries and their families.121  By her careful analysis of the records and 
correspondence of the Society’s early work in the South Seas and South African 
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Missions, Manktelow uncovers a long-drawn-out process of protest and plea from 
the families, and painful experimentation by the Mission, which together transformed 
the administrative practice and organisational goals of the Society.  By the mid-
nineteenth century, the LMS had become ‘a professional institution’, providing for 
the welfare of missionary families ‘including financial security in the face of death, 
investment in the future careers of missionary children, and ultimately expensive 
“homeland” education.’122   
The BMS, like the LMS, found itself obliged to put arrangements in place to cater for 
many of the practical needs of missionaries and their families.  Every missionary was 
issued on appointment with The Manual of the Baptist Missionary Society for India, 
Ceylon, China, Congo and the West Indies, with the requirement that he or she 
‘accept and abide by these regulations’.123  The Manual contained very detailed 
information about missionaries’ salaries, allowances, furloughs and pensions, as well 
as regulations about language-learning requirements, when and under what 
circumstances missionaries might marry, what they must do with any additional 
earnings and where they should make their homes.  
By comparison with the salaries of other professionally qualified Britons, BMS 
salaries were remarkably low.  Before the Second World War, an annual income of 
‘£250 was commonly regarded as the social dividing line marking off the working 
classes from the rest of society’.124  Average annual earnings for male GPs in Britain 
during 1935-37 were £1094, and for male clergy £370.125  In 1939, BMS annual 
salaries for single men and women working in China, irrespective of professional 
qualifications, were £120 for the first three years, £140 for the next seventeen years 
and £160 thereafter. Married men were paid £240 for the first three years, £270 for 
the next seven and £300 thereafter.  Additional payments of between £30 and £65 per 
year were payable for each child, depending on age.  Missionaries were required by 
the regulations to remit to the BMS any earnings over and above their salaries (for 
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example for professional work done in their own time overseas, or as locums while 
on furlough).126  These figures demonstrate that those opting for missionary service, 
especially those with professional qualifications, were unlikely to have been attracted 
by monetary gain.127 
The figures also present a new angle on the difficult question of pay for local staff 
working for the Society.  It was often the case that Chinese doctors, teachers and 
pastors left jobs with the BMS because they could earn more working for non-
mission organisations.  In June 1946, Handley Stockley wrote to the Mission House 
asking how he should respond to a Chinese doctor in Taiyuan who had formerly 
worked for the BMS but said he could not afford to return.128  He would only return, 
he said, if, after working for one year in Taiyuan, he could be sent to England for one 
year of post-graduate work at BMS expense, while his family remained in China, 
housed and cared for at BMS expense.  ‘On return, he would definitely like to come 
back to the BMS.’   Writing, eventually, in October, Dr Chesterman commented: 
If you and Nellie both consider him as indispensable we must 
engage him and get a supplementary estimate on the budget 
for Chinese staff replacing European staff, as we do for India.  
I should be willing to support a claim for salary and 
allowances which will not be more than what you yourself 
are drawing.  Beyond that I feel we ought not to go… though 
we have actually given way in the case of some Indian 
women doctors who are getting more than our single lady 
mish [sic] doctors.129 
BMS staff accepted sacrificial working conditions, but this could be seen to imply 
that indigenous professional staff were expected to accept a comparable loss of 
income and status. 
The BMS expected that each missionary would serve abroad for seven years before 
becoming eligible for one year’s furlough.  The long periods between furloughs had 
other implications for family life.  Missionaries in their fifties or sixties had to take 
into consideration the well-being of their parents and other older family members.  It 
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was one thing to leave home in one’s twenties or thirties with the blessing of parents 
still active and fit in their middle years, but another thing to commit to several years 
abroad knowing that those same parents were becoming frail and in need of care and 
of the companionship of family members.  In the event of a sudden death or other 
emergency in the family, it was impossible to organise a speedy return home.  
Travelling from a mission station in inland China could take days or weeks to reach 
the coast, and the sea journey from Shanghai would take another six or seven weeks. 
In country areas there were very limited opportunities for educating the children of 
missionaries, and making arrangements for schooling was a serious consideration for 
missionaries with young children.  In the first half of the twentieth century, many 
Baptist missionaries sent their children from the age of six to the China Inland 
Mission boarding school in Chefoo (芝罘; Yantai) for their early schooling, and then 
transferred them for their later school years to one of the boarding schools in 
England which catered specially for the children of missionaries.  There was no 
prospect for the children of missionaries to be reunited with their parents during 
school holidays, and the children spent their holidays with guardians, with whom 
they sometimes had little in common.130  
Accommodation on the field was provided by the Society, and an additional annual 
rent allowance of £75 was payable during furloughs when missionaries had to find 
their own accommodation in England.  Missionaries’ wives remaining in England 
while their husbands were abroad were paid a ‘special rent allowance’ of £25, ‘for a 
period not exceeding a year’.131  The time limit on the payment of this additional rent 
allowance reflected the importance the Society attached to their ‘policy that wives 
should cooperate with their husbands throughout their service on the field.  Only in 
exceptional circumstances will permission be given for them to remain in this 
country.’132 
Just as Baptist missionaries were kept on a tight rein financially, so arrangements for 
the direction of work on the mission field were firmly controlled from London.  The 
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BMS was not alone in operating in this way, as an editorial in the Chinese Recorder 
of January 1927 suggests: 
If the mission boards would transfer nine tenth of the details 
of administration of mission affairs to the mission fields it 
would make mightily for the strengthening of missionary 
morale.133   
The BMS arranged for Field Secretaries to be appointed by the Home Committee, as 
‘the direct and legal representatives on the foreign field of the Home Committee’, 
with responsibility for reporting to the Home Committee on all mission activity in 
their area and for ensuring that the decisions of the Home Committee were 
implemented.  They were only empowered to act on their own initiative ‘in cases of 
emergency calling for immediate action’, and to sanction expenditure up to £100, 
before duly reporting any such action to the Home Committee.134  In China each 
province had its own Field Secretary, and in addition an Inter-Provincial Secretary, 
all appointed by the Home Committee, where possible on the nomination of the 
Inter-Provincial Conference, a gathering of representatives of the whole missionary 
body.135   
As the independence and influence of the Chinese church members developed, 
particularly in Shandong, under the leadership of the able and charismatic Zhang 
Sijing, it became necessary to make decisions about representation of Chinese 
Christians on missionary committees.  The General Committee considered the matter 
in February 1934 and resolved that ‘the Interprovincial Council be retained and 
regarded as the representative of the Home Committee to deal with all matters 
connected with the Chinese Church, but that, as occasion requires, it should be 
empowered to invite Chinese representatives for consultation on important matters of 
policy’.  Provincial Executives, however, dealing with the detailed administration of 
‘the portion of the Allocation [of funds’ devoted to evangelistic, educational or 
medical work’ should include Chinese members.136  It is not always clear from the 
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records of these meetings who had been present at each meeting, and therefore how 
strongly the voice of Chinese church members had been heard. 
The dividing line between the responsibilities of London and the field was not 
always clear.  The Manual specified that ‘the Home Committee desires to leave the 
administration on the fields largely under the control of the Conferences or Church 
Councils’, who were empowered to act executively ‘in all matters in which 
autonomy has been given by the Home Committee’, and to send recommendations to 
the Home Committee ‘in all matters in which control must be left with London’. 
Power to decide on the location of each missionary within China rested with the 
Home Committee, but only after careful consideration of ‘any recommendation of 
Field Conference or Church Councils’.137  Tensions quite often arose concerning the 
placement of missionaries within China, when staff in one province thought that 
another province was being favoured with regard to much needed additional or 
specially qualified missionaries. For example, in late 1946, Handley Stockley wrote 
indignantly to the Medical Secretary in London, complaining that the Xi’an 
hospital’s needs for medical reinforcements were not being met:  
I must say the way you give Chee-Loo [Qilu] precedence 
over every other place whatever their needs makes me ‘fed- 
up’ [...] It looks as though Sian [Xi’an], in spite of all its 
work has no real standing except to take the ‘left-overs’ when 
Cheeloo’s voracious appetite is satisfied.  Cheeloo is not 
doing at the moment a fifth of the work of Sian.138   
These arrangements ensured that executive power over the work of missionaries 
remained firmly in the hands of the London Committees and the senior staff based 
there.  They reflected the Society’s desire to present a united front and consistent 
message in its work overseas, and also its need to keep reins on the budget.  The 
regulations required close communication between London and China, and 
willingness on the part of the missionaries on the field to abide by the decisions of 
others who might have no experience of life as a missionary and limited knowledge 
of what was happening in China.  During the 1940s, when communications were 
severely restricted, it was not always possible to comply with these expectations.  
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More fundamentally, in the context of increased expectations regarding joint work 
with Chinese church leaders, and devolution of responsibility to the Chinese church, 
they could become cumbersome.  This can be seen in the attempts by Zhang Sijing, 
leader of the SBU, to maintain contact with staff in London during the early years of 
the war with Japan.139 
The eighteenth-century founders of the BMS had made it a principle that 
missionaries working abroad would not have direct personal responsibility for raising 
the funds necessary to support their work. Within Baptist churches in Britain 
‘corresponding societies’, later known as ‘assistant societies’, were formed to raise 
money to support the work overseas.140  This was in contrast to the North American 
‘faith missions’, which grew up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
financed on the basis of ‘personal support’, that is through the pledged support of the 
individual missionary’s network of friends and sympathetic churches.141  It was also 
a different, arguably more worldly, approach than that of the China Inland Mission 
which held, as two of its founding five ‘faith principles’, ‘no solicitation of funds or 
missionaries’ and ‘faith in God alone to supply one’s needs’.142 
Occasionally the BMS benefitted from substantial legacies, such as the significant 
sum of more than £466,926 from the estate of Robert Arthington in 1910.143  From 
time to time the Society also held special fund-raising drives: the Ter-Jubilee Fund, 
launched in spring 1942 stood at £157,677 by the end of 1943.144  Always, however, 
the modest everyday contributions of individual church members were the bedrock 
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of the Society’s funding, and these were diligently solicited, through national 
publicity and through local appeals.  In the mid-nineteenth century, missionary 
societies ‘stumbled upon an enormously effective rhetorical tool, the missionary box, 
placed in individual households.’145  ‘Every household I visited in Burnley in the 
1940s and 1950s had its missionary box’, commented one informant.146 
Such personalised and often sacrificial giving by individual supporters created a 
sense of obligation, even guilt, on the part of some missionaries, and of ownership on 
the part of some donors.  Concern about prodigal spending of BMS resources is a 
thread which runs through the correspondence of most of the missionaries working in 
China in the 1940s.  This was hardly surprising, given that some of those who had 
donated money kept a careful, occasionally jealous, eye on the way it was spent. 
When Bill Upchurch left China in December 1951, he purchased a tax-free Morris 
Minor in Hong Kong on his way home.  At the time, only two members in his home 
congregation in Hitchin were able to afford car ownership.  ‘We heard people 
express amazement that a missionary could even afford [a car]; was he not supported 
by our pennies?’147   
By the mid 1920s, depression and unemployment in Britain meant that the BMS was 
having serious difficulty raising the funds necessary to resource its greatly increased 
expenditure.  This was not primarily because of declining church membership, which 
was at a twentieth-century peak in the late 1920s, though nonconformist membership 
reached its peak in 1906.148  Rather it was the result of the huge growth in its 
missionary numbers, which had risen from 311 in 1900 to 515 in 1921, and by the 
increase in institutional work that had taken place, mainly as a consequence of the 
Arthington bequest.149  A deficit of £23,000 was recorded for the financial year 
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1924-25, and by the following year this had increased to £34,565, over £1,800,000 in 
present day money.150  For a relatively small and modestly resourced organisation, 
such sums were alarming.  Commissions of enquiry were set up in 1924 and 1925, as 
a result of which plans were put in place for increasing income and reducing 
expenditure.   
These plans included simplifying the Committee structure, reducing missionary 
numbers and making cuts in overseas expenditure.  The cuts were to be achieved by 
withdrawing missionaries from some mission stations, mostly in India, reducing 
missionary allowances by 5% and putting more responsibility for costs on to 
indigenous Christian communities.  It was also agreed that in future BMS hospitals 
would be expected to raise at least 80% of their running costs locally.151  
Implementing plans to reduce missionary allowances, depend more on money raised 
by overseas Christians, and attempt to raise money by charging for hospital services, 
all gave rise to practical difficulties as well as raising matters of principle.  
Recommendations for reducing missionary allowances carried a strong risk that 
missionaries would be driven by practical necessity to abandon missionary service.  
As has already been observed, Baptist missionary salaries were low, compared to 
those of professionals in similar jobs at home, and there is evidence that many 
missionaries in China during the 1940s found it impossible to provide even at a 
minimal level for the needs of their families without having to rely on family and 
friends for help.152  
Putting more responsibility on to indigenous Christians raised fundamental questions 
about the whole structure of Mission finances.  How should decisions be made about 
what part indigenous church members should play in supporting evangelical and 
welfare work being undertaken in their communities?  To what extent should 
responsibility for control of any given activity be dependent on who held the purse 
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strings?  Should salaries for indigenous workers employed by the BMS be on the 
same scale as for the foreign staff?  Or if not on the same scale as foreign staff, at a 
rate comparable to the amount they would receive if working at the same job in a 
secular organisation?  Was it appropriate to charge fees to those using medical and 
educational services provided by the mission or the local church?  And in doing so 
should there be any differentiation between Christian and non-Christian service 
users?  
This subject exercised missionary organisations from their earliest days, and 
reappeared frequently in the pages of The Chinese Recorder.  An editorial in 1928 
declared, ‘the relation of western money to Christian work in China is one of the 
most difficult problems facing Christians in China’.153  It then set out a number of 
possible solutions, all of them problematic: only using ‘western money’ for the 
support of missionaries, rather than also for supporting Chinese church workers; 
turning over all the Christian institutional work in schools and hospitals to the 
Chinese church, and using missionaries for evangelical work only; or using western 
money exclusively for the development of institutional work and no longer providing 
western financial aid to the Chinese churches.  In a subsequent issue, the virtues of 
limiting support were discussed with passion in an article quoting from a National 
Christian Council (NCC) pamphlet by H.C..Chang: 
The missions, since they came to China, have out of the 
benevolence of their hearts made a gift to the church of two 
great stones – and crushed the tender sprouts of initiative and 
independence of our country church.  These stones were the 
free gift of leaders and the free gift of funds.  If we still have 
hopes that the first sprouts of initiative and independence will 
somehow grow out around these great stones, - it’s a difficult 
thing to expect!154 
Many people believed that financial issues presented the main obstacle to the 
churches achieving independence.  The report of Commission II on ‘The Church in 
the Mission Field’ at the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910 
asserted optimistically that the church overseas, founded by missionaries, ‘is now 
                                                
153 The Chinese Recorder, Vol.LIX.(6), June 1928, 335-338. 
154 Lewis F. Havermale, “Western Money and the Chinese Church”, in Chinese Recorder, Vol.LIX, 
July 1928, 427, citing H.C. Chang, “The Rural Church of China Today”, NCC pamphlet, 24. 
 
 58 
both fitted and willing […] to take upon itself its full burden of responsibility and 
service’.155  The claim ignored the importance of wider questions about funding.  
One delegate, Herbert Anderson, BMS India secretary, suggested that the goal of 
self-government was already in place in Baptist churches in India, since ‘in 
accordance with Baptist ecclesiological principle, the society possessed “no 
authority” over local churches’. In his discussion of the conference, Brian Stanley 
observes that at that time all 500-600 Indian evangelists and other staff were paid by 
the London committee, and Anderson’s claim ‘disguised the extraordinary influence 
which the power of the purse still exercised’.156   
Many missionaries undoubtedly remained unaware of the impact of this interplay 
between cash and power.  In his retrospective review of how the missions functioned, 
Victor Hayward describes how this power could be exerted, even in seemingly 
unobtrusive ways: 
One missionary could sit silent at the back of a room while 
his Chinese colleagues debated a matter.  He congratulated 
himself on his self-restraint, and on not even participating (as 
he thought) in the discussion.  Yet all the time, with an innate 
sensitivity to personal relationships and unspoken factors, the 
Chinese were not only aware of his presence, but of his 
unexpressed attitudes.  They deemed it advisable that the 
outcome of the discussion should please those who, after all, 
were going to provide the finances.157   
Such subtle influences need to be taken into account when seeking to reconstruct the 
decision-making processes behind both the Chinese Church’s desire for 
independence, and the BMS’s commitment to ‘surrendering the task’. 
Profile of BMS China Missionaries, July 1937 
In August 1937, 101 missionaries were designated ‘China staff’ by the BMS.158  Six 
had already completed more than thirty years’ service with the Mission, and a further 
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seven had been in post since before 1910.  Twenty had been appointed within the 
previous five years.159  The majority had come to China during the 1920s.  Nine of 
the missionaries had themselves been born in China of missionary parents.160  One 
was a member of the third generation of his family to serve with the BMS in China, 
his grandfather having first gone to China with the China Inland Mission in 1876, 
transferring to work with the BMS in 1883, and remaining in China until his death in 
1937.  His father, a doctor like himself, had died of typhus in 1916, but his mother 
had continued her appointment as a missionary in her own right after his father’s 
death, and was still on active mission service in 1937.  Almost all the missionaries 
described themselves as having been brought up in Christian homes.  
‘In ordinary missionary life, there isn’t much place for brilliance’, wrote Joan 
Williamson in a private letter to Eleanor Bowser, in typically self-deprecating 
fashion: 
We are mostly oxen or cows and we plod along a given way, 
goaded by Hell behind and coaxed by Heaven before. […]  
We are, to use an exaggeration, sows’ ears, most, if not all of 
us; brought up in ordinary Baptist churches; […] and with all 
the faults, virtues and glories of little people.  Therefore we 
make good missionaries.  Set us down in a foreign land and 
we will remain there, year in year out, plodding away at what 
we fondly hope is the Kingdom. […]  Well, it may be, but 
again it may be that we are not quite on the right lines – but 
you mustn’t tell us, […] we have to find it out in blood and 
tears.161 
This was not strictly true.  Thirty-one of the ‘ministerial staff’ were university 
educated and ordained, working primarily in evangelism, pastoral care and church 
organisation.  Of the others, fourteen were qualified teachers, fifteen were nurses, 
fourteen were doctors, and nine had other professional qualifications, including 
pharmacy, business management, banking and accountancy. Among the graduates 
was one with a first class degree in mathematics and astronomy from Cambridge, 
and another who had qualified simultaneously in classics and medicine at 
Cambridge.  This contrasts with the situation fifty years earlier, where missionaries 
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were described as ‘commonplace persons, not very well-educated, not quite 
gentlemen’; ‘with not much learning and still less knowledge of mankind’.162 
There were, however, some who had had to return to education to acquire, often 
painfully, the educational requirements to qualify for missionary service.  Once in 
China, they found themselves amongst colleagues from different educational and 
social backgrounds and operating in a social context very different from that which 
they had experienced in Britain.  Consequently, some experienced the same 
uncertainties encountered by Maurice Tinkler, the son of a Manchester ironmonger, 
who joined the Shanghai Municipal Police in 1919. Bickers describes Tinkler’s 
ambiguous place in Shanghai society:  
These men are more marginal than we might think […] The 
police […] were treated as servants, but at the same time they 
found themselves issued with servants.  They were treated as 
inferior and condescended to, but at the same time found 
themselves hectored and lectured about their superiority as 
Britons and as ‘white’ men to the Asians in the force and the 
city.’163   
It is not wildly speculative to suggest that missionary relationships in China, both 
with their missionary and their Chinese colleagues, were affected by unsettling shifts 
in their perceptions of their status in society.  Nevertheless, Williamson’s observation 
reflects the common sense of dogged commitment of her colleagues to the church 
and to their work in China, which was to be so necessary during the uncertain and 
difficult years between 1937 and 1952. 
As nonconformists and members of a small denomination, Baptists were accustomed 
to being placed on the margins of society.  In 1939, the combined membership of the 
Baptist Unions of England, Scotland and Wales was a little over 380,000, as 
compared with more than 3,700,000 Anglicans, 1,500,000 Presbyterians and 800,000 
Methodists.164  The comparison between Baptists and Anglicans and Presbyterians is 
somewhat misleading, since the Church of England and Church of Scotland do not 
have a concept of church membership of the same kind as the nonconformists.  
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Nevertheless, members of the Baptist Church were apt to be regarded as somehow 
outside societal norms, as the name nonconformist implied.  Ordained Baptist 
ministers numbered fewer than two thousand.165  There were only five recognised 
Baptist institutions specifically designed for training prospective ministers and 
missionaries, many of whom followed their parents into the ministry or missionary 
service.  People tended to know each other, or to know of each other.  A majority of 
the children of missionaries at one time or another attended one of the two boarding 
schools founded for their benefit, Eltham College for boys and Walthamstow Hall for 
girls.  Friendships – or enmities – formed in the claustrophobic atmosphere of a small 
boarding school tended to last for life. 
It was not until after 1854 that nonconformists were permitted to matriculate and 
graduate from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge.  The social dominance of 
the Church of England continued to play a part in community attitudes and 
expectations well into the twentieth century.  A school friend refers to this in his 
account of the Worcester boyhood early in the century of Harry Wyatt, who worked 
as a doctor with the BMS in Shanxi province: 
Educated as we were in a cathedral city, the fact of our 
nonconformity was, in those days, brought home to us both 
by schoolmasters and boys in a way which would probably 
be unheard of now.  Harry cheerfully bore the double burden 
of being not only the son of a parson, but of a Baptist 
minister at that.166 
Baptists tended to be unafraid, where necessary, of standing out from the crowd, or 
of being penalised for their beliefs.  When the 1902 Education Act integrated 
denominational schools into the state system, forty-eight Baptists were amongst more 
than 170 nonconformists who had gone to prison for refusing to pay school taxes, 
which they believed went towards the provision of a form of religious education in 
schools with which they were not in agreement.167  Such capacity to think and act 
independently fitted them well for situations on the mission field where difficult 
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ethical issues needed to be addressed, or where they might find themselves 
endangered by their beliefs. 
The development of BMS work in China 
Was Richard Laughton’s early goal to build an independent self-supporting Chinese 
church fulfilled in the way the BMS developed its work in Shandong, the province in 
which the Society first took up work in China?  Laughton was followed in the 
province by two enormously influential pioneers, Timothy Richard (known to the 
Chinese as Li Ti-mo-tai李提摩太), who arrived in China in 1869, and Alfred G. 
Jones (Zhong Jun’an仲鈞安),who joined him in 1876. Although Richard has 
become much more widely known outside the Baptist denomination, Jones’s 
influence on the nature of the Shandong Baptist church was pivotal.  A colleague, 
who worked with them both, wrote of Jones that he was:  
every whit as great a missionary [as Richard …], always 
looked up to by the Chinese and his colleagues as the 
uncrowned king of the mission, to whom they turned in every 
crisis for help and counsel.  The organisation of the Chinese 
church in Shandong owes more to A.G..Jones than to any 
other man.168 
Jones was killed in 1905 in a landslide caused by a cloudburst on the sacred 
mountain of Tai Shan (泰山), where he went periodically for relaxation and study.  
His premature death at the age of 59 was considered a great loss to the BMS.169   
In an important and influential document published in 1883, Jones described China 
as ‘an ancient, highly civilised Empire, with a vast literature, and most complex 
social constitution’, and set down the principles which he believed should govern the 
work of the BMS in the country.170  He set out his model for relationships between 
missionaries and Chinese, the place of the Christian church within Chinese society, 
and the stance he believed missionaries should adopt in relation to political issues.  
He also described the attitudes due to local institutions and traditions, and the 
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difference between the essential Christian message and aspects of local culture.  A 
personal incident illustrates his sensitivity on the importance of observing local 
traditions.  He was greatly distressed when, shortly before his marriage in 1881 his 
prospective parents-in-law made it a condition of the marriage that he should wear 
his hair ‘in European style, and dress foreignly [sic] at the ports’.171  This meant 
cutting his ‘queue’ which he thought would make him become ‘an insult to the 
Chinese’.  ‘I actually felt I would have to go back to England for change so low did I 
feel; but I couldn’t do that.’   
It was his view that missionaries should encourage outward expressions of 
Christianity which were consistent with Chinese styles, buildings and language, and 
should enable Chinese Christians to take ownership of the church and its 
organisation.   
We abstain from denationalising our converts.  We have 
abstained from constraining our converts to support the 
institutions […] in a distinctively Western style (e.g. by 
building chapels, building in Gothic style). […]   
We have recognised that the Christian religion may naturally 
take different expression and form in various countries, while 
maintaining its essence pure and intact.  So far as in us lay, 
we have tried to conform to the manners and customs of the 
people. 
We have always viewed the Chinese and treated them as if 
the church and its organisation were to be theirs, the force for 
working and supporting it latent in and to come from them.   
We have tried in our ministry to apply the teachings of 
scripture to Chinese circumstances in Chinese forms of 
thought and language [...] without coining terms barbarous to 
them, or rejecting their old thought moulds. 
We neither feel, show nor teach anything that could be 
construed into disrespect of the government, priesthood, rites, 
manners or notions of the people’.172 
Jones was a firm advocate of self-propagation, of allowing local converts to take a 
key role in passing on their new faith to others.  One early report from Jones 
described the process: 
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Stations are springing up and adherents are multiplying at a 
rate out of all proportion to the foreign influence brought to 
bear on the work.  That one fact is precious, almost above 
every other.  How is it done?  By me?  No.  By paid helpers?  
No.  By office bearers of the church?  No, in no way.  It is 
just this.  So-and-so in such a village had friends in the 
adjoining county and persuaded them.  Such a man had 
wife’s relations in the next village.  They wanted books and 
teaching.  This man keeps a shop twenty miles from his 
native village, and when he goes home he exhorts his friends, 
of course.  The leader at another village wants to collect some 
accounts […]173 
Williamson described the methodical way Jones engaged Chinese Christians in 
building and taking responsibility for their own church communities:  
The Christians of each locality were organised into groups, 
and given a leader, selected for his general intelligence and 
spiritual qualities.  Catechisms, collections of hymns, 
addresses and sermons were printed and distributed to the 
leaders for their use. […] And at intervals the local leaders 
were called in to Ch’ing-Chou-fu [Qingzhou] for a period of 
instruction and training.  The local churches were then 
grouped together to form district Associations, which 
gradually developed into the Baptist Union of Shantung.174 
When Jones went home for furlough in 1883, ‘he left behind forty-two churches, all 
self-supporting and with their own Chinese pastors, with an aggregate membership 
of over 800’.175  
In January 1885, the General Committee drew up regulations ‘for the future conduct 
of the China Mission’.  They stipulated that ‘all European missionaries shall be ex 
officio members of Field Committees’, and added that ‘such other Brethren as may 
be deemed suitable, being recommended by the Missionaries in China, and appointed 
by the Executive in England, may become full members of these Committees’.176  
This was a significant acknowledgment of the recognition that Chinese Christians 
were expected to play a full part in local decision-making. 
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Deputation tours were periodically organised to give the Home Committee an up-to-
date understanding of the situation in the field.  Accounts of W.Y..Fullerton and 
C.E..Wilson’s deputation in 1907, and R.F..Moorshead and A.C..Ingle’s medical 
deputation in 1919, include details of increasing numbers of pastors wholly 
supported by church funds and of initiatives taken by Chinese Christians.  Despite 
the loss of over 120 church members killed during the Boxer movement of 1900, 
within three years the number of pastors wholly supported by church funds increased 
from seven to eighteen.177  Fullerton and Wilson concluded their published account 
of their tour by asserting that ‘the rapid increase of the Christian Church in China is 
mainly due […] to the evangelistic fervour and consistent character of the Christian 
converts’.178 
The members of the medical deputation in 1919 were approached by a group of 
women from Peichen (now Binzhou 滨州, Shandong province), requesting that ‘ere 
long we may have not only a hospital in Peichen, but a lady doctor to attend 
especially to the needs of sick women’.179  The women also urged the need for a 
girls’ school, and indicated that they had already collected funds amongst themselves 
towards financing these two projects.  The petition was signed by twenty-one 
Chinese women, ten designating themselves as village school teachers, four as 
evangelists, three as Bible Women, and four simply as ‘Christians’.  It is noteworthy 
that this group of country women had the drive and confidence to approach the 
foreign delegation.  They also appreciated the need to contribute to the funding and 
had begun working towards this. 
The photograph albums of Rev A.E..Greening, missionary in Shandong from 1897 to 
1936, depict the significant numbers of Chinese leaders in post in the early part of 
the twentieth century.  The albums contain numerous pictures of small groups of 
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Chinese, the groups being identified variously as ‘pastors’, ‘evangelists’ or 
‘teachers’, and showing the name of each individual within the group.180   
Figure 2: Shandong pastors and deacons, 1899 
 
An examination of the way in which BMS work expanded into other provinces 
demonstrates both the significance of local history for the development of the 
Mission, and the extent to which the three-self principles had been successfully 
applied in Shandong.  In the autumn of 1877 the International Famine Relief 
Committee in Shanghai invited Richard to undertake relief work in Shanxi, one of 
the five provinces most severely affected by the acute famine conditions which 
devastated much of North China at the time.  Working along with Jones and others in 
horrific conditions, Richard is estimated to have saved 100,000 families from 
                                                




starvation and death.181  The opening of the first Baptist church in Taiyuan, Shanxi, 
was a direct result of this work.   
Some deduce that this constituted an unconvincing start to the church in Shanxi.  
Chinese Christian converts were sometimes disparagingly labelled ‘rice Christians’, 
implying that they ‘converted’ for what they could get out of it.182  Possible 
advantages afforded by ‘Treaty protection’, the promise of access to famine relief, or 
protection from the Japanese in occupied China between 1937 and 1945 might all 
have been attractions.  Whatever the reality, records suggest that the number of 
converts increased significantly ‘during and immediately after severe subsistence 
crises’.  It may be that the involvement of missionaries in humanitarian relief 
‘created a climate conducive to conversion’ which ‘made it possible for members of 
rural society interested in Christianity to come forward without immediate fear of 
persecution’.183 
Richard remained in Shanxi for ten years after the worst of the famine abated, but 
‘was not privileged to see any spectacular spiritual results’.184  Fifteen BMS 
missionaries succeeded him there, thirteen of whom, with their children, were killed 
during the Boxer movement of 1898-1901.  125 Chinese Christians connected to the 
BMS were also killed, and Mission and church property was extensively damaged.  
The Church recovered very slowly, and Chinese leadership was fundamentally 
undermined by fears of a recurrence of the Boxer events.  It was reported that 
‘Chinese evangelists were very few, and widely dispersed’.185  However, Baptist 
missionaries gained the support of the Provincial Governor, Yan Xishan (阎锡山), 
when they were instrumental in stamping out an epidemic of pneumonic plague in 
northern Shanxi during the winter of 1917-1918.  Claiming to have been influenced 
by the missionaries’ philanthropic behaviour, Yan instituted a wide-ranging 
programme of social reform in the province which earned him the title ‘the Model 
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Governor’.186  It was at this time that Yan formed a strong relationship with 
H.R..Williamson, who worked with the BMS for many years in the province, and 
who became a strong influence on BMS China policy in the 1940s.187   
Figure 3: Map showing key BMS locations in Shandong, Shanxi and Shaanxi 
Provinces188 
 
Shaanxi was the third province in which the BMS undertook work towards the end of 
the nineteenth century.  The Baptist church in Shaanxi was founded not by foreign 
missionaries but by forty Chinese Baptists from Shandong.  These Christians had 
migrated to Shaanxi in the late 1880s to take advantage of an offer of cheap land by 
the Shaanxi provincial government.  The offer was designed to encourage 
immigration at a time when the population had been seriously reduced by rebellion 
and famine.  The Baptist immigrants from Shandong travelled as a group and, on 
arrival, established their own village community, Fuyincun, or ‘Gospel Village’        
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(幅音村), some seventy kilometres north of Xi’an.  There they built a small church 
and organised church life along the model already established in Shandong, 
effectively self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating.  Two years later, 
they invited the BMS to send missionaries to assist in the work of expanding the 
church into the surrounding areas.  After initial hesitation on the part of the BMS 
Home Committee, reluctant to undermine the Shaanxi church’s self-supporting 
status, in 1891 the Committee assigned two missionaries and their wives to work in 
Fuyincun.189  In the first ten years, the membership of the Fuyincun church grew 
only slowly, from forty-eight at the outset to one hundred and thirty-five in 1897, 
practically all the additional members being immigrants from Shandong.190   
It is possible that these early difficulties reflected suspicions of the rapid influx of 
outsiders, similar to those seen in Sichuan province in the eighteenth century, when 
the Qing government attempted to repopulate the province by introducing generous 
land reclamation policies.  Judith Wyman has studied relations between the foreign 
and Chinese communities in Chongqing between the 1870s and 1900.  During the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century Sichuan experienced ‘the highest 
incidence of attacks on Westerners and Chinese Christians in all of China’, and 
Wyman questions the conventional explanation that these attacks were grounded in 
anti-imperialism and xenophobia.  Rather, she suggests that the rapid population 
growth, from an estimated two million at the end of the seventeenth century, to 
approximately forty million by the late nineteenth, generated latent hostility towards 
all incomers.  Attacks on members of the Christian community, Chinese and foreign, 
were, she suggests, ‘part of a larger process, that of dealing with other outsiders, 
Chinese ones, who had been arriving for more than two centuries.’191  
The three provinces, Shandong, Shanxi and Shaanxi, remained the primary focus of 
the work of the BMS in China until the departure of foreign missionaries in 1952.   
While the geographical boundaries of the work remained settled, however, the 
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development of medical and educational work in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was greatly extended.  This was partly the result of the increasing 
emphasis on the ‘social gospel’, ‘the idea of Jesus as a social reformer and the 
Christian responsibility to confront social ills’, which prompted ever growing 
missionary involvement in a range of social welfare activities.192  For the BMS, 
ambitious schemes for expansion were encouraged by the Arthington bequest, which 
came with the condition that the funds should be used for ‘forward work’ and spent 
within twenty-five years.193  At the same time, the fall of the Qing Empire and the 
founding of the Republic of China in 1912 encouraged missionaries to believe that 
contributions from Westerners and from the Christian church would be received 
more positively than previously.  One missionary described the change in public 
attitudes to missionaries as ‘a moral miracle of the first magnitude’.194 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the BMS was making a significant 
contribution to the provision of western medicine in North China.  The Society 
established three hospitals in Shandong province (Qingzhou, 1889, Zhouping (周平), 
1903, and Zhoucun, 1915) and was contributing to Qilu University hospital in 
Jinan.195  By 1937, the medical school attached to Qilu was offering full medical 
courses to over a hundred students, including twenty-five women, and also courses in 
pharmacy, physiotherapy and radiotherapy.196  The nursing school had fifty-eight 
nurses in training.  BMS staff had run a dispensary and a refuge for opium addicts in 
Taiyuan, Shanxi, from the mid 1880s.  A men’s hospital (1905) and a women’s 
hospital (1910) were built on adjoining sites in Taiyuan.  In 1905, a hospital was also 
established in Xi’an, Shaanxi, and a small hospital in Sanyuan. 
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In schools, too, the influence of missionary societies was evident.  By 1915 there 
were almost 170,000 Chinese children and young people being educated in schools 
run by missionary societies; in the mid 1920s the figure rose to almost a quarter of a 
million.197  Of these, the BMS was responsible for more than 7,200 boys and girls at 
primary and secondary schools.  Ninety-five students were also attending BMS Bible 
Schools and Colleges, of whom eleven were girls.198  The abolition of the traditional 
examination system in China in 1905 was the spur to the creation of many new 
government schools.  The missionary societies’ energetic expansion in the field of 
education received a serious setback when mission schools and colleges found 
themselves bitterly attacked as instruments of cultural aggression, during the anti-
foreign and anti-Christian movement of 1922. ‘For the first time, Christian missions 
were denounced, not just as tools of foreign influence, but in specifically Marxist-
Leninist terms as handmaidens of the forces of capitalist imperialism.’199   
Demands for the abolition of the unequal treaties and the restoration of China’s 
sovereign rights were widespread following the deaths, on 30 May 1925, of Chinese 
workers at the hands of the Shanghai Municipal Police in the International 
Settlement.  Anti-British demonstrations were staged by students and workers 
throughout China, British as well as Japanese goods were boycotted and slogans 
were posted everywhere, demanding ‘down with imperialism’, ‘down with the 
religion of Jesus’, ‘kill all British and Japanese’.200  Serious damage was sustained by 
mission and church property in many parts of the country, and many missionaries 
and Chinese Christians were attacked by mobs.  The foreign authorities at Peking 
(Beijing) strongly advised all their nationals, including missionaries to move to the 
coast.  By July 1927, about 5,000 of the total force of over 8,000 Protestant 
missionaries in China left either for the coastal ports or home.201 
It was during this political upheaval that the BMS faced its most difficult problems 
on the financial front.  Assessing their work in the three provinces, it was clear that it 
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was the church in Shandong which had progressed most decisively towards 
devolution.  This led the London-based General Committee to decide in late 1931 
that the time had come for the BMS to withdraw from Shandong, while continuing 
work on a similar scale as before in Shanxi and Shaanxi.  Missionaries working in 
Shandong at the time requested a transitional period of fifteen years.  The Committee 
felt this was too long, and in July 1932 decided ‘to reduce its allocation to Shandong 
by ten per cent annually, thus setting the goal of withdrawal by 1942.’  Missionaries 
on the field continued to argue that this timescale was too short, and as a 
consequence the period of devolution was extended to fifteen years, taking the end 
date to 1947.202   
As part of the devolution process, a considerable amount of BMS property in the 
town of Zhoucun, in Shandong, had transferred to the ownership of the Chinese 
church in 1934 and 1936.  This was used to set up administrative accommodation for 
the SBU; for church meeting rooms; and orchards and rented property used to 
generate income for the church.203  A letter received by the General Committee, from 
Zhang Sijing of the SBU, thanking the Committee for making these arrangements 
regarding Mission property also appealed for reinforcements to the missionary staff 
and for the maintenance of the financial grant to the SBU at a fixed figure without 
reduction for the next 5 years.204  
In 1937, a Committee was set up by the Shandong Provincial conference to assess 
the effects of the devolution scheme on church work in the province.  The 
Committee’s report does not spell out its membership, but, as indicated earlier, there 
was provision for Chinese members to contribute.205  The Committee reported that 
numbers of foreign staff engaged in evangelistic work had dropped from twelve in 
1931 to six in 1937.  As a result of the reduction in mission grants, the number of 
Chinese staff engaged in evangelism had also dropped substantially, from forty-
seven to thirty-six.  Some of the most able men had left, and others were reduced 
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almost to destitution.  The report considered the reduction in numbers had been too 
fast, and detrimental to the work of the church.206  
The figure below shows the number of Baptist church workers in the three provinces 
– Shanxi, Shandong and Shaanxi – in 1937, broken down by nationality, gender and 
method of payment.  It includes only church workers, not staff in mission schools or 
hospitals.   
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Figure 4: Numbers of Baptist church workers in Shanxi, Shandong and 
Shaanxi, 1937, showing nationality, gender and method of payment207 
 
From the chart it can be seen that a very large proportion of leadership positions in 
Shandong (91%) and Shaanxi (93%) were filled by Chinese men and women, which 
appears to suggest a strong movement towards self-government and self-propagation.  
However, the chart calls into question somewhat starkly the contention that the 
churches were moving towards self-support.  In both provinces, only a very small 
number of men (around 6% of the total workforce), and no women, were supported 
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by Chinese church funds.  A few men were paid by the mission, but most were 
working on an entirely voluntary basis.  This suggests, that in times of hardship, the 
ability of Chinese church workers to maintain the same level of commitment to their 
work for the church would be much reduced.  In contrast to Shandong and Shaanxi, 
church work in Shanxi was almost entirely dependent on foreign funds.  Withdrawal 
of foreign funds, therefore, would have the most significant financial implications for 
Baptist church leadership in Shanxi, though the large number of Chinese men in 
Shaanxi paid from foreign funds would also be disadvantaged.  This suggests that a 
policy of devolution was likely to have the most disturbing effect in Shanxi, where 
the church in its present form was very much Mission-dominated.   
Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that the first British Baptist missionaries had 
envisaged creating indigenous churches which were in harmony with the native 
culture within which they found themselves, and which had the potential to be the 
instruments of their own growth and government.  These aspirations were consistent 
with fundamental Baptist principles of equality, freedom of conscience and 
institutional independence.  Pioneer BMS missionaries to China, including Richard 
Laughton, Timothy Richard and Alfred Jones shared these convictions, and did much 
to build a network of churches in Shandong which reflected them.  As a result, the 
vision of self-governing, self-propagating, self-supporting churches continued to be 
upheld in BMS work in China, and by 1937, in Shandong, the Chinese Baptist 
Church appeared to be modelled upon these principles. 
The decision of the BMS to withdraw from Shandong was based on the conviction 
that withdrawal was both possible and necessary.  Nevertheless, before war broke out 
in 1937 anxiety had been expressed by missionary staff and Chinese church leaders 
that the BMS policy to withdraw had been decided in undue haste, and the proposed 
speed of implementation was questioned.  The fragile nature of arrangements for 
financing the work of the church, even in Shandong, suggested that without foreign 
assistance the church would be hard-pressed to survive.  At the same time, the 
Society itself was operating at the very edge of its financial resources.  As well as the 
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risks and restraints this introduced, it had the potential to have significant influence 
on decision-making.  
Close-knit personal and familial relationships characterised the Baptist missionary 
world.  Those accepted for service with the Society were committing to austere 
conditions, and tight controls over their personal lives.  Their willingness to face the 
formidable demands of working in China during and after the war against Japan 




Chapter Two: The effect of the Japanese 
occupation on the BMS and the Chinese Baptist 
Church in Shandong, 1937-1942 
‘Truly one sympathises with the folk who say “the Honourable 
one in the Heavens has forgotten this land”.’208 
The previous chapter argued that the earliest aspirations of the BMS in China were to 
build a Chinese Christian church that was ‘self-governing, self-supporting and free 
from every kind of foreign influence’, and that by the early 1930s the Society had 
established a clear plan for achieving this in Shandong by 1942.  The BMS Archives 
suggest that in 1937 the Baptist church in Shandong operated predominantly under 
Chinese leadership.  This chapter argues that the effect of the first five years of the 
war and occupation was to drive the Chinese Baptist church into greater rather than 
reduced dependence on foreign support.  To that extent, the plans of the BMS were 
thwarted, and the intended withdrawal complicated. 
By the end of December 1937, Shandong and Shanxi had fallen to the Japanese, and 
an army of occupation was in place throughout the two provinces, although Shaanxi 
escaped Japanese occupation.  Timothy Brook argues that before the war the 
indigenous Chinese church was still largely controlled and dominated by foreign 
missionary societies, but that the experience of Japanese occupation had the effect of 
assisting it towards its long-stated aim of independence. 
[T]he occupation pushed Protestant Christianity […] from a 
church that in 1937 was externally dependent, mission 
oriented, and mission dominated, to a church that in 1945 
was moving in the direction of independence, union and        
Chinese control.209 
On the other hand, Oiki Ling contends, that at the end of the war the Chinese 
Protestant churches were still mission-dominated.  ‘[M]issionaries were still arbiters 
of doctrine, the source of power, and paymasters of the Chinese Christians.’210  This 
chapter uses records of the BMS in Shandong, including correspondence from the 
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Chinese Baptist church leadership, to contend that neither Brook nor Ling provide a 
sufficiently nuanced picture of the effect of occupation on the relationship between 
missionary societies and the indigenous Chinese. 
The sources available for reconstructing the missionary experience in this period are 
not straightforward.  The impact of censorship on mail in both China and Britain has 
restricted the material within the BMS archive.  After 1937, any mail within China, 
or leaving China, was subject to strict censorship by the Japanese military. 
References to anything considered derogatory to the Japanese was excised by the 
censors, and might put at risk anyone referred to. In December 1937, BMS officials 
in London wrote ‘to the relatives and friends of BMS missionaries in China’:  
Our people in China write with the knowledge that any 
criticism or information that the Japs [sic] do not care to be 
known will only cause the letter to be burnt by their censor.  
So there is a good deal we are not being told.211 
Later, after the onset of war in Europe, mail entering or leaving Britain was also 
subject to British censorship.  Consideration of correspondence from writers in both 
Britain and China has to take account of a habit of self-censorship. 
Enemy occupation introduces changes in the relative power of different groups and 
individuals within an occupied area, and in the way in which they regard and deal 
with each other.  During the Japanese occupation of China from 1937, the Chinese in 
the occupied areas were faced with a daily fight for physical survival.  Some also 
found themselves having to make decisions about matters of principle: where to 
position themselves in relation to the main players in the war, the Japanese, the local 
Chinese puppet government, and the Communist and Nationalist guerrilla forces.  
One witness described how her father, one of three brothers, remained in his pre-war 
employment with the postal service, thus in effect supporting the occupation, but 
thereby able to provide for his elderly parents. Of his two brothers, one joined the 
Communist guerrillas, the other the Nationalist guerrillas in the fight against the 
Japanese.212  Chinese Christians needed to make decisions about where to place 
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themselves in relation to the Japanese Christian church and the foreign missionaries 
with whom they had formerly been associated.  Chinese church leaders needed also 
to decide whether to attempt to work for the growth and development of the church 
during the occupation, or to accept that they were living through exceptional times 
and so concentrate their energies simply on maintaining the status quo.  
The Japanese occupation introduced new dilemmas for British missionaries as 
foreign nationals.  BMS missionaries had to decide whether to stay or to evacuate.  
They had to consider what impact staying or leaving would have on Chinese 
Christians, on themselves and their families and on the continuation of BMS work.  
They had to consider how much freedom they would have to pursue the goals of the 
mission if they remained.  They had to weigh up whether the plan to withdraw 
material support from the Chinese church continued to be appropriate in the 
prevailing conditions, or whether the plan to devolve responsibility should be 
shelved until times were more peaceful again.  Like the Chinese, they had to decide 
how to position themselves in relation to the occupiers, and what behaviour on their 
part was appropriate to their role as third-party nationals.  They had to decide how to 
reconcile their personal convictions with their national and civic duties, and how to 
deal with the moral choices arising as a result. 
These are the key questions which this chapter will address: what were the 
consequences of the Japanese occupation for relationships between Baptist 
missionaries and members of the Chinese church?  Did a shared experience of 
occupation bring a closer understanding between missionaries and their Chinese 
colleagues?  Or were their experiences of occupation so different that they 
emphasised the gulf between them rather than their common concerns?  What was 
the impact of occupation on plans to devolve responsibility and authority from the 
BMS to Chinese Christians?  Was the outcome a stronger and more independent 
Chinese church, one that was no less dependent on foreign missions than previously, 
or one that had reverted to greater dependence? 
Missionaries in Shandong and Shanxi remained at their posts until the Japanese-
inspired anti-British campaign of July 1939 caused the foreigners to relinquish their 
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work in schools and churches, and the BMS hospitals were forced to close down.213  
In Shandong, the hospitals reopened in December 1939, and missionaries also 
resumed church and educational work, in increasingly oppressive conditions, until 
Britain and the United States entered the war against Japan in December 1941, when 
mission staff were placed under house arrest.  In March 1942, all BMS mission 
institutions in occupied territory were closed by the Japanese military and, in August, 
all foreigners were transferred to Shanghai for internment.214  They were assembled 
initially in the former Columbia Country Club (see Figure 5) before being allocated 
to one of the internment camps in and around Shanghai, where they remained until 
August 1945. 
Figure 5: BMS missionaries before internment in Shanghai, Autumn 1942215 
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All this activity took place in the context of a brutal war which affected the whole of 
China, and for which the Chinese people paid a very heavy price.  The removal of 
the foreign staff in 1942 has left gaps in the BMS Archive, which must be taken into 
account when seeking to reconstruct the missionary record during the war years. 
The impact of war 
The Japanese occupation had a momentous effect on China.  The publication of Iris 
Chang’s bestselling account of the capture of Nanjing by the Japanese military in 
December 1937 stimulated a stream of publications concerning this catastrophic 
event.216  For many years, however, neither Chinese nor Western writers had much to 
say about the more widespread human suffering and physical devastation which 
occurred during the whole period of Japan’s war against China, 1937-1945.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, attention in the west was drawn 
primarily to recent events in Europe, and to pressures for change within the British 
Empire.  On the Chinese side, political constraints and suppression by survivors of 
painful memories ensured that the subject was generally avoided. 
Recent work has served to make the harrowing details more widely known.217  Lary 
and Mackinnon write of ‘suffering … so great that it does almost defy description’, 
‘the nadir of civilian suffering in modern China’.218  In The Chinese People at War, 
Lary traces the long-term social effects of wartime trauma and dislocation.  She 
writes of ‘a grim equality to suffering […] the destruction of property, the loss of 
income and the death of family members’.219  She presents her readers with a 
powerful picture of havoc and desolation: millions of people forced to flee from their 
homes, crops and means of production destroyed, and businesses uprooted or at a 
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standstill.  Mitter, in the first recent comprehensive history which draws on both 
Chinese and Western sources, describes it as ‘one of the bloodiest wars in history’.220  
The war transformed vast sections of the population into refugees.  During July and 
August 1937, as a consequence of the Japanese occupation of Beijing and Tianjin, a 
flood of refugees travelled from the North China Plain to Shandong, causing the 
population of Jinan (the largest centre of BMS activities within the province) to 
mushroom from 300,000 to 600,000. When, in October 1937, the provincial 
governor, Han Fuju (韩复榘), abandoned the city, leaving it defenceless before the 
Japanese advance, half a million people from the town fled into the countryside and 
the population dropped to less than 100,000.  During the whole course of the war, 
more than eleven and a half million of the Shandong population (just over 30% of the 
whole population) became refugees or homeless.221  
There was ‘almost no government relief and no compensation for deaths, injuries, 
lost income or property,’ an almost complete lack of public provision for the poor 
and dispossessed.  ‘There were no state pensions for the injured or for the dependents 
[sic] of the dead.  There was no insurance to cover property loss.’222  All over 
Shandong, villages were burned down by the Japanese in reprisal for guerrilla 
activities, and any survivors were left completely destitute.223  Those families who 
had fathers and sons in Free China serving with the military had no access to their 
earnings, since ‘there was no effective system for paying allowances to soldiers’ 
dependents [sic]’.224 
Both Lary and Mitter underline the fear induced by Japanese aerial bombardment, a 
new and unfamiliar weapon of war.  Mitter cites a contemporary report by the 
journalist Du Zhongyuan on the assault on Taiyuan on 8 November 1937, which 
includes the detail that even those taking shelter from the bombs in underground 
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tunnels ‘did not dare to talk in a loud voice as they were afraid they could still be 
heard by the planes.’225  In April 2013, two Chinese octogenarians, recalling their 
memories of the war, both independently referred first to the falling bombs and the 
terrible sense of vulnerability to which they gave rise.226  Lary draws attention to the 
occupiers’ insistence, in Japanese occupied areas, on humiliating the local people, 
reducing them to ‘a state of uncertainty and insecurity that gradually distorted their 
lives’.227  The consequence, as a contemporary observer noted, was that ‘men fear to 
be noticed, walk carefully with a backward glance over their shoulder, suspect 
everyone’.228  
From the moment in July 1937 when Chiang Kai-shek, in an impassioned address to 
the nation, announced that China had reached the last limits of endurance and must 
fight the Japanese aggressor to the end, there was an expectation that every patriotic 
Chinese had a duty of resistance.229  Where resistance failed, and Japanese 
occupation threatened, the GMD’s “scorched earth” policy demanded that all assets 
which could be used by the enemy should be destroyed or removed.  Every true 
patriot would also remove himself so that he could continue the fight against the 
aggressor in Free China.  Those who remained within the occupied areas were 
considered to be working with the enemy and labelled traitors, hanjian, 汉奸.230  In 
January 1939, a journalist in China noted that ‘Even children under the age of four or 
five are, consciously or unconsciously, familiar with the subject of a war of 
resistance.’231   
Thus began the myth which still dominates the popular narrative of the Chinese War 
of Resistance against Japan, a myth which promotes a dismissive, even 
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contemptuous, attitude towards those who failed to ‘resist’ the Japanese.  More than 
that, claims Brook, ‘the myth of resistance has been a powerful moral weapon in the 
arsenals that political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have used to sustain 
their post-war dictatorships’.  Little wonder that ‘the moral landscape of the Japanese 
occupation has remained unassailable in the Chinese historiography of the war’.232   
This long-held interpretation of allegiances during the war against Japan has been 
challenged by recent scholarship in the West and, more tentatively, in China.  A 
growing literature has begun to address the complex continuum of behaviours, and 
the underlying ethical issues, between collaboration, compliance and resistance.233  
The need of those left behind in occupied China to balance the human drive towards 
self-preservation with an acceptable moral cost, has been acknowledged and, at least 
in scholarly analysis, given legitimacy independent of moral judgment.  Those who 
were unable, for whatever reason, to travel West and re-establish themselves in Free 
China, had to find a way to survive the occupation without betraying their country or 
themselves, to make an honourable choice between personal safety and patriotic 
commitment. This is the theme explored by Poshek Fu in his study of the painful 
moral dilemmas faced by three Chinese intellectuals during the Japanese occupation: 
Wang Tongzhao (王统照), novelist and poet; Li Jianwu (李健吾), university teacher 
and dramatist; and Zhou Fohai (周佛海), journalist, who each made, or were steered 
into, a different choice.234  
Brook suggests that it is the association of the word ‘collaboration’ with moral 
failure, and the judgment that that implies, which interferes with productive historical 
analysis.235  ‘The very word is loaded with moral failure.’236  He suggests that the 
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wide span of definitions of the concept also make it problematic.  The word is used, 
at one extreme, to cover ‘all manner of cooperation, active or passive, shown to the 
occupier; anything that enables the occupation to continue’.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, it has been narrowed to the very much more specific, ‘supportive 
engagement in the tasks and ideology of the occupier’.237  
Such widely diverse definitions make it possible for different exponents of the word 
to reach sharply divergent conclusions about the significance of the same set of 
human interactions.  ‘Passive cooperation’ does not speak of perfidiousness, whereas 
‘engagement in the tasks and ideology of the occupier’ immediately conveys the idea 
of informed treachery.  For this reason, Brook suggests that historians should 
suspend judgment, except in cases where there is evidence of ‘self-advancement won 
at the blatant cost of the lives and dignity of others.’238  For historians, this may be a 
useful path.  For civilians, seeking to interpret events in which they are engaged, and 
to find a way forward which enables them to preserve their self-respect, suspending 
judgment may not be an option. 
Brook’s exploration of the link between the recognition of collaboration as a feature 
of war and the growth of twentieth-century nationalism brings us to the fringes of the 
complex situation in which British nationals found themselves at the outset of the 
war against Japan.239  The peculiarly modern application of the term ‘collaboration’, 
writes Brook, is intrinsically bound up with nationalism’s premise ‘that everyone 
should have a nation, and each individual only one.’ Further, along with the 
conviction that ‘nationalism supposed absolute loyalty’ came the ‘invention of 
collaboration between the individual and the nation to which [under occupation] he 
had now been made to belong’.240  These are useful considerations when exploring 
the role of third-party nationals in China during the Japanese hostilities.  As members 
of non-participant nations, there was no call for Britons to defend their own nation in 
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the Asian conflict, nor any need for them to feel they had been ‘made to belong’ to 
another nation.  
Patriotic Chinese Christians remaining in the occupied areas were burdened with a 
particularly problematic dilemma.  As patriots, it was natural for them to support 
their fellow countrymen in resisting the Japanese occupation.  As Christians, they 
were encouraged to ‘love their enemy’.  Ronald Still, working in the BMS hospital in 
Zhoucun, indicated on at least two occasions in letters to his parents his admiration 
for Chinese hospital staff who acted with generosity and forbearance towards 
Japanese patients, and towards Chinese patients who were recognisable as 
collaborators. 
One of the things that has struck me most about [our Chinese 
colleagues’] attitude through all the fighting has been their 
freedom from hatred and resentment, and I can’t help 
admiring them very much for it.  Their whole attitude seems 
to have been one of sorrow because their country has been 
forced into this war…241  
A few days ago we took in a Chinese soldier who, while 
acting as a J [sic] guard, was shot by Chinese guerrillas.  He 
had a bullet through both his lungs, […] I’ve been impressed 
with the kindly treatment that he has received at the hands of 
all our nurses and coolies since he might easily be regarded 
as a traitor to their country.242 
Still chose to interpret the behaviour of the Chinese staff members as an expression 
of Christian love, but it is impossible to know whether they felt compromised in 
these situations, or how they were regarded by their fellow Chinese as a 
consequence.   
Certainly the tone of Still’s letters is in contrast to an incident described by 
Chatterton of a Japanese civilian being brought to a LMS hospital in Wuxi (无锡) for 
an emergency operation.  Having agreed to operate, the missionary doctor, John 
Roberts, found himself at odds with his Chinese staff: ‘they said she was the enemy 
of the country. And I said,  “Well, we are going to do it anyway”. So we operated on 
her.’  Chatterton asks, ‘Did Roberts, by his authority, place his colleagues in a 
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position where they felt they were collaborating with the enemy?  It seems he did.’243  
There is no evidence of such unease within the BMS archive.  Whatever the 
undisclosed misgivings, any indications there are, such as those in Still’s letter 
above, suggest an outwardly united approach from Chinese and British medical staff.  
Written evidence that tells us that the Chinese staff were regarded by other Chinese 
as showing a less than properly patriotic attitude has not been found.   
BMS missionaries as third-party nationals during the 
occupation 
Missionary attitudes to the occupation need to be understood in the context of their 
pre-existing relationships, with both Chinese and Japanese.  The presence of 
foreigners resident in China under the Treaty provisions was itself regarded by many 
Chinese as a form of occupation.  Occupation by the Japanese thus constituted ‘a 
foreign occupation of a foreign occupation.’244  A complex and delicate situation was 
made more complex by the history of pre-war relationships between Britain and 
Japan.   
The rights of the British to reside and trade in China, under the terms of the 
nineteenth-century Treaties of Nanjing and Tianjin, were mirrored by those granted 
to Japan under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and the 1896 Protocols which 
followed.  These included, significantly, the right under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 
to allow both countries to station troops on Chinese soil.245  The ‘most favoured 
nation’ clause, built into the treaty agreements, meant that any privilege granted to 
one of the powers would automatically be enjoyed by all.  The British had benefitted 
from expanded treaty rights negotiated by Japan, including steam navigation rights 
on the river Yangzi, and the right to manufacture goods in the treaty ports, such 
goods being exempt from tariff duties.  Britain’s relationship with Japan had been 
coloured by this enforced interdependence since the end of the nineteenth century. 246   
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Britain and Japan had been allies both before and during the First World War, but 
during the 1920s Britain had been discouraged from developing the alliance by 
opposition from the United States and Canada.247  By the mid 1930s, however, with 
economic depression, ideological conflicts at home, increasing difficulties in 
maintaining Britain’s position as a world power overseas and the growing threat of 
Germany, the British government was under pressure ‘to try to get on better terms 
with Japan.’248 
The Japanese civilian population in China had grown steadily during the early 
twentieth century, and British missionaries were accustomed to having dealings with 
Japanese civilians.  By 1935, there were more than 14,000 Japanese residents in 
Qingdao, a popular holiday destination for missionaries in North China.249  BMS 
missionaries in particular made frequent use of two holiday cottages in Qingdao, 
owned by their colleague Jessie Manger.250  They got to know the proprietors of the 
Japanese shops which lined the streets, saved their dental problems for the attention 
of the Japanese dentists who practised there, and did business with the Japanese 
employees in banking and shipping firms.  At the same time, Japanese patients took 
advantage of the facilities provided by the missionary hospitals: in early 1937, one 
BMS doctor described operating in the hospital in Taiyuan on a young Japanese man 
with ‘a bad case of appendicitis’.   
It was the worst I have had to do and, to add to my 
embarrassment, the patient’s Japanese doctor, himself a 
surgeon, had flown over from Peiping [Beijing] that morning 
to see me do it!251   
In the context of such social and everyday interactions, gestures of friendship 
between missionaries and Japanese would have been a natural enough occurrence. 
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The missionaries’ status as foreigners under the Treaty provisions had always been a 
prominent part of their identity in China.  In all their communications, missionaries 
habitually referred to themselves as the “foreign” staff, rather than the “British” or 
“missionary” staff, using the Chinese term for foreigners “waiguoren” (外国人), 
literally “outside people”.  Does this suggest that to some extent they understood and 
accepted their position as aliens or even misfits?  The distinction was deeply felt by 
Chinese people.  Writing about early twentieth-century government textbooks used 
for first-year primary level pupils, Henrietta Harrison comments: ‘An early lesson 
shows the difference between “Chinese people” and “foreign people”.’252  British 
missionaries’ role as “outsiders” in Chinese society was underlined by their role as 
non-participants in China’s war with Japan.   
At the outbreak of war in July 1937, British residents in China were faced with the 
decision whether or not to evacuate.  Under extraterritoriality legislation, Britons 
living in the concession areas were governed and protected not by Chinese but by 
British courts and legal framework, and at first it seemed possible that life there 
might go on as normal even though fighting raged round about them.  Some chose to 
go; others dared not leave their jobs or businesses; others, living within the 
concession areas, could not conceive that war would affect them personally. Three 
thousand British women and children were evacuated from Shanghai to Hong Kong 
before August 1937 but had returned by Christmas.253  The United States government 
encouraged its citizens to leave: 1400 Americans left Shanghai in August and 
September 1937.254   
The knowledge that the British government would assume some responsibility for 
their welfare was a factor which may have governed the decision of missionaries and 
their families whether to stay or evacuate.  When war first broke out in July 1937, 
many missionaries were taking holidays at the coast, in Beidaihe or Qingdao.  In 
early August, Gwyneth Still wrote telling her parents in Cambridge that her husband, 
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Ronald, had returned to his post at the Foster Hospital (復育醫院), Zhoucun, to 
ensure the safety of the hospital, but she was staying in Qingdao without him.  
Gwyneth reassured her parents: 
Don’t be alarmed – this is one of the safest spots – and the 
British Consul is constantly in touch with us.  We are all 
registered and if any need arose we should be got out of the 
way – there are British ships in port.255  
As the cities in North China began to fall to the Japanese, the knowledge of 
communications between the British and Japanese authorities continued to give 
missionaries a measure of security.256  Taiyuan, in Shanxi province, fell on 8 
November 1937.  Two days later, Fred Price, senior BMS missionary in the province, 
wrote to the Mission House in London, ‘this morning an officer [Japanese] came to 
see if we were all safe, in order to send a message to our Consul at Tientsin 
[Tianjin]’.  In the afternoon, two more Japanese came to the door.  ‘We brought them 
in and had tea together, and they went off with the names of all of us.’257  A week 
later Price expressed satisfaction when he learned ‘that the British authorities have 
been making enquiries at the Japanese headquarters and we think that a telegraphic 
message has been sent to them and through them to all our enquiring friends.’258  
As the war progressed, most British missionaries and their families in rural North 
China chose to remain at their posts, ‘doing’, as one missionary wrote, ‘just what 
they feel they came out to do – namely giving support and comfort to their Chinese 
friends and associates just when they are most needed’.259  They took risks in doing 
so: two missionaries were accidentally killed by Chinese guerrillas in 1938.260  At 
times, Japanese controls over banking meant that they were without funds.  However, 
until December 1941, they were able to continue to take holidays in the Chinese 
holiday resorts, and to order supplies of foreign goods from the coast to supplement 
products available locally.  More importantly, they had the knowledge that their 
government knew of their whereabouts and was prepared to accept a measure of 
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responsibility for them.  This gave them a level of security unknown to the Chinese 
with whom they worked. 
Given these inequalities, was their continued presence universally welcomed by the 
Chinese?  Could it be that their very presence in occupied China, carrying on with 
their usual activities, gave the occupation a veneer of legitimacy which was abhorred 
by the Chinese and categorised as an act of collaboration?  
The delicate position of foreign residents in choosing a legitimate role for themselves 
during hostilities is illustrated by the experiences of the small group of foreigners, 
led by the German businessman John Rabe, who put forward the idea of establishing 
an International Safety Zone in Nanjing in October 1937.  Initially, Rabe and his 
colleagues were suspected by the Japanese of creating a hiding place for Chinese 
soldiers defending the city.261  Over the six weeks of violence that followed the 
Japanese assault on Nanjing, the Safety Zone provided protection for many civilians, 
during which foreigners worked alongside Chinese colleagues.262  Other activity 
which so-called neutral third parties might engage in, with innocent intent, was less 
easy to justify.  Rabe might have been accused by Chinese partisans of ‘assisting the 
enemy’ when he acceded to a Japanese request to organise a Chinese workforce to 
help restart supplies of electricity.263  His action was in the interests of preserving 
order, but enabling an occupying force to preserve order, and thus gain control, may 
arguably constitute an unacceptable deviation from the narrow path of neutrality.264 
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Missionaries in occupied China understood that as third-party nationals living within 
an enemy zone they were explicitly disallowed from participating in the conflict.  To 
preserve their protected status, they had a duty to conduct themselves in a way that 
would not compromise their government’s interests, or risk sparking off international 
incidents.  As the Japanese army advanced through North China, one of the BMS 
medical missionaries in Shandong asked the British Consular authorities whether it 
would be legitimate to give medical assistance to wounded Chinese.  The Consul 
checked with the Ambassador who, in return, advised that ‘formalities […] should be 
observed.’265  The doctor was clearly concerned to know whether treating Chinese 
wounded would be considered as assisting the enemy.  The question was discussed at 
the BMS General Committee meeting early in November 1937, and members present 
registered their agreement with the advice of the Society’s Medical Secretary, ‘BMS 
doctors should treat any wounded who are brought to the hospital, without any 
question of formal proceedings being raised.’266  BMS doctors were thus assured that 
their responsibility was to treat the sick and injured, without resorting to formal 
notifications or negotiations.  There are no recorded discussions about what the 
medical missionaries would have done if the instructions had been not to treat all 
casualties equally. 
Non-medical missionaries also needed to know how to ensure that they did not 
compromise their government’s interests.  Early in 1938, the British Consul General 
in Hankou, G.S..Moss, gave this advice to Fred Russell, senior Baptist missionary in 
Xi’an: 
Should the Japanese arrive in Sian [Xi’an] you must be 
guided by circumstances, and act with prudence and common 
sense.  Keep indoors and try to avoid contact with any parties 
of troops without officers of apparent discipline […] Do not 
attempt any quixotic protection of people you cannot protect 
[…] Don't be obstinate and do not add avoidable international 
incidents to the difficulties we already have if you can 
possibly help it.267 
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Moss’s caution in tendering this advice was well suited to the delicate position in 
which Britain found herself on the international stage at the time.  It could be argued, 
however, that ‘quixotic protection’ was exactly what a Christian was called to offer. 
During initial encounters with Japanese troops, it was relatively easy to abide by 
Moss’s advice, especially as most missionaries were accommodated in compounds 
separated from the areas lived in by Chinese people, often outside the city walls.  
This did not mean they were not at risk, as bombing was indiscriminate.  The 
location of mission compounds was not always immediately obvious to incoming 
troops, and not all Japanese troops were concerned about the finer points of 
international law.  When twenty-two bombs fell on the BMS compound in Zhoucun 
during the bombing on 24 December 1937, Wilfred Flowers reported:  
There is no doubt that they were aiming to hit us.  The 
Chinese thought they were trying to hit the Union Jack.  The 
APC [Asiatic Petroleum Company], also flying Union Jacks, 
had ten just around them.268 
It appears, however, that in the early stages of the war the Japanese generally took 
notice of the special status of British and American nationals, and the foreign 
community was not exposed to direct confrontations with the Japanese invading 
army.269  
The British government’s anxiety that its citizens should do nothing to compromise 
national interests, and the advantages which could accrue from smooth relationships 
with the occupiers, had the potential to expose missionaries to the accusation that 
they were too friendly, or even collaborating, with the Japanese.  This is the question 
posed by Chatterton, in her thesis: ‘whether it was accurate to accuse those 
[missionaries] who remained in occupied China of collaboration’.270 
There are one or two letters in the BMS archive which give the impression that some 
missionaries regarded the occupation with something approaching equanimity.  One 
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such letter was sent by Christine Smith to mission headquarters in London, at the 
time of the capture of Qingzhou, Shandong, on 8 January 1938.  No resistance was 
offered and the town fell without a battle. Smith’s letter makes it hard to believe that 
an enemy assault had taken place: 
You know, I presume, that the city was occupied by the 
Japanese forces on the afternoon of January 8th.  They were 
welcomed by responsible men in the city and arrangements 
made for their comfort.  From that time, troops have been 
coming and going and many have been quartered in the 
homes of the people.271 
The tone of the letter suggests that Smith did not consider herself to be in danger, and 
had little personal investment in the outcome of the conflict.  It is almost as if she 
was opening her home to welcome guests.  Was this really how she viewed the 
occupation, or was she thinking as she wrote of the Japanese censors who would 
examine her letter?  The latter is almost certainly the case when another missionary, 
returning to Dai Xian (代縣) from Taiyuan, wrote, doubtless ironically, that ‘our 
friends the Japanese were in occupation…’, but Smith’s meaning is less clear.272  
Was her apparent sense of detachment from the hostilities an indication of an 
underlying assumption that as a foreigner she was entitled to a different – and better 
– fate than the Chinese?   
This may be unfair, and too much should not be read into what follows.  She goes on 
to say that there has been no difficulty getting supplies and ‘we have indeed much 
cause for thanksgiving’.273  The reference to ‘much cause for thanksgiving’ was a 
common refrain in missionary letters home, a form of shorthand indicating that ‘we 
are still alive and our faith has not wavered’.  It did not by any means signify a 
straightforward or pleasant experience.  Smith’s colleague, Emmott, writing five 
months later, when the nature of the Japanese occupation was more apparent, 
presents a rather different picture: ‘Nearly every house in the city was looted and the 
occupants often treated to indignities’.274 
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While missionaries ran the risk of Chinese accusations that they were collaborating 
with the occupiers, they were also in danger of being accused by the Japanese of 
providing inappropriate help to the Chinese.  Mission compounds across the country 
were crowded with refugees.  Many Chinese people who had no previous 
connections with missions were eager to avail themselves of the protection afforded.  
An incident which occurred at the time of the capture of Taiyuan on 8 November 
1937 was recounted by Harry Wyatt, one of the doctors at the BMS men’s hospital in 
the city.  It gives an idea of some of the difficulties of the situation. 
After we had retired for the night we received a call to the 
Boys' School where we had some seventy-five refugees. A 
group of twenty Chinese soldiers had come over the back 
wall to seek our protection. They had mostly been able to 
steal civilian clothes. They knelt and pleaded with us, saying 
that their lives were in our hands. We pointed out to them that 
we were quite unable to give protection from [the] Japanese, 
and were unwilling to conceal the fact that they were soldiers. 
After taking two pistols from them, we escorted them through 
the break in the wall, advising them to get out of the city at 
all costs.275 
Wyatt must have been aware that sheltering the soldiers would put at risk the lives of 
the refugees already sheltering in the compound.  Making concessions in this 
instance might also have opened the floodgates to many other Chinese soldiers who 
were equally desperate.  It cannot have made for a comfortable decision in the face 
of the soldiers’ pleas, and no doubt seemed an act of betrayal to the men concerned. 
A more complicated example occurs in the case of the gateman at the BMS 
Whitewright Institute in Jinan, who was arrested by the Japanese on 27 May 1939.276  
Soldiers from the gendarmerie, the Japanese military police, visited the mission 
hospital, wanting to question one of the lab technicians, Tian Xuelin.  The technician 
was missing but was thought to have gone to his home, in the grounds of the 
Institute, where his father was gateman.  When the gendarmes discovered that Tian 
was not there, they arrested his father for questioning.  On hearing this, Edward 
                                                
275 BMSA, CH/78, Wyatt, Report on the fall of Taiyuan, undated.  
276 BMSA, CH/23, SP Shantung, Phillips to Williamson, 11.June.1939.  The Whitewright Institute 
was originally established in Qingchow in 1887, and later transferred to Jinan as an educational 
facility intended to be accessible to the general public.  Williamson, British Baptists, 48. 
 
 96 
Phillips, the BMS missionary in charge of the Institute, went to the gendarmerie 
headquarters and managed to see the sergeant handling the case.  Phillips was 
advised that the military believed that young Tian was carrying mail on behalf of an 
important guerrilla leader, and they needed to get hold of him in order to catch the 
leader.  They believed Tian Senior knew where his son was, but had not revealed this 
information. 
The issue for Phillips was ‘whether, or no, I should have started waving the Union 
Jack right away’, with a view to rescuing his staff member, the gateman, from 
Japanese custody, interrogation and almost certain ill-treatment.  It would have been 
perfectly proper for Phillips to claim that the Japanese were exceeding their powers 
in removing the gateman from British property, but ‘I had good reason to believe that 
there were one or two individuals on the Medical School premises who were not 
obeying the law as those in power here understand it.’  Rather than risk public 
charges, and possibly provoke international complications, Phillips did not formally 
report the removal of the gateman to the British consul, although he arranged for the 
information to reach the consul informally via the American consulate in Jinan.277 
Meanwhile, Phillips sought advice from the local civil adviser to the Japanese, 
Nishida, with whom he had had constructive dealings in the past.  Despite persistent 
enquiries from Phillips and Nishida, the gateman was never heard of again.  
Phillips was later able to send a hand-delivered letter to the Mission house in 
London. 
I do not think it quite wise to put down absolutely all the little 
bits of information I have even in this letter, but they are, I 
fear, sufficient to make me believe that our gatekeeper’s son 
(who I believe has managed to escape) had involved his 
father in the games he was up to.278 
Phillips’s use of the word ‘games’ might appear to patronise or trivialise Chinese 
guerrilla activities.  If taken in the context of his other correspondence, it seems more 
likely to be a reflection of his personal style and a product of his public school 
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education, where it was customary to make light of serious or painful issues.279  The 
final lines of his report of the gateman’s arrest suggest that he was by no means 
taking the incident lightly, ‘It makes me sick to think of what has happened, and I 
will not try to put my feelings into words’.280  It is likely that missionaries in 
occupied China were faced with many incidents of this nature, which tested the 
clarity of their judgment, set their loyalty to British national interest against their 
allegiance to their Chinese colleagues and tested their moral compass. 
The only other direct reference to suspicions of collaboration appears in the minutes 
of a post-war meeting of the China Sub-Committee:  
The Committee heard with deep relief and gratification the 
evidence now produced which clears the character of Pastor 
Meng Lo San.  We are making this finding as public as 
possible as rumours had even reached this country that he had 
been an instance of failure to maintain his patriotic and 
Christian principles.281 
No other reference to the incident concerning Pastor Meng could be found in the 
archive.  This is consistent with the understanding that many of the tensions and 
difficulties of this period were never documented.  It is noteworthy that, in this 
instance, ‘patriotic and Christian principles’ are given equal weight by the 
Committee members. 
By September 1939, Ronald Still was the only BMS doctor working in occupied 
China.  When the Zhoucun hospital was forced to close as a result of the anti-British 
campaign, Still arranged a meeting with the British Consul in Qingdao.  The Consul 
told him that he had been informed by the Japanese military that the hospital was 
known to be ‘assisting the guerillas’, and that as long as this continued he ‘must 
expect to have trouble’.  The Consul had challenged the Japanese, saying that he 
regarded it as a grave allegation, and asking for substantiation or withdrawal, but 
                                                
279 For example, under fire during the siege of Xi’an in 1926, he writes a seemingly light-hearted 
letter, describing the heavy bombardment as ‘the crumps’ (BMSA, CH/63, Phillips to Wilson, 
25.April.1926.)  On his post-war return to Jinan in late 1945, he writes that both the Provincial 
Governor and his Chief Secretary had been active in the guerrilla forces in Shandong during the 
Japanese occupation, ‘and can tell good stories of hazards and escapes’. BMSA, CH/63, Phillips to 
friends, 5.January.1946. 
280 BMSA, CH/23, SP Shantung, Phillips to Williamson, 11.June.1939. 
281 BMSA, China Sub-Committee Minutes, Vol.11, 19.July.1946.  
 
 98 
neither had been forthcoming.  Still was confident in reporting to the Mission House 
that he was completely innocent of the charges against him: 
Although of course we treat any wounded who present 
themselves, there is no truth at all in the allegation that we 
take sides in the political struggle, and we co-operate in 
whatever ways we can with the Japanese authorities in their 
investigations and examinations.282 
It is possible that ‘co-operating’ with the Japanese authorities in their investigations 
may have involved allowing the Japanese military to remove from the hospital any 
patients or staff members who were under suspicion.  Although Still was no doubt 
acting under the belief that this was his duty as a third-party neutral, it cannot have 
been regarded with equanimity by resistance fighters, especially given the grim fate 
of any who were thought to have acted against the regime.  Elsewhere Still writes of 
accompanying a patient who the authorities were taking away for questioning, and it 
may be surmised that this was in order to protect the patient from ill-treatment at the 
hands of the Japanese during questioning.283   
Missionaries also found themselves in a difficult position in attempting to decide 
how to relate to the Japanese they encountered who were not personally connected 
with military activity.  A BMS account, detailing missionary experience, records that 
‘Christians among the Japanese also visited and prayed with us, as we with them’.284  
Those missionaries who had come to China as evangelists believed they had a 
responsibility to ‘preach the gospel’ to everyone they encountered, including the 
Japanese.  They considered it appropriate, if not a duty, to look for ways to extend 
the audience for their message.  The Minutes of the General Committee in London 
for January 1938 record a request from Nellie Lewis, of Shanxi, for ‘time and 
opportunity to study Japanese’, and in 1939, Fred Price wrote, also from Shanxi, 
suggesting to the BMS that they should send some of their China missionaries to 
Japan to learn the language in order to facilitate work in China.285  It is not clear 
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whether the incentive to learn Japanese arose from a wish to evangelise the Japanese 
or with the intention of improving communication with the occupying forces, but the 
Committee appeared to assume the latter and responded by encouraging more 
effective use of interpreters.286   
Williamson’s emphasis is clear, however, when he describes the friendly and 
considerate manner in which the Japanese occupiers dealt with foreigners in the early 
days of their occupation of Jinan. 
Large numbers of Japanese troops visited the Whitewright 
Institute, listened attentively to short evangelistic addresses, 
and accepted copies of the Gospels in Japanese.  Quite a few 
soldiers are Christian and some attended Chinese church 
services.  On one memorable Sunday two stayed behind for 
Communion…287 
Yenching University (燕京大学, Yanjing Daxue) was one of only two missionary 
run universities to stay open in Beijing throughout the occupation.288  In February 
1938, the President, John Leighton Stuart, raised with a Japanese embassy official in 
Beijing the possibility of adding courses in Japanese history and literature to the 
curriculum, taught by Japanese professors and funded through the Boxer indemnity.  
‘The president even suggested a spring visit to Japan for Yenching’s Class of 1938’ 
and suggested it ‘would be a beautifully Christian attempt at helping toward peace 
and constructive goodwill.’289 
In all, foreign missionaries in occupied China trod a delicate line between their duty 
as British or American citizens and compassionate concern for the suffering Chinese 
people.  The absence of more detailed accounts of particular issues which they faced 
makes analysis of their attitudes problematic.  It would certainly have impacted on 
Chinese Christians’ perceptions of the missionaries’ loyalties. 
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The Chinese Baptist church in occupied Shandong 
So far, this chapter has dealt primarily with the impact of the occupation on BMS 
missionaries.  The next section focuses on the experience of the members of the 
Chinese church in Shandong, during the years to 1942 when the Japanese removed 
foreign missionaries from the province.  1942 was the year settled upon by the BMS 
for withdrawing from Shandong.290  How well had the Mission and the SBU been 
able to use the first five years of the Japanese war to make progress towards 
‘surrendering the task’?291 
In 1937, the SBU was made up of 300 separate congregations.  The care of these 
congregations was in the hands of 217 Chinese men and 174 Chinese women, the 
majority of them unpaid.292  In a further 212 villages where there was no settled 
church, church services were held at least once a week.  It is an indication of the 
extent to which the churches had already moved towards independence that, in 1937, 
only a very small number of these more than five hundred centres of Christian 
teaching had any financial support from the BMS.293   
Central to the survival of the Shandong church in the 1940s were figures such as 
Zhang Sijing, seen here (bottom right) among a group of pastors photographed by 
Greening in 1919 (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6: Group of Shandong pastors, 1919294 
 
The picture shows a relaxed group, at ease in their relationship with the foreign 
cameraman, and comfortable in the ordinary dress of a Chinese teacher.  The 
photograph was taken at a time when many people in rural China were fearful of 
having their photos taken, believing that in some way the process detracted from 
their life chances.  The young Zhang Sijing looks eager and enthusiastic as he 
embarks on a future clearly linked to that of the foreign missionaries.  In 1937, 
Zhang was Secretary of the SBU, and had overall administrative responsibility for all 
the work. It was his job to keep in touch with these scattered churches, to provide 
support and training for their pastors and to plan developmental work.  His 
responsibilities far out-reached the work of the Mission.  At the time, there were a 
mere thirty-five foreign missionaries in Shandong, including wives, university, 
medical and administrative staff, based in the mission stations at Jinan, Zhoucun and 
Qingzhou.295 
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Between the early months of the war with Japan and the end of 1940, Zhang wrote 
several times, in Chinese, to Williamson, Foreign Secretary in the Mission House 
from early 1938, reporting on conditions in the church.  Of the letters retained in the 
BMS archive, some are accompanied by an English translation.296  The fact that 
some appear without an English translation is a reflection of Williamson’s close 
relationship with Zhang and his easy fluency in Chinese.  The letters that were 
translated into English are likely to have been those which Williamson judged 
needed to be considered in full by the committees.297  The letters provide a rare 
glimpse of the work of the Chinese Baptist community.  The greater part of the 
church records held in China were destroyed when the foreigners left in 1951.298  
Here was a Chinese church leader writing as a colleague direct to mission 
headquarters in London.  Although occasional letters or petitions were sent to the 
BMS in London by groups of Chinese church leaders, only one other Chinese 
employee of the mission appears to have reported to London regularly in this way, 
Dr Jing Yihui (景以惠), since 1928 medical superintendent of the BMS hospital in 
Qingzhou. 
Zhang had worked with Williamson in Shandong between 1926 and 1938 and this 
close working relationship informs their correspondence.  Despite the precarious 
conditions in which church members were living, the letters are remarkable for the 
evidence they provide of Zhang’s continuing focus on the three aspects of 
devolution: self-support, self-propagation and self-government.  It appears that 
Zhang made strenuous efforts to refrain from asking the BMS for additional staff or 
funds, and made it a priority to find ways to build up the independent leadership and 
financial resources of the Chinese church.  His attempts to do this were regularly 
undermined by war conditions and by natural disasters.  Circumstances were very 
much more difficult than those identified in 1937 by the Committee assessing plans 
for devolution. 
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The first major war-time challenge to the progress of the Chinese church towards 
self-support occurred within two months of the outbreak of war.  In September 1937, 
the dykes burst on the Yellow River; (黄河, Huang He) and caused extensive 
flooding in north-west Shandong, around Peichen.299  In Zhoucun, some sixty 
kilometres south, the BMS compounds were inundated with around four hundred 
refugees, and church and Mission members attempted to provide them with food and 
shelter.300  Zhang himself led a party of 3,000 men who worked for twenty days to 
repair the burst river dykes.301   
On 24 and 25 December 1937, Zhoucun itself, where Zhang was based in the SBU 
headquarters, came under aerial and artillery attack by the Japanese, causing large 
numbers of townspeople to evacuate, either for temporary shelter in the nearby hills 
or to begin a flight west, in pursuance of the Nationalist government’s ‘scorched 
earth’ policy.  Ronald Still reported that the majority of the trained nurses in the 
BMS hospital, the Foster hospital, left to volunteer for work with government troops 
engaged in battle further south.302  It was common for professionally-trained staff to 
leave mission hospitals for better-paid posts elsewhere.303  Jocelyn Chatterton has 
argued that one incentive for the exodus of nurses from the mission hospitals during 
the early part of the Japanese attack might have been the higher salaries paid by the 
government hospitals.  There is nothing in Still’s correspondence or in the Zhoucun 
records to suggest that this was the case in this instance.  All the indications are that 
the nurses were acting from a sense of patriotic duty.  As it turned out, the nurses 
returned two days later, finding the government hospitals had transferred from 
Nanjing to Hankou and being unable to secure transport there.  Four nurses later set 
off by rail for Hankou but the others remained in Zhoucun. 
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During January 1938, Henry Payne, BMS Provincial Secretary, a veteran of more 
than thirty years’ work in Jinan, notified the BMS General Committee in London that 
the aid for flood victims had exhausted church funds, and appealed for help from 
home.  The Finance Committee recommended a gift of $6,000, ‘from special funds 
left to the Society with the express intention that they may be employed for work in 
which Mr Henry Payne is engaged’.304  A number of such special funds were held by 
the BMS and some donors asked for their gifts to be ear-marked for the work of 
missionaries whom they particularly wanted to support.  Using money that had been 
ring-fenced for Payne’s work enabled the Society to take action without increasing 
regular financial support for Shandong, thus not jeopardising the devolution plan. 
By 1939, the finances of the BMS itself were in an unhealthy state: receipts for all 
the Society’s work during the previous year fell more than £17,000 (worth over 
£1,000,000 in today’s money) short of expenditure.305  Nevertheless, two additional 
grants were made for work in Shandong.  Failed harvests in 1938 and 1939, and 
looting by soldiers, guerrillas and bandits, further reduced almost the whole rural 
population of Shandong to destitution.306  It became clear that Chinese church 
workers could not continue without supplementing their very modest wages.  A 
bonus of 25% was added to the salaries of Chinese workers, initially for the six 
months from 1 July to 31 December 1939, but was later extended for a further 6 
months to 30 June 1940, to enable these Chinese staff to maintain a barely sufficient 
lifestyle.307   
The seriousness of the BMS’s concern about its own financial position, and its 
anxiety not to set back the programme for devolution, is reflected in the letter from 
                                                
304 BMSA, General Committee Minutes, Vol.36, 19.January.1938, 10. 
305 Daily Mail financial website, historic inflation calculator, accessed 12.October.2014, 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-1633409/Historic-inflation-calculator-value-money-
changed-1900.html.  Total expenditure for the year, including work on all mission fields and work at 
home, came to £144,391, whereas receipts were only £127,247.  Expenditure on China amounted to 
£28,232, whereas expenditure on India, the most costly field, came to more than £64,600.  BMSA, 
Baptist Missionary Society, Directory of Missionaries, Financial Statement and 148th Annual report, 
1939, 215-217.   
306 Private collection of Audrey Salters, Still to parents, 24.May.1939; Still to father, 17.April.1940. 
307 BMSA, Finance Committee Minutes, 13.July.1939; General Committee Minutes, Vol.38, 
17.January.1940, 7 and 12. 
 
 105 
Williamson to Fred Drake, who had taken over as Provincial Secretary during 
Payne’s absence on furlough: 
It is to be made perfectly clear to all concerned that this is a 
bonus, granted as a temporary measure, to meet the 
exigencies of the times, and carries with it no guarantee that 
at the termination of six months the bonus may be 
continued.308 
Drake asked, in response, whether the bonus was to include pastors and evangelists 
paid by the Chinese church, or Mission paid workers only?309  The question 
highlights the complexities involved in trying to separate Mission and Church 
finances, and the potential for inequalities resulting from such an attempt.  
Arrangements which had grown up in an ad hoc way over many years could become 
invidious or unfair in conditions where they became, literally, matters of life or 
death.  It has not been possible to trace Williamson’s reply.  
At this time of national crisis, Zhang was far-sighted enough to be concerned about 
the education of future church leaders.  Formerly an ‘educational ladder’ had allowed 
children in Shandong to progress within the Baptist school system from primary 
school to school-leaving-age.  This was considered essential if enough candidates 
were to be prepared for Christian leadership in the long-term, but had been disrupted 
in 1929 as a result of Government registration requirements.310  The urgent need to 
reopen a BMS junior middle school in the province became an important focus of 
Zhang’s letters during 1939.  He and Drake formulated detailed plans to restart the 
Middle School in Zhoucun and asked the BMS to contribute $25,000, the sum they 
calculated was needed.  This was agreed by the Finance Committee in May 1939.311   
Once again, Williamson’s concern not to allow any dissipation or deviation of funds 
comes across in his letter to Drake: 
Of course you will make it perfectly clear to our Chinese 
friends that this money is to be held in Shanghai in a special 
suspense account earmarked for the purpose until such time 
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as the school is begun, or definite plans made for the 
beginning of the work.312 
This rather heavy-handed warning is redolent of the patronising oversight for which 
Westerners were criticised when delegating responsibilities to their Chinese 
colleagues.313  Was it so unreasonable, however, to make such a stipulation when 
handing over a substantial sum at a time when many other claims might be made on 
the Society?  Subsequent correspondence indicates that the school was successfully 
reopened and did well up to the middle of 1941.  Information on its activity or 
survival after that is not available, and illustrates the difficulty of finding 
documentation relating to the work of the Chinese church after the foreigners left in 
1942.314  The school’s centenary history, published in 2007, has no information 
covering the years from 1942 to 1946, but records that, after a brief post-war 
relocation to Jinan, it reopened in Zhoucun in September 1949.315 
From early in the occupation Japanese pastors had infiltrated all the activities of the 
Chinese church, and it fell upon Zhang to front negotiations between the church and 
the occupiers.316  In November 1938, in order to legitimise the occupation and 
eliminate foreign influence, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye announced Japan’s 
campaign for the New Order in East Asia.317  Its primary goals were to further 
Japan’s economic and political status, but, under slogans such as ‘Asia for the 
Asians’, it set about undermining the Western presence, and this included attempting 
to eliminate Western influence within the Chinese church.  This came to the surface 
during the anti-British campaign of July 1939, when Chinese nationals within all the 
occupied areas were encouraged by the occupiers to demonstrate against the British 
presence.  The demonstrations assumed varying degrees of severity in different areas.   
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In Shanxi, Chinese Christians were threatened and intimidated at each of the places 
where BMS missionaries remained.  In Taiyuan, Chinese Christian leaders were told 
that they ‘would suffer severely unless they left the British mission’.318  One Sunday 
in July, the whole church congregation in Taiyuan was arrested and questioned, 
many beaten and imprisoned, and sixteen detained and charged with involvement in 
anti-Japanese guerrilla activities.  One of the older evangelists spent several months 
in prison before being executed.319  As a result of these and other threatening 
incidents, BMS missionaries decided that it would be in the interests of the Chinese 
Christians if they withdrew altogether from the province, and this they did in August 
1939.320   
In Shandong, missionaries were forced to withdraw from all contact with churches 
and church members, and the BMS hospitals in Zhoucun, Qingzhou and Jinan had to 
close down when death threats were made against Chinese employees.  When the 
foreigners withdrew, church work and church services were allowed to continue.  In 
early September, when the campaign was at its height, Drake wrote to Williamson 
indicating his complete confidence in the strength of the Chinese church.   
It is fortunate that with God’s leading the Church is a 
Chinese organisation and in Chinese hands, and that it will 
carry on whatever happens. It is for us to continue our help as 
long as possible.321 
With missionaries disabled by the actions of the Japanese, Drake indicated his belief 
that the Chinese church had already gained the maturity to survive independently.  
At the end of November 1939, Drake reported a great improvement in relationships 
between missionaries and Japanese authorities in Zhoucun, following the 
appointment of a new military chief ‘who has already made a courtesy call […] of a 
very friendly nature’.322  By January the next year, it became possible to reopen the 
mission hospitals, and missionaries were able to resume their connections with the 
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churches and church schools.  Despite the months of closure, it appeared that public 
confidence in the mission hospitals had not waned, and the Foster Hospital in 
Zhoucun reported that in 1940 a record number of in-patients were treated.323 
The different impact of the anti-British campaign on Chinese Christians, in 
Shandong and Shanxi, owed something to the nature and style of the different 
Japanese military and civilian personnel in the two provinces.  Experience of the 
occupation generally was very dependent on the severity of individual military 
commanders in their dealings with local people, and the control they exercised over 
their staff.  This is illustrated by Drake’s reference to the appointment of the new 
military chief in Zhoucun, referred to above.  It is, however, likely that the evident 
independence of the SBU from foreign control meant that there was less pressure on 
the Japanese military to clamp down on Christian institutions in Shandong, with their 
Chinese leadership.  In Shanxi, foreign missionaries were still closely involved in 
church leadership324 and the campaign against the foreigners had had severe 
repercussions for the Chinese Church.325 
In December 1939, the SBU held a conference reviewing all its recent activities and 
setting out its plans for the future.  Zhang sent the BMS a full report of the 
conference, a report remarkable for its optimism and far-sightedness, given the 
conditions prevailing in Shandong at the time.326  In view of the urgent need for 
increased numbers of evangelists, a course for preachers had already taken place in 
Jinan, which was thought to have been successful.327  Plans were in hand for a 
summer training school for preachers and church leaders, to be run for four weeks 
every year for the next four years.  Zhang also had plans for an inter-provincial Bible 
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School, to give intensive bible training for twenty students taken from all three 
provinces where the BMS was active.   
This is regarded as of vital importance to our church in North 
China.  It is envisaged that church work at the close of the 
war will be making ever increasing demands.  In spite of the 
expense attached to this scheme it is of such importance that 
it should be carried through.328 
In early 1940, after three consecutive years of famine, conditions in rural Shandong 
were desperate.  Zhang wrote again to Williamson making an urgent appeal for relief 
funds: 
Our church members are either compelled to leave their 
homes and travel about as beggars, or else stay at home and 
endure their hunger.  As to their food, it is for the most part 
husks and woods, and dried leaves etc.  If they are able to add 
a little grain to these things, they reckon themselves among 
the fortunate ones.329 
Zhang’s letter, which was forwarded by Payne to London, included the comment that 
he had not asked for help the previous autumn (1939) ‘because of the outbreak of the 
European war and the financial difficulties of the Society of which we are quite 
aware’.  Payne wrote a covering letter to Williamson, in which he reported that 
Zhang’s own brother’s children were out begging in spite of the help Zhang had been 
able to send them from time to time.  ‘It is deplorable to think that a man like 
Chang’s [Zhang’s] brother […] should be reduced to such straits.’330  Zhang’s long-
delayed decision to request help from foreign sources had taken place in the context 
of critically serious conditions in Shandong. 
Was Zhang’s reference to ‘the outbreak of the European war and the financial 
difficulties of the Society’ merely a sycophantic approach to a powerful benefactor?  
In the context of Zhang’s own assured leadership, and his longstanding relationship 
with Williamson, it seems much more likely to have been an indication of Zhang’s 
genuine concern for his European colleagues.  His understanding of the fact that the 
missionary Society’s funds were finite, suggests both maturity and trust.  To outward 
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appearances, the missionary was, by local standards, a very wealthy person.  Even in 
times of war, missionaries lived in large houses, employed servants and ate food 
which was beyond the reach of most local people, and which meant that despite their 
comparatively low incomes by European standards they continued to be able to 
maintain a fairly comfortable lifestyle.331  That Zhang was able to look beyond these 
conspicuous indicators to underlying factors suggests a generous understanding of 
his foreign colleagues. 
Zhang wrote a further letter a few weeks later, saying that he had decided ‘to 
establish three refuges in the most destitute districts for those families who cannot go 
out and beg’.332  From the earliest days of the Mission it had been customary for 
Chinese congregations to depend as much on creative money-making schemes as on 
voluntary gifts from church members.  These were just the sorts of initiative William 
Carey had advocated in the earliest days of the BMS in Bengal.333  The poverty of 
most Chinese Christians meant that such schemes were essential.  Zhang 
demonstrated that he was taking other initiatives to avoid having to rely on help from 
abroad: he had appointed a new man to the SBU administrative staff ‘to care for the 
orchard and beef farm, Christian Co-operative, the agricultural work, clerical work 
etc’.  He had also managed to repay a loan of $500, borrowed from school funds, 
which had been used to build shops next to the city church which were now being 
rented for fund-raising purposes.334  His efforts to build up such resources in these 
difficult times were another indication of his determination to achieve independence 
from foreign funds. 
During the occupation, there was heavy and continuing pressure from the Japanese 
military to take over any property to which they thought they could make a claim.  
They were quick to take over many of the Qilu University buildings when parts of 
the university evacuated to the West at the beginning of the war, and BMS property 
in Shanxi was seized when missionaries were forced to leave during the anti-British 
                                                
331 See Chapter One, page 49. 
332 BMSA, CH/23, SP Shantung, Zhang to Williamson, 16.March.1940, translated by Gao Jian,  
(高键), March 2014; Payne to Williamson, 16.March.1940. 
333 See Chapter One, page 39. 
334 BMSA, CH/23, SP Shantung, Payne to Williamson, 16.March.1940. 
 
 111 
campaign.335  This made it imperative that property was handed over only when the 
Chinese church was able actively to use and maintain it, minimising chances of it 
being opportunistically taken over by the occupiers and lost to the future Chinese 
church. 
Several houses in Zhoucun, which had been built to accommodate foreign 
missionaries, had fallen vacant during the late 1930s but were still owned by the 
Mission rather than the church.  A number of church families had taken refuge in 
them, and on the premises of the mission school, at the time of the Japanese invasion 
in 1937.  In the absence of foreigners, the church members sheltering there came to 
the attention of the Chinese guerrillas, who put church members under pressure to 
provide them with refuge.  At the same time, the Japanese gave signs that they were 
looking for an opportunity to take over the property themselves.336  ‘I cannot, as you 
will understand, go into details with regard to guerrilla activities’, wrote Payne, but 
the difficulty had ‘led to some anxious times’.337    
When alternative accommodation was needed for missionary families evacuated 
from Shanxi following the anti-British campaign of 1939, the BMS decided that 
some of the Shanxi families should come to Zhoucun.  The preferred accommodation 
for the new arrivals was in the mission houses now occupied by Chinese families.  
Fred Drake reported to the Mission House:  
The church leaders have been left with a free hand with the 
property, and now that more of it is needed to house our 
Shansi folk the Chinese resent it […] It looks to me that for 
political reasons (protections etc) they wish to have one 
foreigner, or family, living on the West side, but not a 
second.338   
The fact that the BMS staff had loosened their control of the properties, in the 
interests of providing shelter for church members, meant that the priorities of the 
foreigners and the Chinese came into conflict.  
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The two last war-time letters from Zhang which are held in the BMS archive were 
undated but received in London on 6 June and 11 October 1940.339  In the first, 
Zhang described the emergency shelters set up in the province using funds from the 
China International Famine Relief Committee, a local committee for the distribution 
of international funds, made up of himself and three Chinese colleagues from the 
SBU, two American Roman Catholic priests, and Ronald Still, by that time one of 
only two BMS men still in Zhoucun.  Zhang was acutely anxious about the effect 
that the famine conditions were having on the children:  
There is no rainfall so far and there is no hope for the wheat 
harvest in the north.  We don’t know how to deal with the 
hundreds of children […] The money is running out.  If there 
is no assistance from other places, they would have no chance 
to stay alive.340   
He described also the difficult decisions which had to be made about distributing a 
limited amount of money between an unlimited number of people in desperate need.  
One distribution had been restricted to church members only.   
We had no other choices.  Even if we had further distributed 
additional 20,000 yuan, it would still not make a difference.  
So we decided to carry out the relief in an effective way.341 
In the later letter, Zhang referred in several places to ‘difficulties from outside’ 
having increased.  As a result, it had been necessary to cut down on preparation 
classes for would-be Christians, and there had been great difficulty in maintaining 
sufficient pastors and evangelists: 
We are short of talent. Male and female preachers and 
ministers are insufficient. We will cancel three rural 
preaching teams in the latter half of the year. We have just 
enough preachers to go round. As for ministers for the 
congregations, there are six congregations whose preachers 
are unsuitable. Two congregations need female preachers and 
we don’t have any suitable candidates to invite.[…] Even if 
there were any candidates, we could not recruit them because 
the cost of living is too high.342  
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Zhang concluded his letter by saying that he wanted to resign as Secretary of the 
SBU, in order to return to his family in Shaanxi, who were in difficulties. 
The Baptist archive is almost entirely silent on events in the Chinese church in 
Shandong from this point and following the outbreak of war between Britain and 
Japan in December 1941 when all correspondence between Britain and occupied 
China ceased.  Some information on the experiences of Chinese Baptists, including 
Zhang Sijing, during the succeeding three and a half years of war, became available 
when communications with the BMS were reopened in late 1945 and this will be 
examined in Chapter Four. 
Figure 7: Zhang Sijing in 1937 (left) and 1947 (right)343 
Figure 7 illustrates the toll taken of Zhang Sijing by the war years.  The contrast 
between him as he was in early 1937, smiling and assured in his role as a leading 
figure in the SBU, and the later picture, where his emaciated physique speaks of the 
privations he has endured in the previous decade, is stark.  H.R..Williamson met 
Zhang during his visit to Jinan as part of his China tour in 1945/46.  Afterwards 
Williamson wrote: 
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He had taken this journey at considerable risk, for he is not in 
favour with the Communists. […]   He has managed to 
maintain himself and many of his colleagues in a worthy 
manner, and has done more than any other single person to 
keep our Baptist Church in Shantung [Shandong] together, 
and as actively engaged as possible.  We owe a great debt to 
Chang Ssi Jing [Zhang Sijing] for his courage, loyalty and 
enterprise.344 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the relative positions of missionaries and Chinese 
Christians under the occupation, and has demonstrated some differences in the way 
they experienced Japanese rule in Shandong province.  Questions have been raised as 
to whether these experiences brought them closer in their understanding of each 
other or forced them further apart.  The exploration of the concept of collaboration 
has thrown some light on the dilemmas experienced by the two communities, but its 
limitations are also apparent, being too restricted in its application to point to firm 
conclusions or enable deeper understandings.   
Chinese Christians were in constant danger of homelessness, starvation, and loss of 
life.  British missionaries also faced danger, injury, and hardship; but they had a 
place in the fabric of international legislation, and the backing of a government with 
a duty to protect their interests.  This fundamental difference in personal 
vulnerability must have influenced the way they made decisions about the future, the 
kind of compromises which they were willing to accept, and the way in which they 
regarded each other.  Even where there was no suspicion of treachery, the vast and 
evident gap between the concerns and lifestyles of the missionaries and those of their 
Chinese colleagues during this period are likely to have underlined any sense of 
inequality in the relationship. 
At this interval of time, and without access to other documentary evidence, one can 
only speculate as to the ways in which the Chinese Christians and the foreign 
missionaries regarded each other, and to what extent they understood the constraints 
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under which each was operating.  There can be no doubt though that, in the tinderbox 
conditions brought about by enemy occupation, there was plenty of scope for ill-will 
and misunderstanding.  Evidence that leaders of the Chinese church were ready to 
resume warm and trusting relationships with British Baptist missionaries after the 
war will be explored in Chapter Four.  This suggests that claims of alienation from 
the leadership in the Shandong church are unjustified. 
The other main focus of the chapter has been on whether the war years helped or 
hindered the Chinese Baptist churches in Shandong to move towards independence 
of the Mission.  The letters exchanged between Zhang Sijing in Shandong and the 
BMS Secretariat in London suggest that Zhang and the Society were in agreement in 
their commitment to devolution at the outset of the war.  During the years to 1942, 
Zhang persisted with his drive towards a church that was self-supporting, self-
propagating and self-governing: he continued his efforts to find means to fund the 
pastoral and evangelical activities of the church and to offer educational and training 
opportunities to prospective church leaders.  The BMS encouraged him in his plans 
and made contributions towards their implementation.  However, the restrictions 
imposed by the Japanese occupation, the impoverishment of the people resulting 
from continuing military activity and the terrible consequences of drought and failed 
harvests in 1938, 1939 and 1941, meant that Zhang was forced on several occasions 
to plead for foreign help.   
The archives covering the work of the BMS in Shandong do not provide evidence to 
support Ling’s contention that missionaries were ‘arbiters of doctrine, the source of 
power, and paymasters of the Chinese Christians’, either before or after the war.345  
When Zhang wrote, he did so as an independent leader of the Chinese church, 
responsible for running the finances of the church, and with the knowledge and 
authority to make plans for its future.  He wrote to Williamson, the China Secretary 
at the Mission House, as a sympathetic colleague, and appealed to the Society not as 
‘paymaster’, but as a body which he knew to be concerned for the Chinese people for 
whom Zhang was responsible, and likely to come to their aid in their time of need.  
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There may be traces of a paternalistic attitude on Williamson’s part, but not the 
imbalance of power in the relationship which Ling asserts.  It seems that Ling’s study 
has taken insufficient account of the different approaches taken by different 
missionary societies. 
Brook’s argument, detailing the movement of the Chinese church away from mission 
domination, points to developments after the departure of British missionaries from 
the occupied areas as key evidence for his case.  In the absence of the missionary 
body during this period, the Baptist archive is quiet on this point, although the plea 
for continued financial help after the war ended demonstrates that the Chinese 
church, in those precarious times, remained dependent as ever on mission support.  
The experience and views of returning missionaries in 1945 and 1946 provide some 
relevant indicators. 
The following chapter examines the experiences of those BMS missionaries who did 
not experience Japanese occupation, but were able to continue the work of the 
Mission in Shaanxi province throughout the war years. 
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Chapter Three: The BMS in Shaanxi province, 
1937 to 1945 
‘We recognise that drastic changes in the status of all 
missionaries in China are inevitable and are already 
beginning to take place.’346 
Chapter Two explored the position of foreign missionaries and the pressures put on 
the Chinese Church in Shandong by the Japanese occupation.  Shaanxi did not fall to 
the Japanese and was therefore the only place in China where BMS missionaries 
were able to stay in post throughout the war years, and the only place where 
foreigners had an unbroken record of work in churches, schools and hospitals.  
Unlike Shandong and Shanxi, the Baptist church in Shaanxi was established by 
Chinese Christians, at the outset effectively self-supporting, self-propagating and 
self-governing until, subsequently, BMS missionaries were invited by church 
members into the province.347  By the 1930s, although the long-term goal was 
independence from foreign support, there was no plan to achieve this in the short 
term.  Exploration of the work of the mission during the war years, which forms part 
of the focus of this chapter, reinforces this view.   
Particular political factors coloured developments in the province.  A major new 
element had been introduced into the political scene in China in 1921, with the 
formation of the CCP.  In late 1935, the Red Army had settled in Shaanxi, and the 
CCP had established its headquarters there.  It has been suggested that, before the 
Communists came to power, the majority of Chinese Christians and foreign 
missionaries had had no direct contact with Chinese Communists.  ‘Few knew what 
to expect when the Communist armies arrived to “liberate” them, but most were 
apprehensive and many expected the worst.’348  Examination of the BMS archive 
demonstrates that this was only partially true with regard to missionaries in Shaanxi, 
who had had experience of Communists in the province for several years before and 
during the war with Japan.  
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The abrogation in 1943 of the nineteenth-century Treaties of Nanjing and Tianjin 
also had far-reaching implications.  The presence of missionaries in China had been 
dependent on the legal status afforded them by the Treaties, and without this they 
could only remain with the toleration of the Chinese government.  While in 1943 
their colleagues in Shandong and Shanxi had been removed from the scene by 
internment, BMS missionaries in Shaanxi quite soon became aware of some of the 
consequences of the abolition of the Treaties, including the shift in Chiang Kai-
shek’s attitude to Britain as a result of the alliance between China, the United States 
and Britain.  Other changes in the relationship between Britain and China, brought 
about by the war, also had an impact on missionaries living there.  The effects of 
these political developments on the BMS are explored in this chapter, and begin to 
point to a situation in which foreigners would no longer be able to hold a place in 
leadership positions.   
Although Shaanxi was never captured, Xi’an, along with Chongqing, headquarters of 
China’s displaced Nationalist government, were the main targets of Japanese aerial 
bombardment.  Over four hundred bombing raids on Xi’an caused multiple deaths 
and injuries, damaged property and disrupted industry.  Supply lines were cut, prices 
for scarce commodities rose, and millions of refugees pouring in from the East 
increased demand on the limited resources.  The BMS hospital building, constructed 
in 1905, was put out of service during air raids in March 1939, and medical work had 
to be transferred to the former boys’ school.  The city church and preaching halls, 
and five missionary residences were also badly damaged.349  The peculiar confluence 
of circumstances at work in Shaanxi had an effect both on relationships between 
missionaries and the Chinese church and secular authorities, and on the way in which 
missionaries responded to the developing power of the CCP. 
The Red Army in Shaanxi 
This section considers the developing attitudes of the BMS to the CCP and the Red 
Army, as a result of the presence of the Red Army in Shaanxi from the 1920s, and 
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particularly following their settlement in Yan’an, where there was an established 
Baptist church, in 1935. 
There had been a small Red Army presence, fewer than 10,000 men under the 
leadership of Liu Zhidan (刘志丹), in northern Shaanxi for some time prior to the 
arrival of the veterans of the Long March in October 1935, and missionaries were 
aware of Red Army activity from the early 1930s.350  The belief that Communism 
was an ideology incompatible with Christianity, and its history of violence against 
those who opposed it, formed the basis of initial missionary distrust.  Joan 
Williamson, BMS missionary in Shaanxi from 1923, wrote with characteristic 
passion describing an attack on Xi’an by the Red Army in August 1926, when the 
mission compound was thronged with refugees trying to escape the fighting.  At 2.00 
in the morning, Red Army soldiers broke into the compound searching for grain.  
They returned later in the morning and commandeered the mission’s entire food 
store, including ‘all we had prepared for the refugees’. 
I wish some of the people who are always grousing at home 
could have seen the pathetic sight of the refugees kneeling in 
the mud and asking the soldiers to leave them some food.  If 
ever I feel inclined to vote ‘Red’ I shall think of that crowd, 
as the soldiers were ‘Red’ and supposed to be the People’s 
Army and the protectors of the common people’s rights.351 
George Young, an evangelist with the BMS in Shaanxi from 1924, wrote later that 
‘people could not be blamed for being scared of the “Reds”.’, remembering the 
devastation in Jiangxi province in 1930, when 150,000 people were killed, and more 
than a million were driven from the province in terror.352   
In 1932, Fred Russell wrote to Mission headquarters reporting a raid on three 
villages by armed bandits who carried off several Chinese Christians and held them 
to ransom.  The families concerned had appealed to the local military authorities for 
help, but were told that their men were too busy attempting to ward off Red Army 
troops who were threatening the provincial capital, and were therefore powerless to 
do anything about the bandits, who ‘were well aware of this situation and, of course, 
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were taking advantage of it.’353  Already the presence of the Red Army was affecting 
local conditions.  From the missionary point of view, worse was to follow.  In late 
1934, a young American couple, John and Betty Stam of the CIM, were beheaded by 
Communist troops in Anhui province, leaving their three-month-old baby daughter 
orphaned.  The story was very widely publicised in missionary circles and left a 
lasting impression of Communist ruthlessness and antagonism to Christianity.354 
When the main body of the Red Army arrived in Yan’an in late 1935, at the end of 
its renowned Long March, the BMS immediately felt the impact.  Mission premises 
in Yan’an, including hospital, school and church buildings, were ‘forcibly occupied’ 
and ‘a good deal of damage was done’.355  The two hundred members of the Baptist 
church in Yan’an were cut off from the rest of the Baptists in the area and the 
congregation forced to worship in a cave in a nearby village, to which they 
transported church furniture, including a baby organ.356  
A year later, during what became known as the ‘Xi’an incident’, Chiang Kai-shek 
was kidnapped in Xi’an by two of his own Generals.  Anticipating major 
disturbances and on the advice of the British and American Embassies, seventy-five 
foreigners, including the majority of the BMS women and children, were evacuated 
from Shaanxi.  The tense political situation was unexpectedly resolved as a result of 
‘some of the most complex and delicate negotiations in China’s modern history’, and 
Chiang agreed to form a united front with the Communists, in opposition to Japanese 
aggression.357  
In the aftermath of the negotiations, the Communists indicated that they were 
prepared to modify some of their policies and, in particular, began to adopt a more 
moderate land reform policy.  Rich landlords, who in the past had been killed, were 
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instead subject to fines.  The following month, Xi’an was occupied by the Red Army.  
Jonathan Fenby notes that:  
As a sign of the new attitude, the Red Army gave a banquet 
for local military and civilian officials, north of Xi’an, to 
which an Italian priest and Protestant missionaries were 
invited.358 
Direct archival evidence that BMS missionaries were amongst those invited to the 
banquet could not be traced, but H.R. Williamson observed that, on the arrival of the 
Red Army in Shaanxi ‘some interesting contacts were made by our missionaries with 
Chou-En-Lai [Zhou Enlai]’.359    
Four BMS men had remained in the province at the time of Chiang’s kidnapping, and 
these had immediate contacts with the Red Army troops.  They were ‘agreeably 
surprised’ to find that they ‘no longer carried out their policy of pillage and murder, 
but were friendly to the country people and to the church.’360  George Young wrote 
of his impressions: 
As they settled down in the villages and we came into contact 
with them, it was clear that the Red soldiers were a well-
disciplined body of men who were friendly to foreigners, and 
who treated the peasants well. […]  They were a keen lot, full 
of fun and vitality. […] It was an exhilarating experience to 
meet the leaders and men and women of the Red Army.  I 
found in them a toughness, a resolution, an abounding energy 
and buoyancy of spirit.361 
Elsewhere, Menzies Clow described his interaction with five Communist soldiers 
who became patients in the BMS hospital:   
All listened very well when I went over to talk to them of 
Christianity. […] I found them very willing to discuss 
religion and keen to learn.  They emphasised the point that 
they now believed in religious freedom.362 
It is clear from these descriptions that not only did the BMS missionaries have 
opportunities to engage with the Communist troops in the local area, but that they did 
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so on friendly terms.  So impressed was George Young by his encounters with 
Communism that, in Spring 1939, he wrote enthusiastically to friends at home of ‘the 
hopeful confidence of the east in contrast to the oppressive and fear laden 
atmosphere of European militarism’, a surprising comment given that, at the time, 
China was engaged in all-out battle with Japanese aggressors within its own 
borders.363 
BMS missionaries were not alone in forming favourable impressions after early 
contacts with Communists in Yan’an.  The story of the formidable struggles of the 
survivors of the Long March, and the brave new community they were building in 
the mountains, spread widely.  ‘In Communist propaganda, Yan'an became China's 
"revolutionary holy land," and the border region was promoted as a socially 
progressive and democratic model for all of China.’364  In Britain and the United 
States, a mythology developed around this ‘never-never-land full of sunshine and 
bonhomie’.   
The revolutionary enthusiasm was infectious, as Edgar Snow 
and other journalists reported to the world.  The homespun 
democracy apparent among the CCP leaders was a startling 
contrast to Chongqing […] and the superficiality of contact 
allowed the cultivation of a mythology that captivated 
liberals abroad.365 
The positive image of life in Yan’an was not without its critics.  Some 
contemporaries noted the better food and housing enjoyed by members of the CCP 
élite, which jarred with its egalitarian ideals, and Ding Ling (丁玲), a left-wing writer 
who had lived for a while in Yan’an, criticised the CCP’s failure to implement its 
declared commitment to emancipation for women.366  However, foreigners 
encountering Communism in Shaanxi in the late 1930s were favourably impressed, 
and this included some of the missionaries. 
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Missionaries in Shaanxi were not encouraged to get beyond casual contacts with Red 
Army personnel.  BMS policy had always been to follow ‘the policy of His 
Majesty’s Government’, which required ‘recognition and support of the central 
Government of the day’, and the Nationalist Government discouraged relationships 
with the Communists in the province.367  In his 1937 annual report for Sanyuan 
District, Keith Bryan made ‘special mention’ of Yan’an and referred to the cessation 
of hostilities and greatly improved conditions.  Bryan was keen to revisit the Baptist 
church members from whom missionaries had been cut off for more than two years.  
He noted, however, that despite the improved conditions, ‘negotiations [by the CCP] 
were still continuing with the Central government in Nanking and until these had 
been completed […] it was considered unwise for a missionary to visit.’368  William 
Mudd, writing at much the same time, commented: 
We still have in mind a visit to Yenan [Yan’an].  Journalists 
pass through on the way there, but we have to be careful to 
maintain a neutral position between those whose headquarters 
are in Yenan, and those in Sian.369 
It is not completely clear from Mudd’s reference to ‘headquarters’ in Yan’an and 
Xi’an, whether the latter is an oblique reference to the Nationalist authority, or 
whether he is referring in both instances to Communist authorities.  By March 1938, 
there were communists in both Yan’an and Xi’an, while the Nationalist government 
had its administrative headquarters in Chongqing.370  It would have been in line with 
BMS policy, however, for Mudd to bow to the authority of the officially recognised 
government of the whole of China, the Nationalists, while acknowledging a possible 
exception in the Communist base area in Yan’an. 
An attractive opportunity for the BMS doctor, Handley Stockley, to make contact 
with the Communist leadership had to be turned down for similar reasons.  Stockley 
had been on the staff of the BMS hospital in Xi’an since 1924, and had a reputation 
for successful treatment of diseases of the eye.  Late in 1941, he was approached by 
Mao Zedong’s personal physician at Yan’an, Fu Lianzhang (傅连璋), a Christian, 
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who invited Stockley to spend a week or two in the Communist headquarters doing 
ophthalmic work.  Reporting the incident to the BMS in London, Fred Russell wrote: 
Dr Stockley and I put the case to an influential official […] 
who is in close touch with the Military Governor of Shensi, 
and asked him to sound the Governor on the question.  The 
Governor’s reaction was most clear and emphatic that we 
should not go to Yenan.’371 
Later in the letter, Russell referred to ‘recent evidence of the sincerity of the 
Communist welcome to foreign missionaries’, giving the impression that, despite the 
Governor’s advice, he would have liked Stockley to have been able to respond 
positively to Dr. Fu’s invitation.  Had he done so, Stockley’s name might today be as 
familiar in the People’s Republic of China as that of Norman Bethune.372 
In early 1942, Mao launched the ‘Rectification Campaign’ in Yan’an with a view to 
improving CCP discipline and organisation, and consolidating his preeminent 
position in the Party.  This produced a ‘severe change of mood in Yan’an’.  It 
became much harder for people to enter or leave the region.   
The city was cut off from the outside world not only by 
enemy blockade, but also by a new hardness of the party line.  
An earlier atmosphere of openness and collective enterprise 
gave way to a much more all or nothing environment.  Ideas 
of pluralism and ‘new democracy’ were replaced by a turn 
toward party control.373 
By the end of the war, however, the main deterrent to closer contacts between 
missionaries and Communists appeared to be the stance taken by the Nationalists.  
Williamson visited Shaanxi in November 1945, as part of his post-war tour of BMS 
stations in China, and reported: 
Visitors to the Communist headquarters have said that the 
leaders are willing to receive missionaries if they go for the 
welfare of the people, and that they are ready to permit the 
rebuilding of our church in Yenan city.  However, the 
Nationalist leaders have discouraged, and practically 
prohibited, our missionaries from going there, and Nationalist 
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officials in Shensi itself have so far definitely withheld 
permission for such a venture.374 
The early reputation of the Red Army had made BMS missionaries in Shaanxi wary 
of what they might expect from a communist regime.  From 1934, however, first-
hand contact with Communist forces had given the missionaries opportunities to 
modify their views.  The evidence from the Baptist archive indicates that 
missionaries took note of the approachability of the Communists they encountered, 
and made efforts when they could to interact with them.  Nevertheless, BMS policy 
of remaining loyal to the established Nationalist government, and the missionaries’ 
desire to cooperate with the government where opportunities arose, acted as a barrier 
to more active cooperation with Communists.  By mid 1942, the CCP’s own change 
of policy meant that opportunities to forge links with Communists in their 
neighbourhood were much reduced. 
In the two other provinces in which BMS missionaries were involved, Shandong and 
Shanxi, the Communist presence during the war had taken the form of guerrilla 
action against the Japanese.  Support, which missionaries may have wanted privately 
to give to the Chinese guerrillas in their fight against the Japanese, was mixed with 
apprehension of the destructive effects of guerrilla action in the short term:  personal 
injuries sustained by the guerrillas in carrying out their plans; disruption to everyday 
life which resulted from successful sabotage operations; and the consequences for 
innocent civilians of Japanese reprisals.  A flavour of the mixed feelings thus 
generated is reflected in a letter from Gwyneth Still, in Shandong, to her family in 
England.  She explained that she was hoping for rain, because guerrilla action was 
usually abandoned on wet nights. 
It is pouring with rain now and I think the earth will get 
sufficiently soaked to guarantee a night’s rest […] I suppose I 
ought not to feel so pleased but all these affairs are so 
hopeless.  It is tragic how little they do and what big losses 
they involve.375 
Any overt indication of association with Chinese guerrillas was carefully avoided by 
missionaries in Shandong and Shanxi, in order not to jeopardise relationships 
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between the British and Japanese governments.  Thus missionaries there did not have 
the same opportunities as their colleagues in Shaanxi to form a first-hand impression 
of Chinese communism or to develop an understanding of the nature of the 
movement that was soon to become all important in the future of China.  This 
difference in experience during the war of resistance to Japan may offer a partial 
explanation for the widely differing accounts of the new regime brought back by 
British missionaries returning from different parts of China after the founding of the 
People’s Republic in 1949.  
BMS evangelical work in Shaanxi during the war 
years 
This section explores the role of missionaries in evangelical work and church activity 
during the war years.  The early 1930s saw a blossoming of interest in the work of 
the Mission and the local churches in Shaanxi.  Missionaries and Baptist church 
members attributed this to the relatively peaceful political conditions in the province 
which followed the establishment of the Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-
shek in 1927.   
In 1930, the Chinese church launched a five-year discipleship campaign which 
proved ‘a remarkable success […] in reviving the church and winning hundreds of 
new disciples’.376  While senior missionaries were involved with church members in 
this campaign to reach new audiences and lapsed church members, ideas were 
introduced by a younger generation of missionaries on lines which had proved 
popular in English industrial towns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries: a young men’s group was established in Xi’an and offered a library, 
reading room, singing class, tennis and ramblers’ clubs, along with prayer and Bible 
study groups.  Proposals were also drawn up to open an inn for Christian young men 
arriving from the coastal towns to work in the city, and a hostel for students from 
country villages.377  Some of those attending the meetings and classes came simply 
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to acquire English language skills, seen at that time by many Chinese as an avenue 
‘to study abroad, treaty port employment, or perusal of English literature, political 
theory, and science.’378  As the five-year campaign neared its end in 1934, the BMS 
Provincial Secretary, Fred Russell, reported that the Autumn Assembly had been ‘the 
most successful we have ever experienced’.379 
In the same year, particularly close bonds between BMS missionaries in Shaanxi and 
the Nationalist leadership were established when Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, 
Soong Mei-ling (宋美龄), visited Xi’an to promote the New Life Movement  
(新生活运动; Xin shenghuo yundong), a movement initiated by Chiang ostensibly to 
create a sense of citizenship worthy of the modern Chinese state.380  It was a regime 
which claimed to focus on improving national health and standards of personal 
conduct, and which included on its agenda plans to break the national opium habit.  
When Soong met with BMS staff, she advocated opening a refuge for women 
addicts, and volunteered $3,000 towards the necessary equipment.  The missionaries 
had no reason to resist Soong’s forceful charisma; she was later described by Joseph 
Stilwell as a ‘clever, brainy woman’.381  Menzies Clow, one of the missionaries 
present, records that they ‘gladly fell in with her wishes’, undertaking to set up and 
run the refuge, under a Committee which included the wife of the Chairman of the 
Provincial Government, Shao Lizi (邵力子), and the wife of the Military Governor, 
along with four BMS missionaries. 
Madame Shao is taking a deep interest in the clinic and is 
concerned about even the smallest details of equipment and 
management, nothing escapes her notice […] Working in 
cooperation with such energetic and capable Chinese ladies is 
an interesting experience, and we trust that it will be mutually 
beneficial.382 
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Although there are other instances of amicable cooperation between mission staff 
and Chinese provincial and local leadership, in this context, Clow’s comment reflects 
the pleasure the missionaries felt at finding themselves accepted, for the moment, 
into the very heart of local affairs.  In this instance, associating with the national 
government appeared to the missionaries to come with practical benefits. 
In December 1937 a special meeting was held in Sanyuan of the nine foreign 
missionaries based there.  The purpose of the meeting was to consider a plan 
whereby the church in Shaanxi ‘may eventually become entirely self-supporting and 
self-propagating’.383  At the meeting, many very practical points were made to 
counter the problems that had thus far stood in the way of the Chinese church in 
Shaanxi achieving independence.  Since the Church would never be able to afford 
large numbers of paid leaders, much of the work would have to be structured around 
the use of trained volunteers.  Money raised by church members should be used to 
maintain the pastorate, and the costs of maintaining church property should be met 
by income derived from the property.  There was agreement that it might be possible 
to cease BMS funding ‘twenty five years from now’ but that the Church could not 
maintain large institutions such as schools and hospitals.  If these were to survive 
they would have to operate under independent management and generate their own 
income.  The style and nature of church life thus proposed closely resembled the 
original church planted in Shaanxi by Shandong immigrants, before the introduction 
of large-scale institutional work adopted by the BMS in the early twentieth century.  
There were immediate implications for school and hospital work, some of which will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  The proposals also anticipated developments 
necessitated by the intervention of the CCP after the PRC was set up in 1949. 
After the onset of the war with Japan, church life continued to flourish.  Handley 
Stockley reported in early 1938 that ‘all our Bibles are sold out and it is impossible 
to get any more’.384  Many other missionary letters and reports confirmed this 
account of development and expansion.   
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The work goes with a swing just now.  Revival has broken 
out all over the church area, and very encouraging reports 
come to us from many voluntary preaching bands.  This year 
[1938] has been one of the most successful years for the 
annual spring preaching and visitation campaign.385 
Baptisms […] have doubled, Church contributions have 
increased considerably, congregations have been much 
larger, and the spiritual life of the Church has been 
quickened. […] We are embarrassed by numbers.386   
Church work and attendances at church services, meetings and study groups in the 
Shaanxi churches continued to thrive throughout the years of war.  Evangelism in the 
mission hospitals was also popularly received.  Writing in October 1941, Clow 
declared that, ‘Never have conditions been more favourable for hospital evangelism.  
It is a pleasure to take ward services.’  The patients took the initiative in suggesting 
that ward services should be held on Sundays as well as weekdays.387  
The missionaries’ sense that the war had provided them with new opportunities was 
emphatically confirmed by Dr Margaret Jenkins in an article in which she quoted a 
Xi’an colleague as saying that the ‘doors of opportunity for the Gospel in China have 
been taken off their hinges’.388  Several reasons may be put forward for this buoyant 
interest.  In Japanese-occupied China being associated with missionaries might offer 
a measure of protection, as suggested in Chapter Two.  However, there is no 
evidence in the Baptist archive to support the view that this was an attraction in the 
case of Shaanxi.  Invading Japanese soldiers might be deterred by British flags 
denoting a foreign compound, but aerial bombardment did not distinguish so finely, a 
reality rudely demonstrated by the damage to mission property in Xi’an in early 
1939.   
There were Christian refugees from other provinces amongst the millions of refugees 
driven to Shaanxi by the war, and this has been put forward as one of the reasons for 
the surge in attendance at church meetings and services.  The Baptist correspondence 
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refers specifically to several groups of wartime refugees from the Shandong Baptist 
churches making their appearance and subsequently taking a lead role in church life 
in Shaanxi, another indication of the strength of indigenous church members in 
Shandong.389   
Lary suggests that an important development in China during the 1940s was ‘the 
survival mentality, the idea of looking after oneself at the cost of concern for others’: 
It is a mentality borne of extreme poverty and insecurity, 
when the extended family and broader social connections are 
either absent, through separation or death, or too demanding 
in time and money.  Each small unit strives only to look after 
itself in a dog-eat-dog world where you either survive or 
die.390 
Some missionaries believed, however, that the stresses of war increased the 
relevance of the Christian message: 
All around us there are men and women tense, strained, 
burdened, and bewildered by the hideous cruelty of modern 
war […].  To these brothers and sisters in tribulation we 
come in Christ’s name to strengthen their morale and steady 
their hearts with His message of consolation.391 
There is research which suggests that personal or community trauma may impel 
people to examine their belief systems or seek consolation from spiritual sources, 
although this will not necessarily lead to involvement in organised religion.392  
Shaanxi missionaries were of the view that Christianity’s appeal was enhanced by 
the exigencies of war. 
The conspicuous war work being undertaken by foreign missionaries and Chinese 
Christians may have been another factor that prompted an interest in Christianity.  
The very fact that missionaries stayed on in China after the onset of war led some to 
look more positively on the missionary contribution.  An editorial in the Chinese 
Recorder made this point in its issue of March 1939: 
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As one businessman remarked, ‘What the missionaries have 
done in staying by to serve the people will do more good for 
Christianity in China than ten years of preaching’.  This same 
sentiment of appreciation is being received from all parts of 
the country.393 
One important piece of Christian war work was the National Christian Service 
Council for Wounded Soldiers in Transit. This interdenominational and international 
organisation set up twelve first-aid stations in the provinces of Shaanxi, Henan and 
Shanxi to provide emergency food, shelter and medical aid to wounded soldiers who, 
in the absence of transportation, or a mobile army medical service, lay helpless in 
their thousands in villages and along the roadsides in the aftermath of battle.394  BMS 
staff, church members, pastors and evangelists were actively involved in the 
organisation throughout the early part of the war.  An article in the Missionary 
Herald reflected a widely expressed, though arguably over-optimistic, view: 
Is it to be wondered at that a Chinese cabinet minister was 
seen recently studying a Bible because he had been impressed 
by the fact that the people in China revealing the biggest 
spirit of sacrifice and service were the Christians?395 
The apparent upsurge of interest in Christianity in Shaanxi in the 1930s and early 
1940s engendered a new sense of optimism in the members of the Mission.  In his 
report on his deputation visit to China in early 1946, Williamson commented that 
‘probably the church never stood higher in the estimation of the common people of 
China than it does today’.396  In time of war, foreign missionaries had played a 
respected part.  Shaanxi missionaries could not be tainted by accusations of 
collaborating with an enemy occupation, as those in Shandong and Shanxi might 
have been. 
The educational work of the mission 
Amongst the most important BMS evangelical work in Shaanxi at the time was the 
work in middle schools.  Unlike in Shandong, where schools had been closed due to 
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new regulations, educational work in Shaanxi remained a significant focus, and this 
section examines the place of foreigners within it during the war years.  The BMS 
had opened a boarding school for girls in Shaanxi at Fuyincun in 1892, and a school 
for boys was opened at the same time.397  Jenny Beckingsale was Principal of the 
girls’ school from 1900 to 1913.398  She had been one of the first women to study at 
Somerville College, Oxford, and was a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin.399  
Boarding schools were also opened at Xi’an for both boys and girls, and by the mid 
1920s eight BMS higher primary schools and fifty lower primary schools were in 
operation.  
The abolition of the traditional examination system in China in 1905 was the spur to 
the creation of many new government schools, when for the first time there was a 
call for the education of girls.  Harrison notes, however:  
in practice the new schools were almost entirely for boys.[…] 
In 1909 girls were less than 2% of the total student body and 
education for girls remained to a large extent the province of 
foreign missionaries.400  
Private schools, including mission schools, became subject to government scrutiny.  
Paul Cohen, in his comparison of the reforms of the Dowager Empress Cixi  
(慈禧太后), Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), and Chiang Kai-shek, notes that all three attached 
importance to the expansion and reform of China’s school system, seeing them ‘both 
as an instrument of social control and as a means of fashioning a more patriotic 
citizenry.’401 Regulation of both the management of schools and their curricula were 
essential elements in ensuring that schools conformed to the goals of the national 
government. 
Schools were important to the missionary societies, and the new regulations caused 
serious debate which has generated a substantial literature.402  According to Dan Cui 
                                                
397 Williamson, British Baptists, 55. 
398 J.C..Keyte, Andrew Young of Shensi, Adventure in Medical Missions (London, 1924), 129. 
399 Missionary Herald (August 1913), 257-8. Women were not permitted to matriculate at the 
University of Oxford until 1920.   
400 Harrison, China, 92. 
401 Cohen, “Post-Mao Reforms”, 530. 
402 See, for example, Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges; Ka-Che Yip, Religion, Nationalism and 
Chinese Studies, The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-27, (Centre for Asian Studies, West 
 
 133 
the transfer of control to Chinese heads, and predominantly Chinese boards of 
governors, required by the new regulations, did not take place ‘as a compulsory 
action forced upon a reluctant missionary establishment by the new Nationalist 
Government and a rising tide of Chinese nationalism’, as is often portrayed, 
especially in PRC sources.  Primary reasons for conflict between the mission boards 
and the forces of Chinese nationalism at the time, suggests Cui, were disagreements 
about the proposed pace of educational devolution, and the right of missionaries to 
appoint their own successors in leadership positions, rather than government 
stipulations about the nature of school leadership or curricula.403  Bickers also argues 
that, prior to the introduction of national regulations, Mission Boards understood and 
widely accepted the necessity to transfer leadership in mission schools to Chinese 
heads.404  
For a school to be registered, the regulations also required that all Christian teaching 
must be eliminated from the curriculum in primary schools, and made voluntary in 
higher-level schools.  Debate about the appropriateness and nature of religious 
education within a state education system has been on the agenda of many 
modernising societies, and it is instructive to be reminded of this in the context of the 
debate over mission-run schools in China.  Widespread furore, for example, preceded 
the introduction of the 1870 (England) and 1872 (Scotland) Education Acts, 
including questions about what role the State should play, what sort of curriculum 
was appropriate and what kind of religious instruction should be given, especially in 
publicly-funded schools.405  In 1920s China, however, the issue held particular 
significance.  In the context of the growth of Chinese nationalism, the belief that 
Western missionary institutions constituted a form of imperial exploitation, or 
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cultural invasion, made the subject particularly inflammatory.406  This is expressed in 
an order put out by the Nationalist Government Board of Education to ‘all District 
magistrates and Education Officers’ in April 1927:  
Of the Imperialists’ methods of encroaching on China those 
most easy to perceive are the various kinds of oppression in 
governance and finance; what are most difficult to see are the 
encroachments of civilisations, eg the schools […]  On the 
surface these appear to help China and to promote education, 
but in reality they dope the Chinese people […] to such an 
extent that in church schools they stop students loving their 
own country, compel them to believe the doctrine and inflict 
all kinds of denial of Liberty and equality.407 
The new requirements in China generated concern within the BMS Home leadership. 
Was it appropriate for the BMS to continue maintaining its own schools and 
educational institutions if religious teaching was disallowed?   C.E. Wilson, BMS 
Foreign Secretary in London insisted that ‘The schools and colleges which a 
missionary Society maintains must be missionary in the fullest possible sense’, and 
that must include the unashamed purpose of winning converts for Christ.408  Division 
over the issue led to the resignation, from Qilu University (Jinan) and from the BMS, 
of the distinguished Baptist Biblical scholar, H.H. Rowley.  He articulated the 
conservative side of the argument in a letter to the President of Qilu, Li Dianlu  
(李天祿): 
Either this university stands for a definitely and aggressively 
Christian purpose, or it does not.  If it does, then it seems to 
me to be the only honest thing to say so clearly and 
unashamedly, when the Government asks us to define our 
purpose.  If it does not, then it ought to, since it is supported 
with funds subscribed specifically for aggressive Christian 
work.409   
So fundamental was the issue that the BMS sent a special delegation to China in 
December 1928 to investigate.  The delegation found Chinese Christian opinion to be 
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‘unanimous in favouring registration as a means of removing from BMS schools any 
suspicion of being subversive in their purpose’.410   
At a conference representative of all China missionaries, held in Taiyuan in May 
1929, the view of the majority of missionaries - that registration was ‘regrettable but 
to be preferred to closure’ – prevailed.  A recommendation was sent to London to the 
effect that all BMS middle schools should be registered for a trial period of one 
year.411  The China sub-committee approved the recommendation in September, by a 
vote of 29 to 2, and the General Committee accepted the recommendation in 
October.412  As a result, BMS schools in Shanxi and Shaanxi applied for, and were 
granted, registration.  In Shandong, the application to register the boys’ and girls’ 
middle schools in Qingzhou was rejected by the provincial education authority, on 
the grounds that religion still appeared on the schools’ curricula.  The national 
regulations permitted this, as long as it was on a voluntary basis, and the members of 
the SBU became confused and distrustful at this refusal.  They decided against 
registration and all Baptist schools in Shandong were closed, a decision which both 
the SBU and the missionaries soon regretted.413  The struggles of Zhang Sijing to re-
establish a middle school in Zhoucun during the years of the war with Japan were 
described in the previous chapter.414 
By 1937, the BMS was responsible for fifty elementary schools and two middle 
schools in Shaanxi, catering for almost two thousand boys and some two hundred 
and seventy girls.  Three foreign and one hundred and twenty one Chinese staff 
members were employed in these schools.415  This emphasis on educational work 
was seen as absolutely essential to the development of the Chinese church within the 
province, underpinning all hope of providing an educated indigenous leadership in 
the future.  It is reflected in missionary involvement in the enormous efforts made to 
maintain the work of the Zunde (Tsun Te) Girls’ School, Xi’an, (尊德女子学校， 
西安) during the war years.   
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As a result of the restructuring of staffing arrangements to reflect stronger Chinese 
input, by 1937 Joan Williamson was the only foreign missionary assigned on a 
regular basis to the staff of the Zunde school.  It is from her war-time letters and 
reports that we can acquire some understanding of the struggle in which the school 
was engaged.  In September 1937, just a few weeks after the start of the war against 
Japan, she wrote in buoyant mood:  
We are quiet, peaceful, busy, excited at times […]  We are 
full up with girls, standing room occupied in dormitories, 
Government grant secure this year, no more trouble so far 
over our registration, good standing in the city, June leaving 
exam we got 19 passes out of 20.416 
Within six months, following the capture by the Japanese of the eastern provinces, 
and the atrocities committed during their seizure of Nanjing, her tone had changed,  
This may be the last letter we can get out for a while as the 
J[apanese] seem to be getting over the Yellow River […] the 
only hope for women and girls is to fly.  Where to? […] food 
is scarce outside the towns and what province is going to be 
safe? [...]   Why doesn’t some other country DO something?  
I’m terrified for our girls.417 
As already described the war transformed large numbers of the population into 
refugees and one of the immediate consequences was the movement of people from 
the Eastern provinces to the West.  Pupil numbers at schools in Western cities like 
Xi’an were wildly inflated by the influx of refugees from other provinces.  
Williamson did not provide figures for the years 1938-1941, when the flood of 
refugees was at its height, but, in her annual reports for 1942 and 1943, she 
compared the number of pupils from Shaanxi with those from other provinces.  
During Autumn term 1943, although more pupils came from Shaanxi than from any 
other province, these amounted to only just over one third of the girls attending the 
school.  The majority of pupils came other provinces, predominantly from areas in 
occupied or partially-occupied China, some up to a thousand miles distant from 
Xi’an (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Provincial origins of pupils attending Zunde Girls' School, Xi'an, 
Autumn term 1943418 
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Integrating the members of such a fluctuating and disparate population was no easy 
task.  It was made more difficult by the fact that, over the seven years of the war, the 
school evacuated at least four times, in the summer of 1938 and 1939, when Xi’an 
was suffering particularly heavy bombing raids, and during 1944 and 1945, when the 
city was threatened by a new Japanese advance.  The school roll fluctuated with each 
evacuation. Williamson noted with regret that ‘One of the sad things about all these 
moves is that the poorer girls have to be left’.419  Some pupils were unable to move 
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with the school because their families could not afford the expenses involved in 
evacuating. Other girls were added to the numbers prior to departure or by merger 
with other schools at the point of destination.  Each move involved significant 
administrative, financial and emotional costs.  Maintaining any sort of educational 
focus in these unsettled conditions would have been a major achievement.  Even in 
destinations chosen for their comparative safety, it was impossible to escape attack.  
In late 1939 Williamson described the struggle to pursue educational objectives in 
the midst of frequent heavy bombing: 
We go out [into the fields] at 6.30 am and remain out until 3 
or 4 pm. […] We have to take advantage of every blade of 
grass for shade as well as protection. […]  The continual 
passing and repassing of the aeroplanes makes work difficult 
and during the actual bombing it is impossible to get 
attention.  So many of the girls have their homes in the city 
and they are thinking of their folks.420 
Despite these harrowing experiences, the BMS accounts suggest that the Zunde 
school was greatly helped during its repeated evacuations by a well-organised and 
supportive local community.  Describing the move in mid 1938 to Mian Xian,  
(勉县), some three hundred and fifty kilometres south west of Xi’an, Fred Russell 
wrote that the school was ‘very happily accommodated in an old ancestral home 
belonging to the chairman of the Mienhsien [Mian Xian] Chamber of Commerce’ 
and ‘conditions are everything to be desired’.421   
In 1944, when Xi’an was again threatened during the Japanese Ichigo offensive, the 
school was evacuated for a third time on the instructions of the local government, 
and staff and students were obliged to leave their premises not knowing where they 
would end up.422  They travelled by train as far away from the city as they could, 
disembarking at the railway terminus, unspecified in Williamson’s account.  There, 
‘by the kindness of the district magistrate’, they were provided with accommodation 
in the local middle school.  Williamson praised ‘the unfailing courtesy and kindness 
of all the Chinese officials whom we have met […] Each time [we evacuated] we 
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have had to have help and we got it.’423  This is a significant tribute: it says a lot for 
the goodwill and competence of the officials involved that they were able to make 
arrangements for an unexpected party of more than four hundred school children 
with ‘unfailing courtesy and kindness’, in circumstances where tensions must have 
been running high on all sides.   
Lary argues that the ‘innumerable experiences of trauma, instability and chronic 
anxiety […] produced a morbid fear of chaos [luàn 乱] throughout Chinese 
society.’424  Williamson’s description of co-operation and goodwill suggests that 
Lary’s account of unremitting social dislocation during the war does not altogether 
reflect the variations across the country. 
It is financial problems which dominate Williamson’s letters.  In May 1939 the 
school was promised financial support by the Government, but a change in 
management at the Board of Education meant that this support was withdrawn.425  
Williamson uses ‘Board of Education’ and ‘Education Bureau’ variously in her 
letters.  It is not always clear whether she is referring to the national Ministry of 
Education, or a Provincial authority, but in this instance she appears to refer to the 
Ministry of Education.  By November, the school was again in favour with the 
Government and the Ministry promised financial help ‘next year’, but the situation 
was already acute.  ‘We are too small and financially weak to do anything on our 
own’ (June 1939); ‘our finance is in a desperate state’ (November 1939); ‘finance 
has been a nightmare’ (January 1944).426 ‘With all the help the school received 
during the year from home and local sources, it was still in debt at the end of the year 
about $50000’ (October 1944).427   
The substantial costs involved in maintaining school-work, the devastating effect of 
inflation during the war years, and the unpredictable attitude of the government 
towards funding private schools, meant that on a number of occasions the survival of 
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the school was at stake.  Williamson’s letters illustrate the huge financial burden 
imposed by the commitment of the BMS to institutional work in schools and 
colleges, making clear the obstacle that this placed in the way of indigenous churches 
taking on financial responsibility for all the work of the Mission.  
Figure 9: Sources of funding, Zunde School, 1936-1942428 
 
Figure 9 demonstrates that, in 1938, the Government was the major contributor to the 
school’s funds (44%), with the remainder being raised through the BMS contribution 
(28%) and through fees (28%).  By 1942, the school was very largely dependent on 
fees (45%) for its survival, supplemented by some income (16%) from unspecified 
local sources, while the contributions of both the BMS and the government were less 
significant (13% and 26% respectively).  This does not mean that funding from these 
sources had been reduced: in fact, the BMS had raised its contribution from $5,606 
in 1941 to $20,942 in 1942, and the government from $4,920 to $43,250.  Running 
costs and levels of support had both soared, primarily due to inflation, but the 
contribution from the government was now significantly greater proportionately than 
that from the Mission.  Figure 9 also shows how dependent the schools were on 
secular support and how vulnerable they would be in its absence.   
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The government’s cash grant in 1942 was supplemented by a donation of 12 months’ 
worth of flour for every teacher in the school, a widespread and valuable form of 
remuneration during this inflationary period in China.  Unfortunately, the supplement 
was not forthcoming in 1943 on the grounds that ‘Private schools were started by 
private bodies and they must find their own funds’.429  Was this an example of the 
government flexing its muscles in the light of the newly abrogated Unequal Treaties? 
Without access to local Chinese sources it is impossible to reach a firm judgment on 
this.  In November 1943, the BMS Finance Committee agreed to make a special 
grant of £2,000 (worth more than £82,000 in today’s values) to the school to help it 
over the immediate difficulty, a relatively modest sum but one which reflected the 
financial difficulties of the Society at this point.430  
The significant reliance on income from fees placed the school in a very vulnerable 
position.  Pupils paid no fees in government schools, and the education authorities 
fixed the fees charged by private schools.  For the first term in 1943, ‘they fixed a fee 
which, if charged, would empty the school’.431  If the school had had places for boys 
this would not have been a problem, ‘as people will pay any money to get their boys 
into school to avoid military service’.   In any case, high fees excluded the very 
pupils the BMS wanted to admit, including particularly the girls from lower income 
groups, who would otherwise have no access to education.  
For 1942 and 1943, Williamson recorded details of the occupations of parents of 
school pupils (Figure 10).  The chart shows that in both years the school was 
dominated by the children of those working in commerce, government and the 
military, who were likely to be amongst the better-paid, and probably included some 
of the richest members of the community.  The numbers from the professions – 
teachers and those in medical jobs – were relatively low, and in 1942 there were 
hardly any children from the families of ‘workers’, though these had increased 
dramatically by 1943. ‘Please note’ wrote Williamson, using capital letters for 
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emphasis, ‘WE TEND TO CATER FOR THE RICH.’432  Williamson was distressed 
that the Mission school was largely catering for wealthy groups in the community, 
rather than the more needy and those who were already serving the community such 
as teachers, doctors and nurses. 
Figure 10: Parental occupations of girls attending Zunde School, 1942-43433 
 
Because the school operated continuously on the very edge of insolvency, it was 
unable to compete with the salaries paid in government schools and it was difficult to 
keep good teachers.  Some Christian teachers stayed out of loyalty to the school, but 
many were driven by financial necessity to move to government schools where the 
pay was better.434  Even teachers in government schools, like others on fixed salaries 
and without entrepreneurial connections during this period, were badly affected by 
inflation.  Mitter draws attention to:  
the growing gap between those privileged few who could use 
connections and the black market […] and the vast majority 
who could not.  Between the start of the war and the end of 
1943 the income of teachers had risen only a fifth as much as 
the cost of living.435   
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In the Spring of 1945 teachers’ salaries in government schools were raised, resulting 
in ‘grave difficulties for private schools’.  Some missionaries surmised that this was 
‘a deliberate effort on their [the government’s] part to eliminate certain private 
schools.’436  A decision was made to set up an endowment fund, in order to attempt 
to secure a long-term future for the school which was independent both of the BMS 
and of the local church members.  This was in keeping with the moves towards 
missionary withdrawal, ‘surrendering the task’, identified at the Sanyuan Conference 
in December 1937.437  The school began campaigning for a sum of $5,000,000, 
asking the Provincial Governor and the Commander of the local Military to give it a 
‘kick start’.438 
As a contribution towards the endowment fund, and in the interests of the school’s 
long-term future, Joan Williamson again requested financial help from the Home 
Committee.  In putting to them the case for the work of the school, she was aware 
that not all supporters of the BMS were unreservedly in favour of the educational 
work of the Mission.  There were some on the Home Committee who felt that money 
spent on schools diverted funds and energy from the primary focus of the Society, 
which they considered should be on direct evangelism.  This was especially so when 
government regulations made it impossible to include religious education as a 
compulsory part of school curricula.439  Williamson thought differently.  She 
believed that the close and sustained contact between missionaries and pupils in a 
boarding school provided much more significant opportunities for influencing the 
pupils than occasional visits from an itinerant missionary who might reach a district 
only once or twice a year.  She argued for her point of view: 
The girls are with us ten months out of twelve, and we have 
all our life together.  Surely this counts more in the long run 
than visits here and there, paid mebbe [sic] twice a year?440 
A letter from Fred Russell was put before the BMS General Committee in July 1945, 
asking for backing for the proposed endowment fund.  The Committee recommended 
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an application to the British United Aid to China Fund, aware that the Mission’s own 
resources were already stretched in other directions, and considering that this was an 
opportunity for the school to benefit from this currently well-endowed secular 
fund.441 
The difficulties in keeping the school open over the whole period of the wars come 
across clearly in Williamson’s passionate and emphatic letters: threatened danger 
from military activity; the complete absence of a settled routine; fluctuating pupil 
numbers; strained and unpredictable finances; a struggle to retain competent 
teachers; erratic support from government organisations.  Williamson’s letters were 
not, however, wholly preoccupied with difficulties: she maintained that the war years 
brought some benefits, including the opportunity to live in the school rather than 
with other foreigners in BMS housing.  She declared her preference for living with 
Chinese staff and pupils, and had ‘always advocated [this] as the only way to break 
down certain racial barriers’.  
As a rule it is difficult to carry out as mission houses, large 
and small are provided for missionaries usually in 
compounds and somewhat separated from the “world”.  For 
individuals to alter this and live nearer their friends and 
comrades in this land creates difficulties and in some cases 
might mean a breach of loyalty which is a thing to be avoided 
at all costs.442 
Despite Williamson’s independent character, which is apparent in her letters, her 
emphasis here on the importance of avoiding a breach of loyalty with other 
missionaries ‘at all costs’ is a telling comment on the pressures on missionaries to 
conform to group expectations regardless of personal preferences.  Exploring these 
pressures would provide an interesting focus for future research.443 
Williamson made clear that she took great pleasure in the company of the girls and 
from their achievements.  She described their contributions to the war effort, the 
‘street cleaning’ that had been ‘done specially well by Primary’, and the money the 
pupils raised for charity with their production of Handel’s Messiah.  She celebrated 
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two separate visits the Middle school choir made at Christmas and New Year ‘to sing 
to wounded soldiers.’444  In another letter, written in October 1944, she commented 
enthusiastically on ‘the friendly relation that exists between students and teachers 
[…] that makes work a pleasure.’445 
By April 1945, Williamson was on her way back to Britain for furlough.  A few 
months earlier she had expressed the conviction that there was a future for 
missionaries in China: 
I think there is a great future for our work and we want the 
best people we can get, educationally, socially and in every 
way, good mixers who can turn to anything… who can rough 
it and say nothing.446  
She believed, however, that a new kind of missionary would be needed for this: 
We [who have been here twenty years] are too set in our 
ways and want things done our way.  The new people will 
have to live with, work with, and under, their excellent 
Chinese fellow teachers on less than equality for a bit until 
they have proved themselves worthy of equality, and that is 
right and the way we want it to work.447 
Three years earlier, she had thought the need for foreign teachers in schools after the 
war would be much less, ‘and I worked and planned on that’.448  As she reflected on 
this on the homeward journey, she had come to believe that ‘many more western 
people will be needed than seemed poss [sic] sometime ago.’449  This was because 
she thought that the Chinese church leadership had been crushed by war and ‘those 
that remain in the church are war weary […] For some time leaders from the west 
will have to help greatly in the work they themselves thought had passed to their 
local leaders’.  Was this a realistic response to a felt need on the part of the Chinese, 
or was it the Westerners’ sense of being indispensible and a simple reluctance to let 
go? 
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When two newly recruited missionaries, James and Edna Sutton, first visited the 
school in early 1946, they were ‘shocked’ by the condition of the premises.450  It was 
operating in the old hospital buildings, which had not been fully repaired since the 
bombing in 1939.  Ceilings were hanging down, windows remained broken, and they 
described the general condition as ‘dilapidated’, conditions which must have 
discouraged enrolments of children from families who were able to pay substantial 
fees.  Williamson’s correspondence reveals the increasing difficulties experienced by 
the BMS in maintaining satisfactory educational provision in competition with more 
soundly financed government schools, and the Suttons’ observations underline 
this.451 
Though the experience in Shaanxi had been different from the experience in the 
occupied provinces, Williamson believed that the war had taken a significant toll of 
the Chinese church leadership and this had postponed the day when members of the 
indigenous church could take on the entire responsibility for governing, financing 
and extending the membership of the church.452  At the same time, work in the 
schools was constrained by economic pressures, the necessity to ensure sufficient 
income, and the pressure to take children from relatively affluent families.  This 
detracted from the original goal of the Mission schools, which had been to train up 
teachers, doctors and nurses, to become the church leaders of the future. 
Impact of the war in Europe, and the British entry into 
the war against Japan 
Affairs outside China also exerted an influence over the strength and effectiveness of 
the BMS.  China had been at war with Japan for more than two years when Britain 
declared war on Germany in September 1939.  Immediately following the 
declaration of war, the Mission House was faced with enquiries from missionaries 
wondering whether they should offer themselves for military service, and expressing 
feelings of sympathy and concern. 
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And now the war has come and far greater anxieties fill the 
minds of us all than anything we have experienced hitherto.  
It is our turn to be anxious for you in England. […] Our 
country is constantly in our thought and prayers, and the 
cause in which she is engaged in war. […] The cause is 
connected with that in which we are engaged, and many of us 
wish that we could serve in both.453 
Despite the pacifist views of some individual Baptists, the Society did not take any 
corporate line on the rights and wrongs of military engagement and, like other 
missionary societies, left such decisions to individual conscience.454  Initially, 
however, enquiries from China missionaries both to British consular services in 
China and to Mission headquarters in London were met with negative responses.   
Menzies Clow wrote from Xi’an in early September 1939, asking if he would be 
required to resign from the BMS if he volunteered for war service, and saying he had 
‘a definite feeling that I have a duty to my country especially as a doctor in 
wartime.’455  The reply from Chesterman in London was discouraging:  
I can quite understand your desire to take some share in the 
present war, as many of us did in the last; if there were a 
desperate need for medicals in our fighting forces, I would 
not raise the slightest note of opposition but … 
There followed references to the fact that ‘several who have offered have not had 
their offers taken up’.456  This was consistent with the advice received by Ronald 
Still, of the BMS hospital in Zhoucun, when he consulted the Consul-General in 
Qingdao for advice.  
[The Consul-General] told me that there was no immediate 
need for medicals at home, and that the Government was not 
at present proposing to recall people from China, and he gave 
it as his advice that those who had jobs out here should for 
the present stick to them.457 
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Two years later, Britain’s declaration of war against Japan had an immediate 
impact on the situation in China.  Shaanxi missionaries of an age for military 
service found themselves within the war zone.  In January 1942, Clow responded 
to a direct appeal from the British Military Mission in Chongqing to take up a 
commission in the Royal Army Medical Corps, with which he served until after 
the war’s end.  This was despite advice telegraphed to him (‘strongly discourage 
Clow enlist’) from the Home Committee, who were of the view that  ‘that step 
might compromise the position of other missionaries in Free China if it ever got 
known to the Japanese’.458  
In the autumn of 1943, Bryn Price, BMS missionary in Shaanxi province from 1939, 
was also asked by the British Military Mission if he would consider undertaking 
military service.  Unlike Clow, who was serving the Mission in a job where his skills 
were in great demand, Price’s decision was influenced partly by the fact that he felt 
himself to be insufficiently employed in his work for the Mission.  On 1 December 
1943 he resigned and enlisted, setting out his reasons in a letter to Mission 
headquarters in February 1944: 
All over the world there were those who were leaving 
positions in which they were working hard and really 
achieving something so that they should take their share of 
responsibility in the war, while I was living in remote Sian 
doing less than a full-time job, waiting to enjoy the benefits 
of a peace that was to be earned through the efforts of others. 
The more I felt this way, the more intolerable I felt my 
position to be.459 
The BMS China Sub-Committee were not convinced, and expressed their 
disappointment at his decision.460 
The BMS was reluctant to lose missionaries to war service, especially medical 
missionaries who were considered essential if the mission hospitals were to come 
through the war.  Despite the Society’s clear unwillingness to give its support to the 
plans of Clow and Price, they both followed their own judgment on the matter, and at 
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the end of the war were re-instated as missionaries in good standing.  These 
exchanges demonstrate that although the Mission itself depended for survival on the 
service of individual staff members, it was prepared to accept their decisions where 
matters of conscience were concerned, even if its own resources were depleted as a 
result.  They also demonstrate the commitment of individual missionaries to serve 
their home nation at this time of divided loyalties.  Patriotism in its conventional 
sense continued to be an important aspect of their make-up, despite their 
commitment to missionary work and their extended periods living abroad. 
In all, five missionaries signed up for war service with the British Military Mission; a 
sixth served with the British Red Cross Hospital Unit in China.461  One other BMS 
missionary was seconded in 1944 to work with the China mission of the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) where he was appointed 
Regional Director for Guangxi province.   For each of these men, their knowledge of 
the Chinese language was an important factor in the way their services were 
deployed.  None were immediately free for demobilisation at the end of hostilities in 
August 1945 and all were variously involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction 
work.462  
The presence of the British and American military in Free China, after the entry of 
Britain and the United States into the war against Japan, also affected British 
missionaries working there. The rapid movement of military personnel from Europe 
to Asia, and back again, gave evidence of a very different lifestyle from that known 
to the missionaries, who were accustomed to long isolated periods in China.  Xi’an 
was one of the advanced airfields for bombing the Japanese in the occupied zone, 
and many members of the US and British Military Missions had been stationed there.  
Vincent Jasper wrote from Kunming early in the war: 
we are keeping an open house for military and civil officials 
and not only Chinese.  We get army, airforce, Friends 
Ambulance and students as often as our funds allow.  I am in 
the happy position of being able to do work of national 
service with the hearty approval of our own church officers – 
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most of whom are more than happy to assist in the work 
themselves.463 
Jasper’s comment on his satisfaction at being able to be part of the national efforts 
combined with his enjoyment of the opportunity to mix with this novel group of 
Westerners.  Elsewhere there are references to social gatherings ‘in the house of Mr 
and Mrs Madge’ after Sunday evening services, ‘when tea and cakes were 
supplied’.464  The special circumstances created by the war seem to have given rise to 
a sense of fellow-feeling between the missionaries and the British business 
community, only occasionally in evidence in the pre-war era.   
Williamson, arriving in Xi’an by plane for his deputation tour in November 1945, 
described landing ‘on the great airfield… where large numbers of American planes 
were parked’.  He captured the atmosphere of change and excitement as he described 
being introduced to ‘the surviving remnant’ of the British Military Mission waiting 
to leave on the plane by which he had arrived, and meeting several members of the 
United States Air Force ‘about to wind-up affairs and leave’.  The missionaries were 
rewarded for past hospitality when the Americans departed leaving them a gift of 
‘considerable quantities of stores and equipment’.465 
In these different ways, the World War reaffirmed for the missionaries their sense of 
Britishness, along with an awareness that life in China was coloured by international 
developments over which they had little control.  This would be brought home again 
when the domestic policy of the CCP was formed in reaction to events on the world 
stage. 
Treaty revision and international relationships 
Missionaries’ experience within China was dependent on the treaties which 
concluded the two opium wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60 and which established the 
basis of the British presence in China.  From the outset, British missionaries had had 
an ambivalent attitude towards them and by the early 1920s their negative effects 
                                                
463 BMSA, CH/61 Jasper to Williamson, 27.July.1942. 
464 Through Toil and Tribulation, 186.  Ernest and Edna Madge had joined the BMS as missionaries in 
Shaanxi in 1935. 
465 Williamson, “Christian Challenge”, 7 & 11. 
 
 151 
were generally considered by the missionary societies to outweigh any possible 
benefits.  The anti-British riots which followed the ‘May Thirtieth incident’ in 
Shanghai in 1925, when Shanghai Municipal Police fired on and killed twelve 
Chinese demonstrators, prompted British missionary societies to action.  On 6 
October that year, the Standing Committee of the Conference of British Missionary 
Societies formulated two resolutions to the effect that those Societies approving the 
resolutions would both welcome the abolition of treaty provisions relating to 
extraterritoriality, and support the British government in their efforts towards 
‘comprehensive revision of the existing treaties’.466  The resolutions were approved 
at the meeting of the BMS General Committee in November 1925, and supported by 
most missionaries on the field.467   
On 11 January 1943, Britain and the United States signed new treaties with the 
Nationalist government, formally relinquishing extraterritoriality.  At the time, 
extravagantly optimistic hopes were attached to the symbolism of the abrogated 
treaties.  For many Chinese the ending of extraterritorial rights served ‘as proof of 
China’s acceptance as an equal and sovereign state.’468  Some Chinese Christians 
hoped that China’s newly independent status on the international scene would prove 
to be an asset in building ‘a genuine Chinese Christian movement’.469  For 
missionaries, it was important to throw off the associations between Christianity and 
imperialism, which they believed had undermined the Christian message in the eyes 
of many Chinese people, and it was expected that the cancellation of extraterritorial 
rights would go some way towards this.  The BMS China Sub-Committee recorded 
the new arrangements ‘with deep thankfulness’, describing them as ‘an answer to 
continual prayers’ and expressing to the British and Chinese governments ‘their 
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appreciation and gratitude for this timely and hopeful readjustment of relationships 
with the Chinese people’.470    
In a fulsome address to the NCC in Chongqing on 18 May 1943, Chiang Kai-shek 
declared that the ‘abolition of unequal treaties has freed the Christian Church from 
all association with foreign imperialism or aggression’.  He went on to speak about 
missionary societies, ‘We still need them […]  Don’t feel you are guests.  You are 
comrades working with us to save our people and build a new nation…  Let the 
church identify itself more intimately with the life and needs of the people and 
cooperate fully with the Government and social welfare agencies and build a heaven 
in society.’471  In private, however, Chiang was suspicious of the Allied nations in 
their negotiations over the Treaties, likening them to ‘kidnappers’, ‘hooligans’ and 
‘bullies’, dealing with China ‘as meat on the chopping board.’472  He was particularly 
hostile to Churchill and critical of the British.  ‘All ambassadors are spies by nature’, 
he wrote a few months later, ‘but the British more than most’. 473  Chiang may not 
have had as low an opinion of British missionaries as he did of British diplomats.  In 
any case, members of the BMS China Sub-Committee took his words to the NCC at 
their face value.  The minutes record that they received the information about his 
comments ‘with pleasure and satisfaction’.474  
Keith Bryan, based in the BMS mission station in Sanyuan, prepared a lengthy 
document at exactly this time on ‘The Status of the missionary in the Chinese 
Church’, which included an historical analysis from the commencement of the China 
mission to 1943, and ended with predictions for the future.  With the proviso that ‘the 
longer one has been in China, the less one feels inclined to predict what the future 
may be’, he noted that, with the abolition of extraterritoriality, 
the Westerner in China will have quite a different status from 
formerly.  He will come under Chinese laws and regulations, 
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and I foresee a period in which all kinds of new and difficult 
situations may arise.475 
He concluded with the comment, ‘We must not expect things to return to normal and 
go smoothly as soon as the war is over’.  While he did not elaborate, his use of the 
phrase ‘return to normal’ suggests that he considered ‘normality’ for westerners in 
China was the sheltered life they were able to enjoy under the protection of the 
Treaties.  Earlier in the paper, he had stressed his belief in the autonomy of the 
Chinese church leaders, and his understanding of the secondary place which 
missionaries must and should assume, but his statements here give an indication that 
for some missionaries adapting to the practicalities of a less authoritative and more 
vulnerable position would not be easy.  
With the end of extraterritoriality, the location of foreigners within China became the 
business of the Chinese authorities.  At the end of January 1943, Handley Stockley in 
Xi’an reported with indignation that he had received a visit from the ‘Gestapo Police’ 
(宪兵 Xian Bing), requiring him to supply details of his name, political and religious 
affiliations, his family and financial circumstances, his friends, ‘thoughts’ and 
‘indulgences’, for registration with the civic authority.  Stockley recognised 
immediately that this signalled a change in his status in China, consequent on the 
abolition of extraterritoriality.  He was no longer under the protection of British law 
and the British Government.  Thereafter he must answer to Chinese authority.  
Stockley refused to answer the questions, but signed his name across the form, 
fearing that if he left it blank it would be incorrectly or maliciously completed by a 
Chinese official. 
This is the first definite act of this regime here to infringe 
upon my liberty and a very definite Nazi method. […]  
Extraterritoriality has been gone less than a month.  This is 
one of the main things Britain and America are fighting 
against in Germany and Japan, yet these methods are being 
increasingly employed by the present regime in China. […] 
This is one reason why I have expressed before [sic], there 
may be no place for us here in the future.476 
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Joan Williamson’s first letter to the Mission House after the change was introduced 
emphasises her sense of the vulnerability of foreign missionaries in the new 
situation: 
What we have done in the past cuts no ice these days; we are 
all equal and we cannot say that we have come to do China 
good or any of the things that might have suited another 
generation.477 
Of particular importance to the missionary societies were the implications for their 
ownership of land and property in China.  The original treaties had given foreigners 
the right to lease land in the treaty ports for residence and trade, and land in the 
interior of China for the construction of churches and hospitals.  The term 
‘permanent lease’ was generally used in foreign contractual agreements before 1943, 
‘and this term was tantamount to the ownership of the land passing from Chinese to 
foreign nationals’. Under Chinese land law, land within the boundary of China 
belonged to all the people of the Chinese Republic.  The land law also prohibited 
Chinese people from transferring or leasing land to foreign nationals ‘other than what 
is permitted by the treaties’.  With the abolition of the treaties, any land or property 
leased by missionary societies was to be handed over to the Chinese Government, 
constituting a major cause of concern.478  The fact that the Japanese had seized much 
mission property in the occupied areas was to create particular problems in 
establishing ownership when missionaries returned at the end of the war, expecting 
to resume possession.479 
There were other important ways in which relationships between Britain and China 
were altered during the war years.  The collapse of the British Empire in the Far East 
from December 1941 was a severe blow to British prestige, and a disappointment to 
Chiang Kai-shek, who had looked for significant support from his newly acquired 
allies, Britain and the United States.  The British loss of both Burma and Hong Kong 
had immediate practical effects for China, including closure of the Burma Road.  
Britain’s failure in 1942 to respond on favourable terms to a request from China for a 
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major loan, further worsened relationships between the two countries, and underlined 
the contrast with the United States who had responded generously to a similar 
request, though, to the chagrin of the Chinese, less generously than to their European 
allies.480   
America’s great wealth, expanded economy and substantial oil reserves ensured that 
it was a power to be reckoned with.481  As the war advanced, it was clear that Britain 
had been eclipsed: 
Comparing China’s foreign policy in 1943 with her attitude 
of ten years earlier, nothing is more striking than her 
dependence on America and acceptance of American 
leadership.  Signs of this meet one at every turn, alike in the 
cultural, diplomatic, economic, financial and military fields.  
China looks primarily to America and not to Britain to defeat 
Japan; to furnish her with materials and sinews of war; and to 
build up the great new China after the war is won.482 
The United States did not just dominate politically and materially.  British social 
practices and British culture were dropped.  When the war ended, ‘Shanghai’s 
developing modernity’ was ‘much more American in character, and fed by 
Hollywood.’483 
British missionaries did not find it easy to adjust to this reversal in their relative 
position in China.  In pre-war years, only a very small number of them had worked in 
the rarified atmosphere of the treaty port cities, and most would not have considered 
that they had been affected by the artificially inflated importance accorded to them 
by virtue of their status as Britons.  Over many years they had experienced anti-
foreign initiatives, but they now seemed to be held in open contempt.  In August 
1945, Fred Russell was in Shaanxi and his wife in England.  She wrote telling her old 
friend Williamson, Foreign Secretary at Mission headquarters, that she had had ‘such 
a depressed letter’ from Fred: 
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He says he is fit physically… but mentally he is tired out and 
sick of it all out there – not least trying for him is the very 
anti-British feeling in Sian newspaper articles.  “What is 
Britain doing to help China?” etc etc [sic].  This sort of thing 
worries him much more than most of the others and we have 
had several years of it.484 
Russell was nearing sixty and had been in China more than thirty years.  It is possible 
that his depressed mood reflected his recognition of the changed status of foreigners 
in China, and the fundamental shift in attitudes towards Britain affecting the position 
of British missionaries. 
Conclusions 
During the war years, the BMS missionaries in unoccupied China faced a number of 
challenges, over and above those posed by military activity.  Within China, new 
political forces were beginning to make their presence felt, and missionaries became 
aware that China itself was changing.   
The proximity of Red Army troops and CCP leaders in Shaanxi gave BMS 
missionaries based in the province early opportunities for contact with them.  While 
initially wary of Communism, direct encounters with members of the Red Army after 
its arrival in Xi’an led them to develop sympathy and admiration for them.  The 
Shaanxi missionaries had been able to put a human face on the concept of Chinese 
Communism.  Nevertheless, the Society’s long-established commitment to 
respecting the national government of the day, at this time the Nationalists, prevented 
close association.  By contrast, having no close dealings with communism, BMS 
missionaries based in Shandong and Shanxi could view Communism as an alien 
ideology, to be rejected and resisted rather than accommodated.   
The evangelical work of the BMS in Shaanxi had not been subjected to the crushing 
blows of enemy occupation and physical devastation that had critically undermined 
the Chinese church in Shandong during the war.  Although some ‘war weariness’ in 
the Shaanxi church was identified at the end of the war, the work of the Mission 
there had thrived and its reputation amongst members of the Chinese public appears 
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to have been enhanced.  There is no material in the BMS Shaanxi archive 
comparable to Zhang Sijing’s correspondence with the Mission House from 
Shandong in the early years of the war.  This suggests that the Shaanxi church did 
not have such a strong sense of independence as the highly organised SBU.  The goal 
of self-support, though explicit and intact in mission planning in Shaanxi, both 
before and during the war, was not expected to be reached in the immediate future. 
Examining the work of the Zunde Girls’ School during the whole of the war makes 
evident the problems created by the high costs of maintaining the institutional work 
of the BMS.  It also foregrounds the difficulty of running a private institution bound 
by government regulations, but without the assurance of cooperation or support from 
the Chinese government.  The BMS had invested heavily in school work in Shaanxi 
and believed that mission schools were essential to the future leadership of the 
Chinese church, but the war underlined the barrier such institutions placed in the way 
of self-support.  By the late 1930s, the BMS presence in the mission schools was 
numerically small, but foreign funding was essential to enable the schools to remain 
solvent.  The costs of salaries, equipment and supplies were, for the most part, 
dependent on factors over which the mission had no control.  If they were to survive, 
therefore, foreign funding, or guaranteed Chinese government support, was essential.  
Shaanxi missionaries were the first to experience the effects of the abrogation of the 
Treaties and the abolition of extraterritoriality in February 1943.  In the period to 
August 1945, missionaries in Shaanxi began to experience the force of these 
changes, the consequences of which will form part of the focus of the chapters which 
follow. 
Each of the above points arises from consideration of the distinctive characteristics 
of the English Baptist mission in Shaanxi and its experiences during and immediately 
after the war.  Each also has a bearing on the capacity of the BMS to survive in the 
turmoil in China following the war and to adapt to the changes introduced in 1949. 
The next chapter will examine the changes brought about by wars in China and in 




Nevertheless, the open discussion of Shaanxi missionaries with their Chinese 
colleagues, about whether they should stay or leave, suggests that they continued to 
be motivated to work together if at all possible.
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Chapter Four: Planning and recovery, August 
1945 to July 1946 
‘The idea that the work will start up again just where it left off 
in 1937 or 1939 or any year you like to take, shows a failure to 
realise the vast changes that have taken place.’485 
This chapter is concerned with BMS thinking and Mission resources in the 
immediate aftermath of war, before fresh conflicts changed perspectives.  It 
considers the conditions which faced the Society in the autumn of 1945 and the early 
months of 1946, as it made decisions about its future place in China, and took the 
first steps in new directions.  The chapter explores the ways in which the members of 
the Mission attempted to gauge the new political climate in China, the mood of the 
post-war Chinese church, and the ways that they could continue to work there.  
These included joining with the Church of Christ in China (CCC) in an experiment in 
the Chinese border regions, discussions with church leaders and liaising with secular 
authorities about rehabilitating Mission institutions.  The chapter also examines how 
the events of the war and the immediate post-war period affected the missionaries 
and their families, and the constraints within which they operated.  The chapter 
argues that the Society’s re-entry into the turbulent China field at the end of the 
world war made for difficult personal choices on the part of the missionaries. 
As war in Europe ended and the threat from Japan was subdued, the BMS began to 
assess the new situation.  During the last three years its work in occupied China had 
been suspended.  Missionaries had been scattered, information from China had been 
scarce and intermittent.  Almost half the workforce had spent the years from 1942 in 
Japanese internment camps.486  They had been quartered with hundreds of other 
civilians of all nationalities and had been deprived of their normal occupations and 
employment.487  They had had no contact with family or friends or former colleagues 
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outside the camps, Chinese or Western.  Of the remainder of the China staff, some 
continued to work in unoccupied China, and the rest had been dispersed to temporary 
situations around the world.  Six were on war service, some held temporary positions 
in India or as pastors in British churches, one was a translator for the British 
Government in London, and another was attached to the Mission to Chinese Seamen 
in Liverpool.488  For all China missionaries, the war with Japan and the Second 
World War had brought about fundamental changes in their lives.   
Living conditions and individual freedoms in Britain had changed during the war, 
and were continuing to change.  Those who lived there had been affected materially 
and psychologically, and the consequences of this war-time experience had long-
term effects.  Political and economic adjustments had been made at government level 
to accommodate the demands of war, and these impacted upon all British citizens 
and on the missionary societies.   
On the wider international scene, the war had shifted the balance of power between 
China and the Western nations.  Unrest in the British colonies put at risk the stability 
of the British Empire.  More generally, attempts to protect threatened national rights 
or to salvage damaged economies led to the introduction of restrictions on 
international trade and shipping, and new controls on currency exchange.  All these 
had an impact on the BMS and its work in China in the post-war world. 
Preparations for the post-war period had been going on in China since the formation 
of the optimistically named United Front between the Nationalists and the 
Communists in early 1937.  Long before the Japanese surrender, the armies of both 
sides had had an eye for their positions in the aftermath of the war.  While Chiang 
Kai-shek used the surrender ceremonies and victory parades to publicise his role as 
the leader who had taken his country successfully through the war, Mao Zedong also 
claimed a place on the national scene.  Both joined publicly at the negotiating table 
with Patrick Hurley, the American Ambassador, and resolved ‘in accordance with 
justice and reason [… to] build a unified, independent, prosperous and strong new 
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China’.489  But from the outset, military manoeuvrings called into question the 
sincerity of the negotiations.  In July 1946, the launch of a general offensive by the 
Nationalists north of the Yangtze, and the renaming by the CCP of their military 
forces as the PLA, marked turning points.  The goal of a negotiated peace was 
abandoned and the Chinese civil war of 1946-49 got underway.490  
Ling suggests that missionaries were almost uniquely mistaken in the hopes they 
held out for a political solution to the confrontation between the GMD and the CCP, 
and in their continuing expectation that the GMD would retain the upper hand in the 
government of post-war China.  
Missionaries were optimistic about their future work in 
China.  The underlying assumption was that the Guomindang 
government would be able to sort out its problems and things 
would get better […]  The missionaries did not see any 
reason to be worried about their future in China.491 
She contends that after 1945 British Protestant missionaries in China badly 
misjudged the political situation in the country, as well as the mood of the Chinese 
people.  If missionaries were mistaken as Ling suggests, they were not alone in 
failing to forecast the direction in which events in China would move.  Recent 
historians have argued that the GMD, despite its shortcomings was in a position of 
relative strength in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese defeat.492 
In retrospect, of course, it seems logical to conclude that 
during the war years the always tenuous foundations of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s rule had eroded almost beyond hope of 
repair.  But this was wisdom after the fact.  At the time, few 
observers possessed sufficient clairvoyance to predict either 
the rapidity or the totality of the CCP victory.493   
In the early post-war months, there were no clear indicators as to the eventual 
outcome, or to the form any settlement might take.  The BMS and its missionaries 
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were subject to various influences as they made decisions about future policy, and 
these will be explored now.   
Formation of BMS policy 
For the 35 Baptist missionaries who had been interned in China, the end of the war 
with Japan provided their first opportunity to gauge the mood in post-war China.  In 
more than one internment camp, the internees received gestures of friendship from 
Chinese people living nearby.  The editor of the in-house newsletter for the Eastern 
Area Camp in Shanghai wrote, 
We are full of appreciation for the ‘lao pai hsing’ (common 
people) [laobaixing老百姓] of Shanghai, who themselves 
were almost ground down to earth with hardships and 
suffering in the last few terrible years, have already started to 
contribute to our relief with cigarettes, food, comfort parcels 
and money.494   
The magazine went on to record a gift of ‘foodstuffs’ (eleven thousand cigarettes and 
one parcel of sweets) from Major General Y.P. Ling, Commander of the Shanghai 
District of the Nationalist army, ‘as a token of friendship and sympathy of the 
Chinese army’.  The message from the Commander conveyed ‘sincere greetings to 
the Allied friends and children.  The whole of China rejoices with you today.’495  In 
one of the camps outside Shanghai, an internee recorded that they had been visited 
by local church representatives; five hundred boys and girls from the local Middle 
School ‘came to greet us bringing banners and presents’; they had had visits from all 
the local Chinese authorities and had received ‘$500,000 cash each’, a gift from 
Chiang Kai-shek.496  These gestures gave the impression that many Chinese people 
felt both warmth and goodwill towards their British allies.   
In another camp, Weihsien (now Weifang, 潍坊) internment camp in Shandong, a 
very different message was delivered when, on a ‘chilly gray day in mid-September’, 
a British colonel arrived to address the British internees.  He told them that most of 
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the small foreign businesses in China had been destroyed, anything that had survived 
had passed into Chinese hands, and the prospects of recovery or reparations were 
extremely poor.  He drew attention to the consequences of the abolition of 
extraterritorial rights in January 1943: British residents in China no longer enjoyed 
special protection; the days of a privileged ‘colonial life’ in Asia were ended.   
We cannot force you now to leave China […] but the future 
here is a bleak one. […] Our official advice to you is to give 
up in East Asia […] An era has ended, and with it your own 
past lives.  I’m sorry, but these are the facts.497 
This sombre picture was disturbing.  After previous setbacks – the Boxer episode at 
the beginning of the century, the Anti-Christian Movement in the 1920s, and the 
Japanese-orchestrated anti-British campaign of 1939 – missionaries had returned, 
‘like a flock of birds on a grain field, frightened off by a warning shot or a flapping 
scarecrow, but soon returning to feed.’498  The BMS had been planning for some 
years to bring its work in China to a close.  Was this now the time, not to ‘give up in 
East Asia’, but to ‘surrender its task’? Was the indigenous Chinese church ‘able and 
willing to assume responsibility’?499  
These first contacts with the wider world made clear to the missionaries that 
significant changes had taken place.  On the one hand, the gestures of friendship 
offered by local Chinese to ex-internees in Shanghai suggested that they might find 
themselves in a more welcoming social environment in China than had been the case 
before the war.  On the other hand, the British colonel, one of their own countrymen 
familiar with contemporary China, had advised another group of internees that 
practically, economically and politically things would be very much more difficult.  
The first letters sent by missionary internees from the liberated camps demonstrate 
both their understanding that important changes had taken place and their expectation 
that the Society’s analysis of the new situation was essential to their own future 
plans.  Ronald Still wrote to his parents that, although most BMS missionaries 
expected to be repatriated, a small group would be left behind, ‘in order to enable the 
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Home Board to keep in close touch with developments in the Chinese Church in the 
reorganisation that is bound to take place.’  He indicated that his own return home 
could only be determined ‘when it has been decided […] what will be the manner of 
the new cooperation between the Home Board and the newly organised Chinese 
Church’.500  Still was confident that the changes which had taken place would be met 
by a different approach from the BMS.  Another missionary, with more than thirty 
years’ experience of working in China, wrote, ‘We long for guidance from you about 
our future movements’.501  These missionaries anticipated that the BMS was on the 
brink of fundamental change – might, indeed, be preparing to ‘surrender its task’ in 
China – and would not be following blindly on familiar paths.  
Several missionaries in unoccupied China had already communicated their thinking 
about this to the Home Committee.  Ernest Madge had written from Xi’an that, 
Ways and means of helping the North China church after the 
war will need a great deal of hard thought, but I personally 
think that the BMS can never go back to the old role of 
leaders.  We shall need to investigate very carefully the needs 
of that church, and plan in great detail before we send anyone 
back there again.502 
As a formal step in bringing together ideas on future policy in China, a meeting was 
held in London in June 1945 of all China missionaries, serving and retired, who were 
currently in Britain and able to attend.  Central to the discussion was the statement 
from the CCC: 
that all questions of reoccupation ought to be considered by 
them, and that they should have the main voice in deciding 
whether, when, and under what conditions, work in the 
present occupied fields should be resumed.503 
Responsibility for policy decisions about BMS action in post-war China, was in the 
hands of Williamson, BMS Foreign Secretary in London.504  As Bickers has noted ‘ a 
great deal of influence could be wielded by a very few individuals within particular 
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societies’, and such was the case with Williamson.505  Williamson, known to his 
colleagues throughout his career by his Chinese name ‘Wei’ (魏礼模; Wei Lima), 
served in China for almost thirty years.  From 1908 he worked in Shanxi but in 1925 
moved to Jinan as Dean of Qilu University Extension Department, where he 
remained until his return to England in 1938.506  His obituary notice in the Baptist 
Yearbook recorded that he ‘was on cordial terms with Chinese officials and with the 
leaders of Shanxi University’, and had been decorated twice by Yan Xishan, for his 
services to education, agriculture and industry.507  He was popular with missionary 
colleagues and with Chinese Christians.  His departure from China in 1938 to take up 
office with the Mission Board in London was regarded as a serious loss by 
missionaries in the field.  Gwyneth Still wrote home: 
The general opinion out here is that he ought to stay on 
longer.  There is no one who can possibly take his place […], 
no one has the general experience he has, nor the knowledge 
for the provinces. […P]eople feel that in a situation as serious 
as this, Dr W[illiamson] ought to be spared longer, but of 
course it has been settled and is not likely to be altered 
now.508 
His colleagues in China considered that his experience and judgment were needed on 
the field at such a critical time in Chinese history.  
Nevertheless, Williamson’s long experience of living in China, and the working 
relationships which he had developed there, put him at a disadvantage when 
attempting to analyse the mood and needs post war.  His choice of subject matter for 
the very first dialogue in his book Teach Yourself Chinese, published in 1947, places 
him in a pre-war world where foreigners expected to have servants, and expected 
those servants to attend to their practical needs.509  The dialogue takes place in a 
private household somewhere in China.  When the doorbell rings and a friend offers 
to answer the bell, the householder replies, ‘No need.  I will tell Lung Fu [the 
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servant] to go.’510  Williamson’s confidence in placing this dialogue at the very 
opening of his book is a telling reflection on the hierarchical nature of social 
relationships which he took for granted during his years in China.  It suggests a lack 
of awareness of the changes which had taken place since he left.  Behaviour which 
was acceptable practice in foreign households, as in prosperous Chinese households 
in the 1920s and 1930s, was no longer favoured by the mid 1940s.  
Williamson’s influence on post-war decision making in London was pivotal.  
Understanding his thinking about Chinese attitudes and Chinese politics throws light 
on BMS decisions in this period.  In 1943, in the wake of the Treaty revisions, he had 
published China among the Nations, a reflection on China’s early history, philosophy 
and contemporary standing.511  Williamson’s personal admiration for Chiang Kai-
shek comes across strongly in the book, along with his confidence that Chiang would 
lead his country to peace and stability, and to a respected place on the international 
stage, once the war with Japan ended.  Williamson concluded: 
China has become democratic.  Her feudal age is behind her.  
She has no territorial ambitions except to secure the return of 
Manchukuo.  She depends not on military might but on moral 
force to influence the world. 
All this should make her an ideal member of future Round 
Table Conferences.  For there, standing four-square against 
all international injustice and unworthy and compromising 
attitudes, she will be found conciliatory, reasonable and 
helpful in unravelling knotty questions of international 
relationships.  Ready to receive, she will be willing to give; 
making light demands of others she will impose the heaviest 
demands upon herself.   
She is proud, legitimately so, of her long civilisation.  But she 
is ready to learn from others, and adapt herself 
accordingly.512 
Members of the BMS London Committees with an interest in China were likely to 
have read Williamson’s book, and, because of his acknowledged expertise, awaited 
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eagerly the results of his fact-finding tour of China during December 1945 and 
January 1946, organised to give him an up-to-date picture of circumstances there. 
Williamson’s report on the tour, published in late 1946, was widely read.513  With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is easy to trace in it evidence that Williamson’s pre-war 
experience of China was having a strong influence on his perceptions.  On arrival in 
Chongqing, he wrote enthusiastically of meeting ‘many government officials, most 
of them old acquaintances’. Amongst these, along with Yan Xishan, his old ally from 
Shanxi days, he mentions appreciatively Chen Lifu (陈立夫) and Chen Guofu  
(陈果夫), who, he writes, ‘head up the right wing faction in the Nationalist 
government’.514  Mitter describes the Chen brothers more critically:  
two tough political operators. […] Throughout Chiang’s rule, 
the Chens would push for crackdowns on dissidents, and 
argue that China needed a more regimented society, rather 
than a more liberal one.’515   
Through his personal contacts with the GMD leadership, Williamson was able to 
secure a letter from ‘General Shang Chen [商震; Shang Zhen], the Generalissimo’s 
Chief of Staff’, and the senior Nationalist General who had been involved in the 
breach of the Yellow River dykes in June 1938.516  This, wrote Williamson, ensured 
him safe passage on his travels and proved the ‘Open Sesame in many a difficult 
situation’.517  Williamson, if aware, was undismayed by the fact that a significant 
body of opinion opposed these men. 
One particular encounter encouraged Williamson to believe that pre-war trends of 
co-operation between the missionary societies and the government would be 
sustained, and even improved.  He had a meeting with P.Z. King (金寶善; Jin 
Baoshan), Director of the Chinese National Health Administration, which:  
left no doubt in our minds that in the new medical 
programme of the Chinese Government, our Mission 
hospitals will have a recognised and worthy place.  We […] 
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were assured not only that our help would be welcomed in 
the public health work, but that such help was essential.518 
This reinforced requests which had already been conveyed by the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to the British Government asking that it facilitate the return of 
British medical workers to China, at the end of the European war.519 
Williamson attended the NCC conference held in Shanghai, 28-31 January 1946.  
This was the first major post-war Christian conference, attended by delegates who 
between them reflected a broad spread of war-time experience: thirteen Chinese who 
had spent the war in occupied China; ten Chinese who had experience of both 
occupied and unoccupied China; up to seventeen Chinese from unoccupied China; 
and twenty missionaries, eleven of whom had been interned.520  Williamson’s 
observations at the conference were important influences on him in forming the 
conclusions to his report.  As regards the political situation, he believed that: 
in the not-too-distant future, China will be united under one 
Government in which all the present political parties will be 
represented.  I consider that Christian influence is strong 
enough to ensure freedom to propagate our religion in the 
institutions we organise, and which will need to be 
recognised by the national Government.521 
As regards the expectations of the Chinese Church, he wrote: 
There is no doubt that the Chinese Church will welcome 
missionaries and that they need them […] But they ask that 
they shall be as free as possible from ‘race-consciousness’, 
ready to ‘think things through with the Chinese’, and able to 
convey ideas without any assumption of superiority or desire 
for any particular status.  In a word, they want missionaries 
who are prepared to be genuine ‘colleagues’ with their 
Chinese brethren.522 
Williamson foresaw a society where his own collegiate relationships with Zhang 
Sijing and the SBU in the 1930s would be widely replicated.   
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It is likely that Ling was much influenced by the sanguine expectations of 
Williamson’s 1943 book, and by the confident tone of his post-war report, when she 
described the general mood of optimism amongst missionaries in China in the last 
months of 1945.  ‘Most of them believed that the Chinese people wanted them, and 
thought that their help was important to the future development of the Chinese 
Church.’523  She argues that ‘most of the missionaries’ ‘assumed that Christian 
agencies had overcome anti-foreign prejudice’ and ‘for these reasons, missionaries 
seemed to have few doubts that they would be wanted and welcomed’.524 
The views of other mission workers call into question the validity of such easy 
generalisations.  Rufus Dart had worked in Shanxi since 1925 and was well aware of 
the ‘relationship of friendliness and co-operation between officials and missionaries’ 
which had been considered such a feature of pre-war mission work in the 
Province.525  On his return to Shanxi after internment, Dart, unlike Williamson, 
sensed that the situation had changed, and through his wife passed on an urgent 
message to staff at the Mission House: missionaries would be welcomed back by the 
Chinese church, but: 
had a tendency to be associated with parties (political) or 
governments which is not without danger to the church.  
They [the Chinese church] want us to be more circumspect in 
our attitude with temporal power.526  
In February 1945, seeing the growing threat from the CCP, the British Minister at the 
Chongqing Embassy was asked by a high ranking Chinese official what the attitude 
of the British government would be if China were divided after the war: 
There can only be one answer to such a question.  The policy 
of His Majesty’s Government in such an eventuality must be 
that which it has always followed in the past in a China 
partitioned by civil war or other causes, namely, recognition 
and support of the central Government of the day, while at 
                                                
523 Ling, Changing role, 54. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Williamson, British Baptists, 104. 
526 BMSA, CH/57, Dart to Chesterman, 26.November.1945.  This writer met with the Darts’ son, 
Peter, at his home in Bristol on 7.October.2011.  Amongst his father’s papers, Peter had a portrait size 
photograph of Yan Xishan.  Peter was curious to learn who this was, knowing only that it was a 
Chinese official greatly admired by his father.  Rufus Dart’s admiration for this Chinese political and 
military leader had been so impressed upon his son that it had remained with him for more than sixty 
years, despite Peter’s general ignorance of the historical context. 
 
 170 
the same time conducting de facto relations through His 
Majesty’s consuls with any regional administration.527   
Bickers, writing of the revolution of 1911, argues that, in reality, the usual pattern in 
China was for the British to ally themselves ‘behind the force best guaranteeing order 
and stability’.528  By mid 1946, it appeared that neither party could be guaranteed to 
provide either, requiring a different type of decision for the British. 
Factors influencing BMS post-war decision-making included the immediate 
impressions of interned missionaries, the views of the Society’s highly-respected 
Foreign Secretary and his report on his China tour, the voices of those returning to 
the field and the directions advised by the British Government.  None pointed clearly 
to ‘surrendering the task’.  Several suggested that the task might be redefined, 
implying a new relationship with the Church in China. 
Partnership with the Church of Christ in China  
There is evidence in the archive that, already during the war, the BMS was open to 
considering new ways of working with the Chinese church.  In the autumn of 1943, 
the Director of the CCC Border Service Department (中华 基督教会全国 总会 边疆 
服务部; Zhonghua Jidujiaohui Quanguo Zonghui Bianjiang Fuwubu) approached 
the BMS staff in Shaanxi asking that they second a medical missionary to work for 
them in Xizang province, and a Biblically-trained missionary to undertake publicity 
work for them in Chengdu.529   
The origins of the Border Service movement lay in the relocation of Chiang Kai-
shek’s government to Chongqing in late 1938.  Chiang needed fresh natural 
resources for the fight against Japan, and his attention was drawn to the border area 
by the shift of the country’s centre of gravity to the West during wartime.530  He 
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mounted a programme of ‘frontier reconstruction’, and, from mid 1939, students and 
young professionals were recruited from the eastern provinces to offer ‘service’ to 
the border regions, with the object of providing educational opportunities, welfare 
services and a better quality of life to the remote tribes.  The programme was initially 
hugely popular, to the extent that hundreds of students competed each year for the 
privilege of being selected to take part.531  
In 1940, Chiang invited the CCC to set up its own branch of Border Service.  For the 
CCC, joining up with the Border Service gave Chinese Christians an opportunity to 
show themselves as ‘a unifying element’ within the nation, in contrast to the anti-
imperialist narratives ‘which traditionally depicted [Christianity] as an alien culture 
that divided China’.532  The official guidelines for the new CCC branch, published in 
1943, stated: 
This department by using the spirit of service of Christ and 
the Central party’s [GMD] guiding virtue of transforming the 
frontier people through education, seeks to engage them in all 
sorts of service in order to illuminate the frontier brothers’ 
knowledge, their economic toil, improve their livelihood, 
promote national unity and enrich the nation’s strength.533 
A former professor on the staff of Qilu University, Zhang Bohuai (张伯怀), was 
appointed Director.  Zhang was known to the Baptist community from his work at 
Qilu, where he was familiarly referred to as W.B. or Bill Djang.  He appears to have 
had a genial and confident relationship with the foreign missionaries: there is a 
reference to him hosting a ‘dinner party’ ‘for all English Baptists’ in Chengdu in 
October 1940.534  Bill Upchurch, BMS missionary in China from 1935 to 1952, 
described Zhang as ‘one of the finest Christians I have ever met and was proud to 
call my friend’.535    
Williamson had been engaged in discussion with Zhang about the CCC Border 
Service from its earliest days. ‘I am anxious’ wrote Williamson to Fred Russell in 
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Xi’an, ‘that we should have our place in these forward movements to the West.’536  
In April 1945 George Young from the BMS in Xi’an, visited ‘the North West 
Border’ and reported enthusiastically to the BMS China Sub-Committee that the 
Border Service provided ‘a great opportunity for evangelistic work’.537  The Sub-
Committee was ‘deeply impressed’ by Young’s report but decided not to take any 
action until ‘the whole matter of the future policy and scope of work in China’ could 
be considered.538 
When the matter of assigning staff to work with the Border Service was again 
considered at the next meeting of the China Sub-Committee, there was opposition 
from some of the China missionaries present on the grounds that the Society might 
be spreading itself too thinly.539  They suggested that ‘the Society had never yet fully 
occupied the three provinces in which it worked in the past’ and much work needed 
to be done, particularly in schools and universities in these areas.  Despite these 
concerns, the Sub-Committee decided to make plans ‘for cooperation with the 
Church of Christ in China in work in the new areas’, and, soon after, John Henderson 
Smith was assigned to the job.540  
For the BMS, allying itself with the CCC Border Service would mean not just 
working in a new (and remote) geographical area, but working in a completely 
different way.  Foreign missionaries would be working for a Chinese organisation 
(the CCC) and they would be working not just on an equal basis with Chinese 
colleagues, but under the supervision of Chinese staff.  The BMS decision was an 
indication of its recognition that conditions for missionaries in China would never be 
quite the same again, and an indication of its full acceptance of the maturity and 
authority of the CCC. This was not quite the first time BMS missionaries had worked 
for the CCC.  In February 1940, Victor and Eva Hayward, evacuated from Shanxi 
province, had been seconded to work with the CCC’s Chinese Home Mission project 
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in Guizhou province.541  There, Hayward had taught at the Great China University, 
which had evacuated from Shanghai, had shared in the leadership of the CCC 
Guizhou Committee and had taken part in the Kweizhou [Guizhou] International 
Relief Association in its massive work with the million refugees escaping the 
Japanese.  But working with the Border Service Mission was a clear break from the 
BMS’s traditional policy of distancing itself from political movements.  The CCC 
Border Service Mission was funded 60% by the Chinese Nationalist government. 
The minutes of the China Sub-Committee do not record any discussion about the 
potential risks involved in aligning the Mission so closely with a GMD initiative, and 
details of the discussion leading up to this positive decision are not included.542  
Zhang’s charismatic personality, and his longstanding links with Williamson at Qilu, 
seem likely to have been important influences.  Here was an influential Chinese 
Christian from the Baptist stable, taking the gospel to vast, previously untouched, 
parts of China.  He was also working in partnership with the highest authority in the 
land, the Nationalist leader for whom Williamson had developed a keen admiration.  
Williamson wrote later: ‘We can justifiably feel proud as a Society that one of our 
Chinese leaders has been chosen for this important pioneering work’, showing an 
understandable delight in what appeared to be the fruits of the Society’s early 
labours.543  Williamson’s influence on the meeting and his pre-war associations seem 
to have swayed the Committee decision, despite the reservations of missionaries 
currently working in China. 
The response from the leadership of the CCC to the BMS decision was immediate.  
H.H..Tsui (Zui), of the General Assembly of the CCC, wrote to Williamson 
commending the decision and recognising the shift in working relationship between 
missionaries and Chinese:   
The assignment of Western personnel to work under the 
direction of the General Assembly is a more advanced type of 
cooperation than has been possible on any large scale in the 
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past, and we hope that this will be the continuation of a 
fruitful and happy relationship between yourselves and us.544   
Zhang himself wrote to Williamson thanking the BMS for allocating Smith to work 
in the Border Service Department, and emphasised ‘how grateful we are for this type 
of relationship with the English Baptist Missionary Society.’545  Shortly after his 
arrival, Smith wrote detailing the work to which he had been assigned in Xichang, 
(西昌) Sichuan province, and praising ‘this thrilling story of modern missionary 
enterprise’.546  Smith recognised and apparently welcomed the reversal of roles 
between missionaries and Chinese Christians, where the authority lay predominantly 
in the hands of the Chinese. 
A year later, Smith’s report was much more negative.547  There were high levels of 
disunity, a rapid turnover of staff members and difficulty in recruiting Chinese to 
work with the Service.  Smith was particularly concerned about the lack of priority 
being given to specifically Christian work.  No efforts were being made to undertake 
evangelistic work with the 700,000 ethnic Chinese living in and around Xichang.  
The Chinese church and the cooperating missions contributed only about 6 million 
dollars to the 45-million-dollar annual budget for the work of the Border Service, and 
Smith thought that this was one of the reasons that church work was undervalued.  
His recommendation was, however, for expansion rather than retreat.  He advised the 
appointment of five additional Chinese and two additional Western evangelists, and a 
Western doctor and nurse, arguing also that for each of the missionaries appointed, a 
special extra annual allocation of funds should be made to ensure that funds would 
be available specifically for evangelistic work.  Smith believed that the future of the 
Border Service work rested mainly with the Chinese, but that, because of the 
widespread disruption in China caused by the impending civil war, ‘the years 
immediately ahead will be the special responsibility of the co-operating missions’.548   
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Smith found that, for him, there were practical difficulties in working in this remote 
place in such close partnership with Chinese colleagues.  He recommended:  
That it is a general practice in Forward Movement work for 
Western Personnel to have food prepared in Western style 
and that adequate facilities for this be provided on all main 
stations.  Personally I favour such a general ruling on this 
matter rather than leaving it to individuals to decide.  This 
latter may lead to comparisons being made.549 
Whether or not to emulate local diet and living styles had been a matter for debate 
since the earliest days of the missions.  For some Westerners, it was difficult to adapt 
to a diet consisting entirely of Chinese food.  In the early years, when missionary 
compounds provided for very separate lifestyles, flexibility according to personal 
needs and circumstances was possible and acceptable.550  Smith was working in the 
mid-1940s, living alongside Chinese colleagues who were more outspoken than they 
might have been in times when the Treaties were in force.  He believed that life-style 
choices could lead to uncomfortable public comparisons about whether one 
missionary was ‘better’ than another.  Smith himself was subject to thyroid 
deficiency, which affected his dietary options, and no doubt he wished to avoid 
invidious comparisons with other foreigners not affected by such problems.551  In 
fact, he resigned from the Border Service in September 1946 because of his 
difficulties in accessing appropriate drugs for his condition.552  
Despite the difficulties Smith had experienced in working with the Service, the BMS 
retained its commitment to this CCC initiative.553  In February 1947, Bill Upchurch 
was appointed to work among the Lolo tribe in Xichang, where he and his family 
remained until January 1951.554  In retrospect, this may have proved misguided, 
dissipating the Society’s scarce resources and linking the missionaries clearly to the 
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Nationalist leadership.  It was, however, an indication of BMS missionaries’ 
commitment to finding new ways of working with the Chinese church. 
Return to the formerly occupied provinces 
The BMS had now to make a critical decision as to whether or not work should be 
re-opened in Shandong and Shanxi, where, because of the Japanese occupation, no 
missionary had been present for three to six years.555  The decision would ostensibly 
reflect the basic goal of the Mission to ‘surrender the task’.  The means by which the 
Society set about making this decision will now be considered. 
Figure 11: Map showing areas previously under Japanese control and those 
under Communist control at the point of Japan’s surrender in August 1945556 
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In the immediate aftermath of the surrender, both Shandong and Shanxi were 
engulfed in widespread hostilities.  In all, 1,246 battles took place in China between 
1945 and 1950 and Shandong and Shanxi were two of the provinces most hard-hit.557  
In Shandong, Nationalist guerrillas had had the upper hand until 1943, but by 1945 
better internal organisation by the CCP at local level had allowed the Communists to 
take control.558  ‘By the spring of 1945, almost all of the Shandong countryside had 
been abandoned [by the Japanese] to Communist control […].  At the time of the 
Japanese surrender, Communists claimed control over 92% of the land area.’559   
The Mission Board proposed that Fred Drake, Edward Phillips, Rufus Dart and Eric 
Sutton Smith, who had all been interned, ‘should remain for the present in China’, to 
assist in the process of working out what should be the future role of the BMS in the 
provinces now emerging from Japanese occupation.560  Letters written by these 
missionaries provide very detailed accounts of their return, Drake and Phillips to 
Jinan and Dart and Smith to Taiyuan.  They describe in full the welcome they 
received, the devastated condition of mission property, their urgent attempts to make 
good the worst of the damage and their assessments of changes in China which had a 
bearing on whether or not missionaries were still needed.561  
Shanxi had been an important CCP base from before the war and, by late 1945, large 
areas of the province were under Communist control.  Taiyuan, the provincial 
capital, remained nominally Nationalist, under the grip of the provincial governor, 
Yan Xishan.562  There, an early priority for the missionaries was to find out what had 
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happened to the church in the six years since they had left during the Japanese 
campaign of agitation against the British in 1939.  Dart described his ‘appalling’ 
five-day train journey from Shanghai to Taiyuan.   
[W]e have not seen the like the last twenty years.  You have 
to fight for standing room only, and at night must stop where 
the train stops, and find the nearest piece of ground to lie 
down and sleep, as inns are out of the question, already full 
up.  I just mention this for your information.563 
Dart was surprised and delighted to find that the church in Taiyuan was ‘flourishing 
and alive’, with a full programme of activities.  More than a hundred were attending 
Sunday services, of which about twenty had to sit outside the small church building 
on benches, which, in the cold of a Shanxi December, the missionaries considered ‘a 
testimony to their enthusiasm’.564   
Ling takes the view that Dart’s account of his return demonstrated his delight that 
there was a continuing place for missionaries in the Chinese church, and that 
missionary work could continue as before.565  This is not consistent with the 
emphases in Dart’s letters.  It was the discovery that the church had grown and 
thrived in the absence of missionaries that provided the ‘tonic’ which raised his 
flagging spirits after three years’ internment.566  Dart celebrated his belief that the 
spirit of independence of the Chinese Christians had grown tremendously.  ‘They 
now talk of their church, their responsibility and privileges, in a way they never did 
before.’567  This had happened during six years when ‘they have had no financial or 
other help from us’.568  This is a church such as Brook describes when he writes that 
‘the occupation pushed Protestant Christianity […] in the direction of independence, 
union and Chinese control.’569 
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The church had been kept alive by the strong leadership of Xu Lingzao (Hsu Ling-
Tsao), a nurse trained in the early 1920s in the BMS Women’s hospital in the city.570  
From 1924 she had been responsible for an orphanage, which she kept open 
throughout the occupation, and which became the centre of church life.  In the last 
three years of the war, an influx of new members, over half of whom were ‘younger 
men and women around thirty years and under’, had swelled congregational numbers 
and added a charismatic and emotional dimension with which some of the older 
members were uncomfortable.571  In the early months of 1946 a split in the 
congregation threatened and the newer members opted for a break with the CCC.  
Individual missionaries judged these developments within the Chinese church 
differently according to the emphases of their personal beliefs, for there were 
significant differences of opinion, even within the BMS.  Ernest Madge, who joined 
Dart in Taiyuan early in 1946, looked anxiously at what he described as these ‘family 
squabbles’.572  Where Dart had seen growing maturity, Madge feared schism. 
The Taiyuan church will be more and more critical of the 
missionaries who come here, and will demand a large say in 
the work that they do. […] With sympathy and patience we 
know the outlook of this church can be broadened.573 
These are indicators that in Shanxi, as Brook argues, where missionaries had 
continued to take a dominant role in church affairs up until 1939574 the church had 
indeed grown in their absence. 
In Taiyuan, the two hospitals had been an important focus of BMS work.  The 
Japanese military had taken them over during the war, and many valuable buildings 
had been demolished for street widening.575  Chinese municipal authorities had 
moved in after the surrender, and the acute shortage of houses and public buildings 
made negotiations for repossession of the Mission buildings particularly difficult.576  
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Missionaries were advised by the Provincial authorities that a recent edict from the 
Chinese Government stated that all Japanese property in China must be handed over 
to the Central Government as war reparation.   
If the owner of the land wishes to purchase such buildings he 
may do so, the purchase money to be put to the credit of 
Japanese reparations.  If the owner does not wish to purchase 
the buildings concerned, then both buildings and site revert to 
the Central Government who in turn will undertake to 
compensate the owner for his loss.577  
The abolition of extraterritoriality meant that foreigners were now subject to Chinese 
land and property law.  This, coupled with complications arising from Japanese use 
of much of the property during the war made establishing ownership fraught.578  
In Shandong unsettled conditions meant that the small towns changed hands 
frequently in continuing skirmishes.  Zhoucun, headquarters of the SBU and one of 
the three towns in the province where BMS work had been centred, was captured by 
the CCP on 28 August 1945 and retaken by the GMD on 15 September.  It remained 
precariously in GMD hands until retaken by the CCP on 8 June 1946, who withdrew 
again on 2 July.579  Fred Drake described a visit there in January 1946: 
The Choutsun-Changtien [Zhoucun-Zhangdian (张店)] region 
is an island held by guerrillas in the interest of the national 
Government, surrounded by a sea of Communism. […]  The 
whole town is bristling with arms, and girdled with street 
fortifications, as this is the last outpost of the Government 
forces; and one cannot move about the streets after dark 
without knowing the watchword for the evening.580   
Jinan, the provincial capital, became ‘virtually a besieged city; the railways are still 
cut; refugees continue to stream into the city from the Communist “liberated areas”.  
There are over one hundred refugee primary school teachers in Tsinan [Jinan] 
now’.581  During the war, church life had been severely disrupted.  Church leaders 
had been impoverished, large numbers of church members had become refugees, and 
much church and personal property had been damaged or destroyed.   
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However, the returning missionaries were encouraged by the welcome they received 
on their arrival in Jinan.  For Phillips, the moment of return, after three and a half 
years’ internment, to Jinan, the city in which he and his family had made their home 
since 1928, was personally hugely significant.  
We never had believed in the suggestion of a few that we 
would not be wanted back again, but we have been surprised 
and overwhelmed by the sincerity and warmth of our 
welcome. It was not our practice formerly to shake hands 
with rickshaw coolies on the streets but it has been quite the 
right thing on this occasion!  From coolies, urchins, street 
hawkers, through to officials in high positions our welcome 
has been genuine and very stimulating.582   
Drake and Phillips noted with pleasure that the South suburb congregation in Jinan 
was flourishing under the impressive leadership of a young pastor Sun Shouxin.  At 
the Christmas Day service in December 1945 ‘the church was full and many different 
groups of young people took part’.583  The congregation had raised sufficient funds 
over recent years to balance the budget with a little to spare, a considerable 
achievement during the war years.  Drake and Phillips did not involve themselves in 
the work of the churches, which they saw as the responsibility of Chinese church 
leaders, but instead concentrated on the three BMS hospitals in the province and on 
Qilu University in Jinan, which had been a major focus of missionary work in the 
province before the war.  Phillips took prime responsibility for restoring the 
university and its buildings, while Drake liaised with the Chinese church leaders, 
Zhang Sijing, Wang Juntang and Jing Yihui, about the hospitals and the schools.584 
Qilu was staffed and financed jointly by eleven missionary societies, British, 
American and Canadian among others, and was subject to a cumbersome 
administrative structure.585  Since November 1937, it had operated on two different 
sites.  When the greater part of the university evacuated to Chengdu in November 
1937, fifty faculty members had remained in Jinan and the university hospital had 
remained open until taken over by the Japanese for military purposes in early 1942.  
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Decision-making was particularly fraught when the staff and student body were 
physically divided between two sites, almost a thousand miles apart, and were 
operating for almost eight years under very different conditions and with very 
different priorities.586  Since the departure of the foreigners in August 1942, the main 
university premises in Jinan had been in use as a Japanese Military hospital, and in 
December 1945 were still occupied by about twelve hundred Japanese wounded and 
six hundred staff.  Following the Japanese surrender, the Whitewright Institute had 
been taken over by the Provincial Ministry of Military Affairs.587  Re-establishing 
ownership and resuming occupation of university and mission property was 
laborious and frustrating.   
British businessmen were also frustrated in their attempts to repossess their 
properties at the end of the war.  In June 1946, almost a year after the end of the war, 
George Kitson of the Foreign Office China Department complained that a large 
proportion of British-owned wharfs and ships had still not been recovered.  There 
was evidence, he suggested, not only of a lack of energy and goodwill on the part of 
the Chinese authorities, but also of a desire to obstruct, if not confiscate.  ‘Excuses 
for non-rendition are often malicious and frivolous.’588  Geoffrey Wallinger, British 
Minister at the Embassy in Nanjing complained that: 
Widespread lack of respect for property rights and the high-
handed action of underlings […] are one of the more 
disturbing features of post-war China and have largely 
contributed to the general atmosphere of pessimism in 
foreign circles regarding the future in this country.589  
Drake and Phillips’ disappointment and frustration over the condition of their 
property and the difficulty of reasserting their ownership were accompanied by 
anxiety about the enormous costs involved.  Letter after letter, from them and from 
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Dart in Taiyuan, contained details of schemes to secure money and materials from 
relief organisations, and to modify plans to take account of the limited mission 
resources available.590 
Drake and Phillips were eager to reopen the university hospital in Jinan.  Most of the 
former hospital staff, including nine doctors and the majority of the nurses, who had 
worked throughout the war in the Municipal Hospital, were willing to return when 
plans were put in place for its reopening.  The hospital was gradually re-equipped 
with help from the British, American and Canadian Red Cross, although help from 
UNRRA and the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(CNRRA) was slow to materialise. ‘I understand’, wrote Phillips, ‘that CNRRA 
officials in America and China, of all grades, have been advised of this particular 
need for months but the farther we go the more remote seems the prospect of help 
from that quarter.’591   
As already observed, the correspondence of the BMS missionaries who remained in 
Shandong during the occupation is almost entirely silent on the matter of 
collaboration with the occupiers.  A rather different perspective is suggested by 
Williamson’s visit to Jinan during his China tour, when he did not feel the need to be 
so circumspect.  In the report he wrote on his return home, he noted that the Qilu 
doctors and nurses who continued, under the auspices of the local Chinese puppet 
government, to provide medical services during the occupation were ‘regarded by 
some as collaborators’.   
As I see it, but for the step taken by these graduates of Qilu, 
multitudes of their fellow countrymen would have gone 
without medical aid for four years.  I leave the problem with 
you.  It is not yet solved in China.592 
He noted also tensions between those members of Qilu university staff who remained 
in Jinan and those who left for Free China during the occupation.  
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The peculiar circumstances attendant on long mutual 
separation of former colleagues and friends, […] have 
produced a situation in which mutual suspicions and even 
hostility readily arise.  Those who remained are accused of 
having collaborated with the enemy, while those who left are 
regarded as deserters.  Between these extremes a great variety 
of mutually hostile opinion is found.593 
Nothing is said about such tensions in the very full letters which Drake and Phillips 
wrote from Jinan.  They would certainly have been aware of them, but doubtless did 
not want to put in writing information which might fall into hostile hands.  
Williamson’s account, from the safety of his British location, shows the limitations 
of relying on missionary correspondence as the sole basis for assessing the sensitive 
realities of the time, or of judging missionary attitudes to them.    
It may be that such tensions underlay the hesitation of Chinese nationals to assume 
leadership roles in the university.  Immediately on his return to Jinan in December 
1945, Phillips wrote to the University President, Wu Keming (吴克明), then based in 
Chengdu, pressing Wu to find a Chinese member of staff to lead the university in its 
post-war recovery in Jinan.  
Mr Drake and I would much prefer that one of our Chinese 
colleagues should head up the take-over, but it seems that at 
present my colleagues wish to push me forward for that 
work. […] I am willing to take the lead here for the time 
being but I urge you to send your own representative from the 
West, or, failing that, to appoint one of our Chinese 
colleagues here to act in that capacity.594 
No action was taken relating to this request and Phillips felt obliged to continue in 
the role of acting chair until eventually relieved at the end of 1946.595  
The BMS also had responsibility for hospitals in Zhoucun and Qingzhou and, in 
January 1946, Drake and Phillips made a hazardous journey to Zhoucun to assess the 
situation.  During the wartime occupation, the Zhoucun buildings had been used for 
military purposes and, after the Japanese withdrew, the town had been occupied 
successively by Communist and Nationalist troops, who used the hospital as a 
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barracks.  The missionaries found it ‘stripped of every door and window, along with 
every window and door frame, staircase and floorboard, banisters and verandah 
rails’.596  Anything made of wood had been used for fuel by successive detachments 
of troops.  Something of the sense of desolation experienced by the returning 
missionaries was captured by James Harris, months later, who wrote: ‘The shock of 
seeing our hospital and East side premises in such a state was almost more than I 
could bear.’597  Drake and Phillips initiated some basic repairs, and employed 
gatemen to keep a watch on the property.   
Grievances carried over from the years of the occupation cast a shadow within the 
Chinese church.598  The missionaries were advised of a ‘local squabble between 
Chang Ssuching [Zhang Sijing] and his enemies’ which had resulted in ‘moves made 
by recalcitrant local Christians to expropriate the hospital and dispense with 
foreigners’.599  The use of the pejorative word ‘squabble’ suggests that the 
missionary who wrote the letter did not attach much importance to the views of those 
who wanted to ‘dispense with foreigners’.  There is insufficient archival evidence to 
explain precisely the nature of the disagreements.  The account of Zhang’s work in 
Chapter Two suggests that he had close and congenial relationships with his 
missionary colleagues.  Negative feelings towards the foreigners may have affected 
the attitudes of other Chinese Christians towards Zhang, and tensions within the 
Zhoucun Christian community made the Mission hospital vulnerable to outside 
attack.  
In early 1946, Qingzhou was in the hands of Communists.  Dr Jing, who had been 
active in the BMS hospital throughout the war, was suffering from stress and had 
moved temporarily from Qingzhou to Jinan.600  Staffing levels in Qingzhou had been 
maintained (including six graduate nurses, ten student nurses, one pharmacist, and 
one business manager) and the fabric of the hospital was in better condition than in 
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Zhoucun.  The church, mission school and hospital were being kept together by 
Wang Juntang, ‘an old and faithful steward of the Mission’.601  Nevertheless, in Dr. 
Jing’s absence, the lack of a qualified doctor, Chinese or foreign, left the future of 
the hospital in doubt. 
There are no references in the returned missionaries’ letters to the Japanese-imposed 
Protestant church union which had been initiated at the time the foreign missionaries 
were removed from the province.  Williamson had been in China when the first 
overtures were made by Japanese pastors to Chinese Christians.  He wrote that ‘the 
attempts of the J [sic] to unify the Church for the purposes of convenient control had 
succeeded up to a point’ but the Chinese had refused to accept the constitution drawn 
up by the Japanese and had managed to substitute it with one they had devised 
themselves.602 
The Chinese were suspicious that these overtures were 
actuated by political motives and in consequence no progress 
was made in the sphere of Christian fellowship.  That I think 
in general represents the situation here.603 
It is clear from the letters of these three experienced and energetic missionaries, Dart, 
Drake and Phillips, that in their first months in post-war China, they focussed their 
efforts on reclaiming and restoring what they could of the Mission’s institutional 
work, in particular the hospitals, in which the BMS had invested such substantial 
amounts of human and material resources, but encountered great practical 
difficulties.  Deciding what to do with these institutions was a major stumbling block 
in any plans for withdrawal from China.  Missionary letters from Shanxi and 
Shandong also hint at, but do not detail, some fractures in relationships between 
Chinese Christians which had their origins in the years the foreigners were absent. 
Missionaries and their families 
Another aspect of the missionaries’ adjustment to the post-war world was a sense of 
feeling distanced from those at home, as a result of their very different war-time 
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experiences.  In Britain between 1939 and 1945, newspapers, newsreels and 
magazines conjured up a powerful sense of the whole nation being part of an intense 
and shared experience, brought vividly to life in the recurring photographic coverage, 
and held in the popular memory by phrases like ‘finest hour’, ‘backs to the wall’, 
‘community spirit’, ‘people’s war’.  Missionaries, who had neither been in Britain 
nor engaged personally in the war effort, were largely excluded from the British 
experience of the war years and could only very partially enter into this important 
aspect of national identity.  This sense of exclusion was magnified many times over 
for those who had been interned.  Langdon Gilkey, who was interned in Weihsien 
camp in North China from 1942 to 1945, captures the disorientating experience: 
A week or so later, on March 11, 1946, I was home […]  All 
the familiar sights, sounds, and smells, the well-loved people, 
the buildings and the streets of the university community 
were there.  Yet inwardly, I was a man from another planet.  
Everything was absolutely normal – and totally strange.  I did 
not know how to go about finding my way in it.604 
Gilkey was American and his home was in Chicago, but his experience was 
comparable to that of British internees returning to Britain.  It was not only difficult 
for them to understand fully what the wartime experience had been like.  There are 
indications that the returning missionaries and their families were made to feel a 
sense of guilt for not having taken part in the struggle or shared the shortages, 
difficulties and dangers.  The ten-year-old daughter of one formerly interned 
missionary was told by a teacher in a school class in late 1949 that she considered 
that the girl’s father had shirked his patriotic duty by remaining in China during the 
war and failing to sign up for national service.605  Fred Russell spent the war years in 
Shaanxi, separated from his wife and family, subject to bombing, evacuations, 
shortages and banditry.  Yet he felt constrained to conclude his chapter in Through 
Toil and Tribulation, the post-war account of the Baptist missionary experience in 
China, with words which verge on apology, almost guilt: 
We do not pretend that these difficulties and hardships were 
comparable with the difficulties and hardships endured in 
Britain during the bitter war years.  But just as people at 
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home proved that they could ‘take it’ so the missionaries on 
the field showed the same spirit.606 
Russell was reflecting here his understanding of the importance of establishing an 
awareness that the efforts of those at home had been shared by those overseas.  
The extensive disruption caused by the war meant that family separations, always a 
part of missionary life, were more frequent and more prolonged.  Fred Drake, 
himself born in China, and his wife, Dora, were committed to educating their son in 
China, but in 1938 war conditions meant that suitable schooling was unavailable.607   
They had been unwilling to send their seven-year old to boarding school in England, 
thinking it unfair ‘that the whole sacrifice of the divided home, if it had to be 
divided, should be laid upon the child’.608  They had therefore decided that Dora 
would have to stay in Britain when Drake returned to China.  By the summer of 
1945, Dora had been separated from her husband for seven years.  The end of the 
war raised the prospect of a family reunion, but, as already noted, Drake did not join 
the other internees on the repatriation ships leaving Shanghai for Britain.  Instead, he 
travelled with Edward Phillips to review conditions in Jinan.   
By March 1946, Drake felt his exploratory work in Shandong was at a stage when it 
could be left to others, and was beginning to think about returning home.  At the 
time, sea passages from China were almost impossible to obtain and a further long 
delay seemed inevitable, unless the BMS would agree to Drake returning by air.  Sea 
passages were allocated through the British Government and those made available to 
the Missionary Societies continued to be scarce between 1945 and 1947. In early 
1946, one newly-married couple sailed for China on different boats two days apart, 
which would have meant that they did not see each other for more than six weeks.  
This led to a protest from the secretary of their home church, who complained that it 
was ‘a great pity that these two young people, so recently married, should have been 
treated as strangers for the purpose of travelling’.609  Dr Chesterman replied:  
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During the war (and until now) individual societies did not 
book passages.  These were made by the various Government 
offices to Edinburgh House, the headquarters of the 
Conference of British Missionary Societies.  We then are 
given our share.  Some boats are transport ships and only take 
men.  We have to accept any passage that is offered us or we 
go down to the bottom of the list for the next allocation.610   
Much to Dora’s chagrin, the Committee refused to allow Drake to fly home, on the 
grounds of the extra expense involved and the fact that it would be unfair to other 
missionaries if one were given such preferential treatment.  A very heated 
correspondence ensued, in which Dora argued passionately that Drake’s position was 
different from that of other missionaries and accused the Mission of failure to make 
proper provision for the very real needs of its staff: ‘It is the old state of affairs – the 
more one considers the Mission, the less he is considered by the Mission.’611  The 
Committee would not alter its decision.  Dora concluded a final indignant letter on a 
different note: 
It is true that I am very near the end of my tether, but it is also 
true that much as I want and need Fred, I cannot get clear in 
my mind how right it is to put family before God’s work.  
Fred himself is in the same quandary.612 
Dora had identified a central dilemma for missionary families.  Was it always wrong 
to put family concerns or personal needs before the work of the Mission?  Might it be 
that sometimes caring for family was God’s work?   
As part of the research for this thesis, oral interviews were conducted with thirteen of 
the sons and daughters of BMS missionaries who served in China during this 
period.613  Between them, they had experienced the many variations of schooling and 
upbringing open to them as missionary children.  They represented different ages, 
family structures, and family relationships, and a range of different China 
experiences.  It would be simplistic without much fuller information, and more 
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detailed analysis, to draw conclusions about the impact on these children of their 
parents’ missionary work in China and the consequent separations.  However, they 
do illustrate that for many children, these separations had had a profound effect.  
Two of those interviewed, now in their eighties, remained fiercely bitter about what 
they saw as their parents’ abandonment of them in the interests of their work for the 
missionary society.  Relationships particularly with their mothers had become deeply 
soured.  Others who were sent to stay with extended family members, for instance 
during holidays from boarding school, believed they were unwanted and their 
presence barely tolerated.  Against this, there were also those who spoke with pride 
of their parents’ commitment, or recounted positive experiences stemming from 
support from siblings or school friends, or described positive and important 
relationships with guardians in Britain. 
Several of the missionaries’ children spoke of crying themselves to sleep for days or 
weeks on arrival at boarding school at the age of seven.  This misery, of course, was 
not confined to missionaries’ children, and occurred in an era when it was much 
more generally considered acceptable, even desirable, to send children to boarding 
school at a young age, although such social norms would have been more common in 
wealthier social groups than the ones from which most missionaries originated.  
Research into the effects on adult men of being sent away at an early age to boarding 
school describes a perception of ‘woundedness’ amongst them, and feelings of 
having lost ‘something very fundamental: trust and innocence, the sense of 
belonging, a sense of it being all right to be a child and have a childhood’.614  Most 
children at boarding schools were able to reconnect with their families for several 
weeks each year, but the children of missionaries might not see their parents for 
years at a time.  
After the war, missionaries with school-age children could not be certain that there 
would be any appropriate schooling for them in China.  Following the opening of the 
Japanese offensive against Britain and the United States, parts of the Chefoo 
boarding school for missionaries’ children had been temporarily relocated to India, 
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but by late 1945 the future of the school was in doubt.615  Post-war conditions of 
scarcity in Britain made it harder for missionaries to find guardians for their children, 
if they left them at home for schooling: housing and feeding additional youngsters, 
and taking responsibility for their personal support and moral guidance, was not 
something to be entered into lightly.  This, and the very unsettled conditions in 
China, meant that many missionaries with children saw no option but to leave them 
in Britain, with one or neither parent, when they returned to China.  Gwyneth Still 
responded robustly when Dr Chesterman wrote from the Mission House expressing 
appreciation of her willingness to allow her husband to return to China alone in late 
1946: 
Of course I cannot say that I am pleased that Ronald should 
go back to China without us, but feeling as we do about the 
need there at present, there seems to be no choice.  I know I 
cannot leave the children yet and it seems quite unsuitable 
that we should take them out in present circumstances.616 
Even leaving children approaching adulthood, involved considerable sacrifice on the 
part of the parents and their children.  Handley Stockley and his wife left behind two 
sons and a daughter, aged 17, 14 and 11, when they returned to China in late 1945.  
The oldest, a son, had left school and was expecting to be called up for military 
service, but meanwhile was trying to find work.  The parents’ anxiety for their son’s 
well-being, and their sense of helplessness at trying to parent him at such a distance, 
comes through in their weekly letters to him.   
I wish you would write us oftener.  How about once a week?  
If you are short of money for the 6d, ask Uncle Bernard, for 
we do want to hear from you.617 
If by any misfortune you should find yourself without a 
definite place to go […], remember these addresses […].  If 
you have to go to any home, be sure to try to have all your 
rationing cards etc in proper order before you leave one place 
and go to the next, it makes so much difference to the lady of 
the house.618 
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Forty-one China missionaries left the Mission between the onset of the war with 
Japan and the post-war resumption of work in 1945/46, almost half the pre-war total.  
Seventeen families with school-age or pre-school children were amongst those still 
prepared to serve.  All were faced with a choice regarding arrangements for their 
children when considering return to China.  Five couples returned, leaving their 
children at boarding school in the immediate post-war period.  One other couple took 
their three pre-school age children with them when they went back in late 1946, 
leaving two older children at boarding school in England.  Four other families went 
back with pre-school children.  In seven families, the mother chose to remain in 
Britain with the children, when the father returned.619  
In 1945 the BMS set up a special sub-committee ‘to consider in all its aspects the 
care of missionaries’ children’.620  This was in the immediate aftermath of the death 
in Local Authority foster care of twelve-year-old Dennis O’Neill.  Dennis’s death, 
and the subsequent trial of his foster parents, caused a huge national outcry in early 
1945, and for several days was given greater prominence in the pages of The Times 
than even the events of the war.621  Dennis’s death, and the concerns arising from it, 
meant that the care of all children living away from their parents was now very much 
in the public eye.   
It had not been unusual in the past for the young children of missionary parents to be 
sent back to Britain in the care of missionaries other than their parents, and then 
placed for short-term care with families chosen by members of Mission Board staff, 
sometimes on the strength only of a church member’s verbal recommendation. One 
concerned missionary wrote in late 1946 about a colleague, ‘he is looking forward to 
coming back to China, but they have three small boys and they do not know what to 
do with them.  I was wondering if Mrs Harris of Rustington would take them?’622 
The BMS could scarcely afford to risk a public scandal over arrangements for the 
children of missionaries.  When the special sub-committee eventually reported in 
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1949, the Society’s Officers ‘laid some stress on the fact that the primary 
responsibility for the care of missionaries’ children rested on the parents’.623  This is 
the kind of ‘double-think’ that Manktelow finds again and again in the dealings of 
the LMS with the first missionaries in the South Seas and in South Africa.624  The 
Society demanded of its missionary staff that they put themselves in positions in 
which it was impossible for them to give satisfactory care to their children, while at 
the same time disowning responsibility for the consequences.625  
The government committee set up in the wake of the Dennis O’Neill inquiry, to look 
into provision for children ‘deprived of a normal home life’, was only one of a 
number of social welfare initiatives introduced in Britain at this time.626  From the 
early 1940s, promoting the idea of ‘a better Britain after the war’ had been part of 
Government strategy.  In July 1940, the War Cabinet considered a paper on the 
proposed social reforms.627  The Beveridge Report, published in December 1942, 
became the blueprint for many of the subsequent reforms.628  Within a remarkably 
short space of time, a range of new legislation was enacted which established the 
principle of universal right of access to services, regardless of income, geography, 
gender, age or occupation.  For the first time, the middle classes were included as 
entitled recipients of sickness and insurance benefits.  Stronger central control was a 
direct consequence of the new legislation.  Contributing payments for services, 
which previously might have been a matter of individual choice, became 
compulsory.629   
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The new welfare legislation was generally welcomed by the churches, because it was 
‘seen to be identifiably Christian’.630  The minutes of the BMS Committees for the 
period immediately following the passing of the new statutes suggest that debate 
centred on the practical consequences.  The benefits and costs to the missionary 
societies as employers under the new scheme were weighed, as well as how they 
applied in practice.631  At a special meeting of the General Committee, called in 
September 1946 to consider the Society’s financial problems, one member observed 
optimistically that they might benefit from the impending nationalisation of the 
health service.  Appeals for cash for the voluntary hospitals, said Rev H.G. Lewis, 
‘would probably soon cease’ and ‘that money might be devoted to missionary 
purposes’.632   
One issue that arose was the way in which the 1944 Education Act would affect the 
two boarding schools which catered specifically for missionaries’ children, 
Walthamstow Hall and Eltham College.  The Act allowed for independent schools, 
funded partly by the state and partly through tuition fees, to exist alongside State 
schools.  One quarter of the places in these schools were directly funded by central 
government, while the remainder attracted fees, some paid by the Local Education 
Authority and some by private pupils. Walthamstow Hall and Eltham College fitted 
within this administrative framework, being classified as ‘Direct Grant’ schools.  
Prior to the 1944 Act, the children of missionaries paid only £13 per term, whereas 
other pupils were charged £36 a term.633 This constituted a substantial saving over 
the whole school year, especially where there were two or three children boarding 
from the same family, but under the new administrative arrangements such 
preferential treatment would not be possible.  Minutes of the BMS Finance Sub-
Committee in December 1945 report that discussions had taken place between the 
Governors of the two schools and the Ministry of Education to find ‘ways and means 
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of assisting missionary parents’, but does not specify what kind of ‘ways and means’ 
were hoped for or anticipated.634   
SOS from Shandong 
Following the exploratory work of the small group of returning missionaries, in May 
and June 1946 mission headquarters received two letters from Shandong.  One letter 
was from Dr Jing, medical superintendent of the BMS hospital in Qingzhou, who 
wrote (in English) referring to ‘the special circumstances [a discreet reference to the 
fighting between CCP and GMD troops] which have obtained since the Japanese 
capitulation’, and their destructive effect on staff morale.  He went on, ‘Our greatest 
hope is that in the nearest possible future you may be able to send us an English 
colleague or two to help tide us over this very difficult period.’635  The other letter 
was from Zhang Sijing pleading with the BMS to reverse their decision not to allow 
Henry Payne, already past retirement age, to return to China: 
This destruction is a thousand times more serious than the 
previous one […]  We are short of talented people from both 
East and West.  In such a difficult situation, if Pastor Payne 
came back he would make a very important contribution […]  
In this situation we really need someone to guide and help 
us.636 
These two appeals for help from China had an important effect on the BMS which, at 
the time, had not formally retracted their 1930s decision to withdraw from Shandong 
by 1942.637 
In June, the China Staffing Sub-Committee met to make plans for staffing the work 
in China.  A conference of the CCC was to be held in Shanghai in October and was 
expected to make a statement of policy regarding the relationship between the CCC 
and the various Societies affiliated to it, but it was considered advisable for the BMS 
to make some preliminary plans for the immediate future.  The meeting concluded 
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that, ‘at least for the period of the next nine months and without prejudice to the final 
China set-up, despite the activity of Communists and other difficulties, as many 
mission stations as possible should be occupied.’638  
Despite indications of the growing independence of the Chinese church, and the 
continuing commitment of the BMS to supporting the Chinese leadership, the terrible 
destruction of the war years and the continuing turmoil in China had brought about a 
situation in which the BMS felt unable to hold to its pre-war plan.   
Conclusions 
As the BMS attempted to make decisions about its future place in China in the 
autumn of 1945 and the early months of 1946, it was influenced by its leadership in 
London and by the missionary workforce both in China and in retirement or on 
furlough in Britain.  Most missionaries who had spent the war in China voiced an 
awareness that major changes had taken place, and that these changes necessitated 
finding new ways to work with the Chinese church.  The London leadership was in 
the hands of a highly respected ex-China missionary, who, although experienced and 
knowledgeable about the China scene, had not worked there during the most recent 
upheavals.  In retrospect, it appears that his understanding had not kept pace with the 
new forces at work in China, and his advice did fully not recognise their importance.   
Getting involved with the work of the Border Service was a bold step in finding new 
ways to engage with Chinese Christians, but it could be said to have proved unwise 
in the light of the political uncertainties.  Returning tentatively to the formerly 
occupied provinces, missionaries found a warm personal welcome.  Missionaries 
were also confronted by damaged and denuded hospitals and educational institutions, 
and a shortage of staff to take on professional and leadership roles.  A tension was 
created between the amount of work needed to save the institutions from collapse 
and the commitments which the BMS had previously made to withdraw support from 
Shandong.  
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Conditions in Britain were changing.  It was less easy for missionaries to make 
satisfactory provision for their children.  Changed understandings regarding the 
effects on children of early separation from their parents made earlier expectations 
regarding the missionary lifestyle seem less and less acceptable.  New legislation in 
Britain meant that previous arrangements for missionaries committing to a career for 
life might need rethinking. 
But urgent appeals for help from Zhang Sijing, the respected and resourceful leader 
of the SBU, and Jing Yihui, the doctor who had sustained BMS medical work in 
Qingzhou, challenged the Society and members of its staff to attempt to take up work 
once again in ‘as many mission stations as possible’.639  The following chapter will 
explore some of the consequences of that decision. 
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Chapter Five: The BMS in China during the Civil 
War, July 1946 to December 1948 
‘As long as the present situation exists, we shall have to come 
to the aid of the pastors and the evangelists and church 
workers who were previously supported by the church.  The 
civil war means that the people are more and more 
impoverished and pastoral aid is more and more difficult for 
them. […] We are slowly and painfully learning the truth of 
the situation in China and in the church.’640 
This chapter explores the fortunes of BMS missionaries in China, and their 
relationships with Chinese Christians, during the period between the breakdown in 
mid-1946 of negotiations aimed at establishing a coalition government between the 
CCP and the Nationalists, and the final months of 1948 when it became apparent that 
the victory of the CCP and the fall of the Nationalist Government were inevitable. 
Examination of the missionary records during this period suggests that, just at a time 
when Baptist missionaries and Chinese Christians were working in sympathetic 
partnership, political events and national developments in China were conspiring to 
make it harder for missionaries to understand or have a part in the predicaments with 
which Chinese Christians were faced.  After eight years of warfare with Japan, most 
Chinese people longed, most of all, for the cessation of blood-shed and a stable 
government.641 
The chapter begins with a brief analysis of the ways in which the civil war affected 
the work of the Mission and the lives of church members.  Military activity, 
disruptions to the transport network, international and Chinese government attempts 
at national reconstruction, economic crises and the consequences of inflation all 
played a part in dictating the options open to the BMS and its missionaries.  They 
also influenced the interaction between missionaries and other players on the scene: 
the Mission Board in London, political parties in China, Chinese Christians, 
members of other missionary societies and their foreign colleagues in China.   
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The first section is followed by detailed examination of two examples of missionary 
experience.  These are documented in official missionary records and in the memoirs 
and personal papers of individual missionaries, but are also described in more recent 
Chinese accounts of the same moments in history.  The availability of different 
perspectives allows a more rounded understanding of these dynamics. 
The first example is from Qingzhou, Shandong, and centres around Wang Juntang, a 
Chinese Christian and longstanding supporter of the Mission.  The case suggests 
some new understandings of the interactions between Chinese Christians and 
missionaries, and of the difficulties Chinese Christians may have had in managing 
their loyalties at this time of national conflict.  Even experienced and sympathetic 
missionaries faced formidable obstacles in understanding the position in which 
Chinese Christians found themselves at this time.  The case throws some light on the 
difficulties behind Tom Allen’s observation that missionaries were ‘slowly and 
painfully learning the truth of the situation in China and in the church’.642 
The second example concerns financing and rebuilding the mission hospital in Xi’an, 
in Shaanxi province.  By the early stages of the Civil War, Xi’an existed as a 
Nationalist island in an area under Communist control.  The experience of the 
hospital illustrates the expectations of mission staff with regard to the future of work 
in China, and tells us something about the interaction between missionaries, their 
Chinese colleagues, the Home Committee, and supporters in Britain.  It draws 
attention to the problems British supporters of missionary work had in understanding 
conditions in China. 
The final section of the chapter deals with the way in which the BMS began to 
confront the prospect of a communist victory, and the implications for its continuing 
work.  The Society chose not to dictate to individual missionaries whether they 
should stay in China or leave, and the chapter examines the ways in which 
missionaries approached this decision. 
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The Civil War and its impact 
In the early autumn of 1946, a series of GMD initiatives in north China appeared to 
put the Nationalists militarily in the ascendancy.  A leader in The Times on 12 
September 1946 declared that ‘General Chiang Kai-Shek has replied to the 
Communist attacks […] by launching vigorous drives north of the Yangtze […] and 
the Communists have been unable to resist the Government troops’.643  On 19 March 
1947, the GMD captured the Communist capital, Yan’an, and Chiang Kai-shek was 
reported to be ‘euphoric’.644  Ronald Still, based at the time in Shandong, was less 
confident and wrote home to his father, ‘The Government are talking in optimistic 
terms about clearing up Shantung in the next two or three months.  Perhaps they will 
be right.  It will be an unsettled time’.645   
By the end of 1947, however, the Nationalist army, which appeared to have so much 
in its favour in 1946 and early 1947, was giving ground inexorably to the 
Communists.  The military and political factors which led to this reversal have been 
extensively explored elsewhere.646  The purpose here is to highlight some of the 
ways in which the conflict impacted upon the lives of Chinese Christians and on the 
work of the BMS.   
Unlike other modern civil wars where a high degree of popular participation is a 
distinguishing feature, the Chinese civil war was largely fought out between rival 
armies.647  There were strategically important battles, ‘the largest military 
engagements following World War II’, but when towns and cities changed hands 
street fighting did not often feature.648  The common practice was for incoming 
troops to enter overnight without opposition, the defendants having fled in 
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anticipation of defeat.  The war was not even supported in its early stages by strong 
popular movements.  The student movement, which became a powerful influence on 
the development of the war, and which was denounced by the GMD as ‘a creature of 
the Communist Party’, was initially and predominantly an anti-war movement, rather 
than a movement ideologically in tune with the CCP.649  Likewise, the strikes and 
rice riots in which members of the general public were also involved, were aimed at 
practical material gains rather than a calculated attempt to undermine one or other 
side of the conflict.650 
Nevertheless, the population as a whole was fundamentally affected by the war. 
Conscription by both sides had far-reaching consequences for almost every family, 
and skirmishes by guerrillas in the countryside made everyday life precarious. 
Exorbitant taxes were levied to finance military expenditure, and physical 
contributions to the war effort were exacted in the form of forced labour for building 
defensive works.  Crops were routinely commandeered to feed the military, with the 
result that hunger and scarcity were widespread.  This is the situation which Allen 
identified when he wrote of the BMS having to come to the aid of church workers 
‘who previously were supported by the [Chinese] Church’.651 
The Communists deliberately allowed Nationalist soldiers to defect, and then 
pressurised defectors to come over to their side and also periodically impressed 
civilian personnel to serve the military.652  Punitive tactics were adopted by both 
sides against ordinary civilians suspected of disloyalty.  Brutal methods of enforcing 
compliance or punishing opposition were common, and missionaries frequently 
faced the results.  Handley Stockley gave many distressing examples from his 
experience of hospital work in Taiyuan in 1946 and 1947.  He described equal 
ruthlessness on both sides: 
People who come from areas occupied by the Communists to 
this [pro-Nationalist] city have a very tough time, however 
innocent their reason for coming. […]  One of our northern 
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Christians was kept in the Provincial headquarters for six 
weeks, another got out in two weeks – but the latter’s hands 
were double their normal thickness owing to having been 
beaten with clubs.  Nellie today had a woman patient beaten 
from head to feet all down one side by the Communists – so 
what is there of choice!653 
Chinese Christians and church leaders were considered particularly suspect by the 
Communists.  The pastor of one of the small Baptist churches in northern Shanxi was 
suspected of Nationalist sympathies and held by the Communists for several months 
in solitary confinement, before being sent to forced labour in the mines where he was 
believed later to have been killed.654  James Harris, on his return to Shandong in 
1946, described the fear in the village communities, which endured repeated 
turnovers between the two sides in 1945, 1946 and 1947: 
I regret that it is not possible to go to the villages and our 
more distant outposts.  It is not that I am afraid to go but the 
Chinese rightly point out that the people to whom I spoke, 
and with whom I made contact, would be sure to suffer after I 
had gone.  In the villages no one scarcely dare speak to 
anyone else.655 
Wilfred Flowers described the impact of the continuing turnovers in the small towns 
and villages of Shandong, ‘Any who cooperate with the Nationalists are eliminated 
by the Communists when they take the place, and any who then cooperate with the 
Communists are liquidated by the Nationalists when they take over.’656  Mutual 
suspicion between neighbours put new pressures on Chinese Christians’ relationships 
with foreign missionaries.  Anything which made people stand out from the rest of 
the population put them in danger. 
The transport infrastructure had been fundamentally undermined as a consequence of 
war-time bombing, and continued to be subject to deliberate sabotage by guerrilla 
forces, both Communist and Nationalist.  ‘Do you realise,’ wrote Stockley in August 
1946, to his teenage son in England: 
that communications in China are very much worse now than 
they ever were during the war.  There is scarcely a single 
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railway that is running even a straight run between any two 
important towns.  All the lines have been ripped up by the 
Communists.657  
During the final months of 1945 and throughout 1946, the shattered network was put 
under huge strain when displaced industrial, commercial and educational institutions 
began the process of attempting to re-establish themselves in their places of origin, 
and millions of refugees tried to make their way back home.  Two years later, when 
the movement towards Communist victory was beginning to be apparent, a new tide 
of refugees crammed the transport channels.  In November 1948, the British 
Ambassador in Nanjing, anticipating the need to evacuate British personnel, 
commented on the difficulties of securing transport ‘owing to priority demands of 
officials and wealthy Chinese fleeing southwards’.658  
Throughout this period, missionaries were making many journeys to and from the 
more remote parts of China.  There are many examples of tramping from place to 
place in protracted attempts to find means of transport and authorisation to travel; of 
harrowing, uncomfortable and dangerous journeys on unmade roads and the 
shattered remains of bridges and rail tracks; of luggage lost and trucks overturned.659 
Lifts were negotiated from unlikely sources and favours were called in:  Connie 
Allen described her husband getting a lift on a Nationalist army truck when the 96th 
Army moved its personnel from Jinan to Weifang, ‘as Tom knows the Secretary of 
one of the officers’.660  A few months later, Ronald Still secured the use of a US 
army jeep to help get around, but access to oil and petrol was problematic.  The 
British manager of the Shell Company in Qingdao had been a fellow internee in 
Shanghai during the war years and came to Still’s rescue with a few barrels of petrol 
and motor oil.  ‘We will do our best to help again – but must warn you that our 
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stocks are very short indeed.’661  In January 1948, the China Sub-Committee noted 
that:  
certain [BMS] property [in Taiyuan] not at present in use had 
been let to Chinese Air Organisations and other bodies and 
special privileges had been secured in connection with plane 
transport.662   
Figure 12: Left, Allen, in passenger seat of Nationalist army truck; right, one 
of many breakdowns of the truck on which Still and Nelson hitched a lift to 
Zhoucun.663 
Many missionary accounts of difficult journeys were detailed and graphic, but were 
undertaken without complaint.  Ironically, one of the few murmurs of discontent was 
from an older missionary who found herself unexpectedly returning from Taiyuan to 
Xi’an by air:  ‘I had hoped to go back by cart, ten days, instead we rush back in an 
hour and a half.  It fair takes one’s breath away!’664  
Civilian air travel was in its comparatively early days, as evidenced by the difficulty 
Dora Drake had in persuading the BMS to allow her husband to travel home by air in 
1945.665  Military activity forced those who wanted to get around China, including 
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missionaries, to take to the air if they could afford it, since overland travel was 
usually dangerous and very often impossible.  The initiative of the Lutheran 
missionary societies in purchasing their own plane, the ‘St. Paul’, in 1946, proved of 
great assistance to all missionary societies in facilitating movement during the last 
years of their presence in China.666   
University personnel and equipment were flown back from 
places of refuge in western China, medicine and relief 
consignments were transported to inland hospitals, 
missionaries were brought back to their fields and mission 
executives were flown to remote places.  The extensive 
operations continued until the close of 1949, when it was no 
longer possible to fly in China and St.Paul was sold.667   
The ‘St..Paul’ ‘flew the equivalent of 18.5 times round the world’ and ‘became a 
symbol of Lutheran cooperation’.668  By the early 1950s, when the last missionaries 
were leaving, air travel was accepted as the most appropriate and efficient way to get 
around. 
Co-operation between missionary societies in the use of the ‘St..Paul’ was not the 
only form of reciprocal help to which the civil war years gave rise.  Missionaries 
from different Societies were frequently brought together as they offered or accepted 
hospitality from each other in the course of broken journeys or enforced stays in 
unexpected places.  There are many references to BMS missionaries having been 
met, escorted and given hospitality by members of different missionary societies.669 
Whenever possible, the BMS reciprocated.  Ronald Still undertook to do a month’s 
medical work in the American Lutheran Mission hospital in Qingdao, ‘as some small 
return … for their very kind hospitality to me and other members of our mission 
passing through’.670  Later in this period, when BMS missionaries were driven from 
their traditional bases by the Communist presence, many took up work with other 
missions in other parts of China.671 
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Wartime destruction of mission buildings also brought missionaries and Chinese 
Christians into more intimate forms of contact.  Fred Drake gave an atmospheric 
description of his first post-war meeting with the three leading members of the 
Shandong Chinese Baptists, Zhang Sijing, Wang Juntang and Jing Yihui in ‘a 
vacated Japanese house’ at Zhoucun.  
We talked far into the night […] but we reached no 
conclusion.  We slept side by side on mats on the floor.  In 
the night I woke and heard them still discussing the same 
question.672  
On his return to the bomb-damaged hospital in Zhoucun after the war, Still shared 
meals with his former servant, by whom he was welcomed back ‘with as much 
apparent joy as I felt on seeing him’.673  Missionaries Rufus Dart and Eric Sutton 
Smith, returning to Taiyuan at the end of 1945, lived for months in the home of the 
leader of the orphanage, Zhang Hu Shi.   
We share a room here and have the use of her [Zhang’s] 
sitting room, and this is her expressed wish too.  She is 
feeding us well on Chinese food three times a day, and we 
feel it is right to stay right here.674 
Such intimate contact between missionaries and Chinese Christians was unusual in 
pre-war days.  Although there are many examples of missionaries inviting Chinese 
friends and colleagues to their homes as guests, both for meals and overnight stays, it 
was rare for foreign and Chinese households to merge.   
There are two examples from the 1940s of missionaries engaging in deliberate 
experiments in community living with Chinese families.  In early 1942, Victor 
Haywood wrote to his parents of what he called his ‘Christian Community Living 
experiment’, living as a family with seven Chinese young people, including a small 
boy, sharing meals and living expenses according to their means:   
We have learned a great deal from each other, and though 
naturally everything has not come up to our best ideals, we 
have a very happy life, and the experiment has proved 
immensely worthwhile.675 
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The second occasion, occurring at about the same time, described another missionary 
couple who had decided to live together with the family of their ‘table boy’: 
We have taken on the job of educating, christianising and 
‘hygienising’ [sic] this family, working out a suitable diet to 
suit their budget, sending the eldest to school.  Also trying to 
teach the mother and younger children the elements of 
hygiene.  Chinese children all wear split pants, so that their 
parents do not have the trouble to teach them or train them in 
matters of hygiene.  We are getting rid of the splits in the 
pants.676  
This was the only example of such cultural insensitivity that came to light in the 
course of extensive exploration of the BMS correspondence for this period.  In 1947 
Fred Drake wrote expressing his conviction that this couple should not have been 
allowed to return to China after the war with Japan.677  
Post-war reconstruction was a massive task confronting the Chinese government.  
Despite the well-established historical narrative of incompetence on the part of the 
Nationalist government, recent work has focussed on evidence of substantial efforts 
which the government made to tackle the task.  Refugee relief was an integral and 
daunting challenge.  Mitter points out that the Government’s efforts in this respect 
had propaganda value as well as practical and humanitarian importance, since ‘the 
government knew that its treatment of refugees was being judged in comparison with 
the Communists and with the Japanese’.678  The Development and Relief Committee 
(DRC, or 赈济委员会; Zhenji weiyuanhui), created in 1937, provided assistance at 
national level ‘well beyond anything previously seen in China’.679   
Plans for post-war reconstruction began to be addressed by the Nationalist 
government in 1940, when the Ministry of Social Affairs was established, with 
oversight of labour relations, civil society and social policy.680  Just as Mitter draws 
attention to the propaganda motives of the GMD in its provision of welfare and relief 
policies, so Tehyun Ma argues that their social policy initiatives were as much about 
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‘strengthening the nation on the international stage … making its government a more 
viable proposition to support’, as they were about ‘dealing with questions of 
industrialisation, urbanisation and labour unrest’.681  At the international level, the 
UNRRA was formed in 1943 with a view to coordinating aid after the war ended and 
avoiding the mistakes of the aftermath of the First World War.682  In China, under 
pressure from the Nationalist government, it was agreed that legal title to the goods 
and other donations would pass to the Chinese once they entered China.  At that 
point, a separate organisation, known as the CNRRA, would take possession of the 
supplies, with UNRRA advisers making recommendations.683  
The national efforts towards reconstruction in China were important to the BMS in 
two ways.  Firstly, any public resources on which they could draw would be 
invaluable in their own reconstruction efforts.  Secondly, working in partnership with 
others for the good of the whole community was in keeping with the emphasis on the 
‘social gospel’ and the theology of service, which had guided many developments in 
missionary work during the 1930s and 1940s.  One BMS missionary who was 
seconded to work with UNRRA in Guanxi province gave a positive account of his 
experience:   
The sum spent directly on relief and rehabilitation in the 
province was upwards of CNC$2,000,000,000. In addition, in 
spite of particularly difficult transport conditions, about 
10,000 tons of goods were brought in, chiefly food to meet 
desperate famine needs.  Seventy to eighty county and 
provincial hospitals, and one hundred and fifty primary 
schools, were reconstructed…  About 20,000 refugees were 
given food and shelter. 
Seeds, fertilisers, water buffaloes and tractors were also provided to assist in 
agricultural rehabilitation.684  Invaluable supplies were made available through the 
International, British and Canadian Red Cross, and there are references to the fact 
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that hospital work would not have been able to continue at all without such 
support.685   
More frequent, however, are the examples of frustration felt by those who were faced 
with human need on an enormous scale and found themselves unable to access the 
resources which were available to meet that need.  For example, Ernest Madge 
expressed frustration at the difficulties his colleague, Handley Stockley, was having 
in getting help with reconstruction efforts at the BMS hospital in Taiyuan. 
We have been having trouble with CNRRA, I’m sorry to say, 
over help for the hospital.  The same trouble has been 
cropping up all over China, and both the Chinese and the 
English language press has been severely criticising the 
whole organisation. […] There is pressure being brought to 
bear from some unknown quarter to ensure that only certain 
groups get help. […] CNRRA has the power to help any 
group it sees fit, but just delays every other project.  [T]here 
has been no decision on the whole project which we 
submitted, while other hospitals in which certain individuals 
have an interest is [sic] getting everything they ask for and at 
once.686  
In March 1946, Wilfred Flowers, at the time seconded from the BMS to the British 
Red Cross and St John War Organisation China Hospital Unit, wrote home that ‘All 
relief agencies have decided that they can count on UNRRA for nothing but promises 
and on CNRRA for nothing besides transportation’.687  James Harris complained of 
receiving ‘a typical official letter from CNRRA in response to our appeal on behalf 
of the Choutsun hospital’.   
It is suggested that ‘when the repairs are completed’ we 
should send a further request.  By that time I don’t think there 
will be any CNRRA left to whom to appeal.688 
China’s formidable task of aid and reconstruction was further undermined by the fact 
that, ‘in 1946, when the program was well underway, one of the world’s worst 
inflations was in progress’.689  Between 1937 and 1945, average prices rose two 
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thousand times.690  This was the direct result of the GMD policy of printing money to 
make up the huge deficit between income and expenditure.  This gap between 
income and expenditure continued after the war and the government continued to 
deal with the problem by printing more bank notes, leading to soaring prices, labour 
unrest and increased wage demands, reduction in purchasing power and a contraction 
in industrial output.691  In February 1947, in a desperate attempt to stabilise the 
economy, wages were frozen and price controls put in place on staple goods, 
including rice and fuel.  The situation did not improve. By the summer, ‘people had 
to carry bundles of $10,000 notes, and traders had to assume that the packets they 
received had the correct contents’.692   
The government continued to increase the volume of notes in circulation, which rose 
from Y34 trillion in December 1947 to Y250 trillion in June 1948.  In the following 
six weeks it rose to ‘somewhere between Y600 and Y700 trillion’.693 
Prices […] rose so fast that shopkeepers changed price tags 
several times a day.  On June 25, and again on July 10, prices 
spurted about 30% during just one working day.694 
In an attempt to solve the problem in August 1948 the Government introduced the 
Gold Yuan Reform.  Two billion notes of new gold yuan were printed.  The 
Government demanded that all old notes, the fa-pi, should be turned in and 
exchanged for the new currency, along with any privately held gold, silver or foreign 
currency.  In order to promote the success of the new currency, the government 
simultaneously froze prices and prohibited wage increases.  By 31 October it was 
evident that the attempt to curb inflation had failed, and many people had been 
ruined by the reforms.695   
Missionaries were seriously affected by these developments.  Soaring costs put many 
of their plans to rebuild mission properties beyond their reach.  Colossal increases to 
the cost of living meant that missionaries had great difficulty making ends meet. 
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Campbell and Tulloch dispute ‘the usual conclusion’ that members of the middle 
class in post-war China were generally impoverished because they received fixed 
incomes.  In fact, they argue, 
persons with fixed nominal incomes become extremely rare. 
The wages of office workers and other employees almost 
always rose as fast as prices and even discounted anticipated 
inflation.696   
Missionaries, paid from London but in local currency, on the basis of regulations last 
up-dated in 1939, were amongst that extremely rare group of middle-class workers 
whose incomes were not adjusted to take account of inflation.  The BMS, faced with 
a £22,000 deficit for the year 1946-7, looked upon any requests for additional 
expenditure with disfavour.697  In September 1946 the BMS Finance Sub-Committee 
had a discussion about rising costs and exchange difficulties, particularly in 
Shandong, and noted that missionary living expenses in China at that time were 50-
70% higher than they had been before the war. There was agreement that 
‘adjustment of allowances would probably be necessary before long.’  The record of 
the meeting continued, ‘The Committee noted this, but recommended no immediate 
action’.698  
Two months later the Finance Sub Committee considered a moderately-worded 
recommendation from Edward Phillips, senior BMS missionary in Jinan, that the 
BMS adopt a more flexible policy with regard to payments to married missionaries in 
China.699  Under the existing system, ‘the man missionary in the field’ was paid his 
salary in yuan, and the household income – to cover expenditure in both China and 
Britain – was therefore subject to Chinese inflation, making it harder for the husband 
to provide a stable income for his family in Britain.  Under Phillips’s proposal, which 
was similar to policies already adopted by other missionary societies, the salary 
would be split into a portion paid in Sterling (which would go direct to wives and 
children in the United Kingdom) and a portion paid in yuan which would go to the 
missionaries in the field.  This would ensure that the families at home were protected 
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from the consequences of inflation in China.  The portion paid to wives would be 
made up of an allowance based on the cost of living, plus a rent allowance.  The 
husband would then be paid a maintenance allowance which could be adjusted 
according to the actual cost of kitchen expenses, fuel, light, water and wages, plus 
45% to cover insurance, postage, toiletries, shoe repairs and other sundry expenses.  
Phillips suggested that such arrangements would be better adapted to the wildly 
fluctuating prices in China.  For illustration, Phillips noted that ‘millet costs nearly 
twenty thousand times its pre-war price in dollars’.  Again, the Committee ‘resolved 
not to vary the basis of support’.700 
Changing exchange rates, as well as rising prices, had a significant impact on the 
missionary budget.  Missionaries were dependent on money drawn in sterling for 
their own living expenses, for paying Chinese pastors, teachers, doctors, manual or 
domestic workers, and for all the other expenses arising from their work.  Often, 
variations in exchange rates had benefitted foreigners working in China and, to keep 
on the right side of both the British and Chinese governments, the Mission always 
conducted its financial affairs on the basis of the official government exchange rate.  
This put them at a serious disadvantage, however, at a time when there was a very 
large discrepancy between the official rate and the open market rate, since their 
living costs were determined by the open market rate.   
In February 1947 Fred Russell wrote to the Mission House pointing out that at the 
time the open market rate was CNC$54,000 to £1 sterling, while until recently the 
Government Bank rate had been CNC$15,000 or $16,000 to £1.  Russell requested 
‘discretionary powers’ to deal with the situation.  A cabled response authorised ‘the 
Society’s financial representatives in China to do the best they could in the 
emergency’.701  They were warned, however, that this would probably involve 
selling drafts on the open market and that, on previous occasions, this had only been 
possible on the authority of the British Ambassador.  Despite the rapidly changing 
situation, the BMS felt obliged to keep very strictly within British Government 
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guidelines, while their staff members in China were left to deal with the difficult 
consequences of the costly delays. 
The problem many missionaries faced in maintaining two homes, one for themselves 
in China and one for their families in Britain, continued to be a major source of 
difficulty as the monetary situation in China worsened.  Several missionaries wrote 
spelling out the difficulties, but the Mission Board was reluctant to review its 
policies or to make exceptions.  In October 1946, Hubert Spillett wrote describing 
the impossible situation with which his family would be faced if he returned to 
China.  After detailing the allowances for which his wife was eligible and deducting 
costs for rent and insurance, he pointed out that she would be left with a weekly sum 
of £4 4s 5d to cover all expenses for herself and two children, an impossible situation 
he claimed, though one faced by many families of skilled workers at the time. 
I do not see how I myself can work effectively if I am 
harassed by the thoughts of the difficulties my family is 
facing. […] I can only place this matter in your hands and 
trust that some special assistance may be given us at this 
time.702 
The Finance Committee had that very month increased allowances to missionaries 
based in India.703  Nevertheless, the reply to Spillett from Williamson offered little 
comfort, ‘I fear I cannot offer any more than is done for everybody at this stage. […]  
I think, therefore, that you had better plan on that basis’.704 
Post-war austerity was due to a shortage of goods not of money to spend.705  Middle-
class incomes had been squeezed and so this group probably felt hardship 
particularly acutely.  To add to the difficulties, the winter of 1946-47 was one of the 
most severe in living memory, its effects exacerbated by the national coal shortage.  
Freezing temperatures, snow and gales lasted from January until early April, and for 
three weeks in February domestic power supplies were cut daily for three hours in 
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the morning and two hours in the afternoon.706  Spillett was very conscious of the 
difficulties his wife and family faced trying to manage on what was seen to be the 
very small allowance the BMS offered for wives remaining at home.  He wrote 
again, in January 1947, before the worst of the winter, asking that his request be 
reconsidered, but again he received no satisfaction.707 
The end of the war had not brought an end to suffering in China, and BMS 
missionaries resumed work there feeling that failing to go back would amount to 
abandoning their Chinese colleagues when they were needed most.  Chinese church 
leaders, who had previously been funded by local church members, were forced to 
look once more for financial support from abroad.708  At the same time, funds were 
urgently required for the reconstruction of mission institutions, and this necessitated 
close and often frustrating efforts to work with secular and international aid agencies.   
The missionaries and their Chinese co-workers: the 
case of Wang Juntang 
The following section examines relationships between the Baptist missionaries and 
their Chinese colleagues during the post-war era, by exploring the case of one 
Chinese Christian, Wang Juntang, a prominent figure in the Baptist community in 
Qingzhou in the years before and after the Second World War.  Considering the case 
of Wang Juntang allows us to assess the degree to which there was true 
understanding between missionaries and their closest Chinese colleagues.  Looking 
at this in the particular circumstances of the divided loyalties generated by the civil 
war helps us to identify more accurately the fundamental nature of relationships. 
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Figure 13: Left, Wang Juntang; right, Mrs. Emmott with Wang’s two 
daughters709 
In February 1946, Wang had been one of the three leading members of the Shandong 
Baptist community who met with Fred Drake to discuss the role of the Mission in 
Shandong after the war.710 There are many references to him in missionary 
correspondence and in the personal memoirs and family letters written by 
missionaries.  He features in the unpublished memoirs of Bert Emmott and Tom 
Allen, as well as in the diary of Ronald Still and in the published letters of Nancy 
Bywaters.  By piecing together these accounts, and adding other details which appear 
in official sources, an interesting picture emerges of this man and his relationships 
with his foreign colleagues, a picture which also throws some light on the Chinese 
Christian community in Shandong in the troubled period immediately following the 
Second World War. 
Emmott tells us that Wang was educated at the mission school in Qingzhou.  
Expelled at one point because of his rebellious behaviour (and here Emmott does not 
specify details), he was re-instated as a result of the pleas of his Christian mother, 
and went on to a successful school career.  After qualifying in law, he served 
variously as magistrate, YMCA Secretary, instructor in Chinese classics and, later, 
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head teacher at the Mission school and business manager at the Mission hospital.  He 
also served as one of the teachers at the Bible School for trainee pastors.  He was 
prominent in the work of the SBU and for a while acted as its Vice President.711 
The personal regard in which Wang was held by his missionary colleagues is 
apparent.  Allen, writing to his children at boarding school in England, described 
Wang as: 
a friend of the family, […] a fine type of Chinese Christian, 
well read in old Chinese literature, and a lover of Chinese 
painting. […] He was my teacher, and he used to teach me 
Chinese customs and ways.712   
It is worth noting here the value which Allen placed on familiarising himself with 
Chinese ‘customs and ways’.  This was typical of BMS missionaries in Shandong.  
Fred Drake, in particular, was respected for his knowledge of Chinese culture and 
classics, in contrast to the ‘arrogant’ ‘dismissal of Chinese beliefs and the culture’ 
with which missionaries were often charged.713  Allen showed his personal regard for 
Wang by including him among a number of Chinese friends who were guests at his 
wedding in Jinan in April 1934.714  In other personal papers it becomes apparent that 
when Wang had experienced a tragedy in his family life, he had been supported by 
missionary colleagues.  In 1941 his eighteen-year-old daughter (pictured on the right 
in Figure 13) died in the BMS hospital in Zhoucun of rapid progressive tuberculosis.  
The doctor in attendance was Ronald Still.  Afterwards Still’s wife wrote home: 
I know there are plenty of sad things now, but we all felt this 
very much. […] The father [Wang] is such a fine man and 
makes no complaints.  He just went out of his way to express 
his gratitude for what was done for his daughter.715 
Appreciative descriptions of Wang’s central position in the work of the church and 
support of the foreigners also appear in formal missionary records.  In early 1942, 
when British and American missionaries in Shandong found themselves placed under 
house arrest by the Japanese and without cash, Wang was one of two Qingzhou 
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Christians who lent substantial sums from their own savings to provide the foreigners 
with the means of survival.  Four years elapsed before it was possible to repay these 
loans, and meantime there had been currency changes and rampant inflation, which 
created mathematical puzzles – and ethical dilemmas – for the missionary staff in 
deciding the most equitable method of repayment.  It was not until November 1946 
that the Shandong missionaries were able to meet to arrange repayment, when they 
agreed that the loans should be refunded ‘at the rate of exchange prevailing when the 
money was used’.716   
On his return to China after the war, Williamson described Wang’s important 
contribution during the Japanese occupation: ‘Mr Wang Chun T’ang [Wang 
Juntang], an old and faithful steward of the Mission, with characteristic tact and 
diplomacy managed for a long time to keep the flag flying, through periods of 
Japanese and Communist occupation.’717  Not all references to Wang were positive.  
It seems that his strong personality sometimes led to disagreements with other 
Chinese church leaders.  Describing tensions concerning the Qingzhou Bible School 
in early 1947, there is a reference to discontent among his Chinese colleagues at his 
share in the curriculum.718  It is not clear whether it was the content or the 
organisation of the curriculum which gave rise to this dissatisfaction. 
The members of the Chinese Baptist church had maintained their work in Qingzhou 
throughout the Japanese occupation.  Despite the intense hostilities between 
Nationalist and Communist forces immediately afterwards, Wang’s leadership skills 
were instrumental in ensuring that the church, school and hospital, as well as a daily 
soup kitchen, were in operation when the first foreign missionaries, Bert Emmott and 
his wife, returned at the end of 1946.  In January 1947, Mrs Emmott fell seriously ill 
and they called for the help of Nancy Bywaters, newly qualified as a doctor and a 
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recent recruit to the mission, who had arrived in China only a few weeks earlier.719  
Bywaters was in Qingzhou when, on 23 February, the Communists entered under 
cover of darkness and took over the city.720  
In the weeks that followed, Bywaters had several encounters with Communist 
soldiers and their civilian leaders as they searched mission premises, looking for 
billets, inspecting for signs of military involvement, or simply out of curiosity.  Her 
comments reveal the discomfort she felt, as a newcomer to China, at this 
unaccustomed invasion of her privacy: 
12th March, 1947 I had just finished my bath (luckily) when 
another troop of soldiers invaded us again and tramped all 
over the house.  When they had satisfied their curiosity most 
of them departed, but two stayed talking. 
13th March, 1947 On our return from a walk we found the 
young Communist soldier who visited us yesterday.  He had 
made himself quite at home in our absence and washed his 
round yellow cap in the kitchen and hung it in the front 
garden to dry. He talked to Mr Emmott solidly all through 
dinner, mostly politics apparently. 
16th March, 1947 This afternoon a crowd of forty to fifty 
soldiers came in and roamed the house and garden, but only 
for a few minutes.721 
On 25 April 1947, the missionaries invited one of the Communist leaders in the city, 
Mr Li, to an evening meal, along with Wang Juntang and two other leading members 
of the church.  It appeared that Wang had first encountered Li when he and other 
members of the hospital staff had been carried off by Communists at the end of an 
earlier period of occupation during 1946, in one of their raids to obtain skilled 
medical help to treat their wounded.722  Bywaters noted in her account of the 
evening: 
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But [Wang Juntang] bears [Li] no personal ill-will, though, 
like all the other Chinese I have met here, he has no room for 
the Communists as a party.  It was interesting to listen to the 
friendly conversation, knowing what these three Chinese 
really think about the Communists!723 
Could Bywaters, who had been in China less than five months and at that time spoke 
virtually no Chinese, know ‘what these three Chinese really think’?  It would have 
been ingenuous of her under any circumstances to assume that she did, but was 
particularly so in a country engaged in civil war, when political allegiances were 
sensitive and personal relationships distorted by political and military concerns.  She 
can only have reached this conclusion on the basis of discussions with other 
missionaries who had been in China for longer, a good example of what Bickers 
describes as the habitual tendency of the British in China to pick up their knowledge 
of local conditions not from their own observations, but from the British colleagues 
who had preceded them.724   
By 1946, a key objective for many Chinese was to attain peace.  Ideological issues 
had become blurred by regional variations in the performance of the main political 
parties.  ‘Several scholars, both Chinese and foreign,’ Westad observes:  
have recently negated the nationalism versus socialism debate 
by describing the purpose of the great majority of peasants as 
reactive – that is, as aiming at avoiding warfare and surviving 
its immediate consequences, rather than consciously 
committing themselves to the revolutionary cause.725 
The CCP had had a base in Shandong since the early 1930s and large numbers of the 
local population had been recruited to the Communist guerrilla units during the war 
against Japan.726  As in other civil wars, the issues were not simple, personal loyalties 
were strained, and families and friendships divided.  In this context, the friendly 
interaction between the three Qingzhou Christians and the leader of the local 
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Communist forces could be subject to a wide range of interpretations of which 
Bywaters was evidently unaware. 
The apparently relaxed interaction between Li, the Communist leader, the three 
Qingzhou Christians and the foreign missionaries during their social gathering in late 
April 1947 belied conditions elsewhere in the province.  In west Shandong in early 
summer, a CCP campaign of ‘terror and radical reform’ against rich and middle-rank 
peasants had led to an ‘increasingly frenzied atmosphere’.  ‘In one county, Sanghe, 
more than one thousand were beaten to death’.727  By early June, Emmott, then 
senior missionary in Qingzhou, was greatly exercised as to whether he should move 
to Jinan, where there was a substantial foreign presence.  He stayed, he wrote, with a 
view to securing ownership of mission property in the face of persistent attempts by 
the Communists to appropriate it.728  He enlisted Wang’s help in his attempt to 
prevent its seizure.   
I […] advanced every reason I could think of (and WCT 
could think of) but reason is powerless against weapons. […]  
Just imagine WCT being unable to advance reasons himself 
and having to depend on me to express them!  But such is the 
position.729 
Emmott’s informal reference to Wang using only his initials (‘WCT’ represents the 
Wade-Giles Romanisation, Wang Chun Tang) is a measure of the closeness the 
mission staff felt to this Chinese colleague who had worked with them over many 
years.  Emmott took Wang’s inability to argue the case for the Mission as an 
indication of the obduracy with which they were faced in their dealings with the 
Communist military.  In another letter Emmott mentioned Wang when describing the 
Communist Land Reform policy which was being implemented in the area at the 
time.  He wrote that Wang owned twenty mu, of which eighteen were taken.  
‘[Wang’s] comment, when told of what had happened was “Let them have the 
lot”.’730  Emmott assumed that here Wang was using irony based on his despair. 
                                                
727 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 133. 
728 BMSA, CH/58, Emmott to Williamson, 18.June.1947. 
729 Ibid. 
730 Ibid, Emmott to Williamson, 3.July.1947.  A ‘mu’ is a Chinese unit of measurement equal to 
approximately one third of an acre.  It seems Wang held approximately three and one third acres, of 
which three were taken.  “Landlordism – officially described by the CCP as the condition of living 
 
   221 
Another incident occurred concerning Wang Juntang during the same disturbed 
period and is recorded in Ronald Still’s diary.  On 25 June 1947, when the 
Communists were about to evacuate the town in yet another turn-over, ‘about thirty 
to forty Communists surrounded the hospital and carried off nearly the whole of the 
hospital staff’, leaving behind only two male nurses and the evangelist.731  Wang’s 
name heads Still’s list of hospital staff thus abducted.   
They were carried westwards into the mountains where the 
communists are trying to consolidate their power, and the 
intention no doubt is to try to make them render medical 
service to their forces.  Destination unknown.732  
Still recorded that he and Drake sent a statement in Chinese to General Y.W.Wang,  
(王耀武; Wang Yaowu) Commander in Chief of the Nationalist forces operating 
from Jinan, ‘to enlist assistance to clear the fifteen of charges of collaboration’ and a 
report to ‘the Governor, S.Y. Ho [何思源; He Siyuan]’.733  In a further urgent effort 
to rescue the missing staff members, Drake and Still met with the United States 
colonels at the headquarters of the Executive Team in Jinan, and with Colonel 
Huang, the Communist member of the Team, hoping for American or Communist 
help in their recovery.  Colonel Huang indicated that he himself was ‘virtually a 
prisoner in Jinan’, which was then under Nationalist control, and had no means of 
communication with Communist Headquarters at Linyi (黄永胜).  ‘But’ wrote Still in 
his diary, Huang 
listened very sympathetically to the facts, said that persons 
would not be maltreated, gave details about Communist 
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commands in the area and promised to send message to 
Peking to be forwarded to Shantung [Shandong] Communist 
headquarters at Lin-i [Linyi].734 
It is not clear from the records how long the group were held, but, in his memoir, 
Emmott describes them as having been ‘held in captivity several months’.  They 
eventually returned to their posts in the hospital unharmed.735 
Communist forces left Qingzhou on 4 August 1947, and Nationalists re-entered the 
next day.  Emmott, who had temporarily relocated to Jinan during the latter part of 
the Communist occupation, returned on 9 August.736  All BMS premises were taken 
over by the incoming Nationalists, who used the Mission school buildings as their 
military headquarters.  Wang Juntang was himself living on the school premises, and 
there, wrote Emmott, Wang was  
in constant contact with the chief officers.  He talks religion 
with them and has even tackled the General about his vices!  
The General has a chat with him nearly every day.  Wang’s 
learning is an attraction.737   
Wang apparently showed an unusual capacity to endear himself to those in positions 
of power, the foreign missionaries, the Communist occupying forces and the GMD 
leadership.  As already indicated, both parties in the civil war were quick to deal 
savagely with anyone who appeared to favour their opponents, and Wang’s ability to 
sustain friendly relationships with all sides was surely unusual.  Does this reflect his 
willingness to compromise in the interests of his own or other people’s safety, or his 
skills as a consummate politician?  Emmott’s daughter, who as a teenager knew 
Wang and his family, recently gave her comments on this: ‘I think his chief loyalty 
would be to his fellow Chinese, and he would do what was needed to care for those 
in need – which surely is a Christian principle, isn’t it?’738   
                                                
734 Private collection of Audrey Salters, Still, diary entry 5.July.1947.  As part of the ceasefire agreed 
with General Marshall on 10.January.1946, Executive truce teams were set up, with commissioners 
representing the United States, the GMD and the CCP, with a view to supervising the ceasefire, 
Cambridge History, 729-30. 
735 BMSA, CH/58, Emmott, China Memories.   
736 Ibid, Emmott to Williamson, 16.August.1947. 
737 Ibid. 
738 Personal letter from Joan Wells to Audrey Salters, 24.October.2014. 
 
   223 
A new twist to his story emerged forty-five years later, in the history written in 1992 
to commemorate the centenary of the Qingzhou hospital.  The history acknowledges 
the hospital’s roots in the work of the BMS doctor who led it from its beginnings in 
1892 to a fifty-bed hospital with modern theatre and X-ray apparatus in 1928.  It 
makes no mention, however, of Jing Yihui, the Chinese doctor who kept the hospital 
going, almost single-handedly, through the years of Japanese occupation from 1937 
to 1945, and who received much honourable mention in the Baptist archive.739  
Another man, who appears not at all in the Baptist archive, is named as President of 
the hospital from 1915 to 1946.  Wang Juntang is named as President from 1946 to 
1947.740  Under the CCP regime Jing was obliterated from the hospital records, but 
Wang’s name was preserved.  Does this mean that Wang’s name was one that could 
be respected in the Communist historiography, and if so, why?   
On 20 September 2011, in response to a general request for information about the 
history of the hospital, a message was received from Dr Pan Jingnian (潘靖年) 
Assistant President of the modern institution which succeeded the BMS hospital.  
The message makes reference to Wang’s ‘abduction’ in 1947, but presents it in 
somewhat different terms to those set out above: ‘自 1947 年 7 月王均堂带领部分医
务人员随部队转移’  [In July 1947 Wang Juntang brought some staff members from 
the hospital to follow the troops.]741  Despite Drake and Still’s communications on 
Wang’s behalf with the Commander of the Nationalist military and with the 
Nationalist Governor He Siyuan, it seems that this did not prevent Wang from being 
subsequently regarded with favour by the Communist hierarchy. 
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A much fuller history of the hospital was published in 2012.742  This time, both Jing 
and Wang are included.743  Jing’s role as head of the hospital, his specialist skills in 
ophthalmology, and his courage in maintaining the hospital during the Japanese 
occupation are all recorded.  His entry ends by relating that, in 1966, he was 
‘persecuted to death’ but, after the Cultural Revolution, he was ‘rehabilitated’.744  
Being ‘rehabilitated’ in this context means that his reputation was restored to honour, 
despite the fact that he had been found guilty of being ‘an enemy of the State’, and 
lost his life, either in captivity or during an incident of mass violence, in the Cultural 
Revolution. 
Wang’s entry in the 2012 history records, unusually, that he was a Christian, (基督教 
ji du jiao), a detail which does not appear against any other names in the hospital 
record.  It notes his posts within the former BMS school and hospital, without 
acknowledging the foreign origins of these institutions.  It gives particular emphasis 
to the support he gave to the PLA Eastern China Field Army, in June 1946 and again 
in June 1947, when he is described as having provided accommodation and medical 
and nursing care for injured PLA soldiers.  The history also notes that, when the PLA 
moved out of Qingzhou after the battle of Linqu (临朐) in late July 1947, Wang 
accompanied the soldiers with a group of hospital staff.745  This was the event which 
Ronald Still described in his diary as ‘kidnapping’.  Wang retained his credentials 
with the CCP after the establishment of the PRC: he became the representative of the 
first Provincial People’s Congress of Shandong, a member of the City Committee of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of Jinan, and the 
deputy director of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic 
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Movement of the Protestant church.  The significance of the latter will be explored in 
Chapter Six. 
This new information calls for a fresh analysis of some of Wang’s earlier behaviour, 
including his friendly interaction with the Communist, Li, when Li was invited to a 
meal with BMS staff in Qingzhou.  Wang’s failure to find words to argue the case for 
the retention of mission property by the foreigners also assumes possible new 
meanings.  ‘Just imagine’, wrote Emmott, ‘[Wang] being unable to advance reasons 
himself and having to depend on me to express them!’746  Might the fact that Wang 
uncharacteristically allowed Emmott to do the talking suggest that he preferred not to 
be identified as an opponent of Communist goals?  And what did Wang really mean, 
when, deprived of his eighteen mu of land, he declared, “Let them have the lot”?747  
Was he using this occasion to signal his sympathy for the Communist cause? 
As the presence of British missionaries was understood to be generally unwelcome to 
the CCP, Chinese Christians found themselves in a difficult situation.  Their future 
would depend on whatever government took charge of the country at the close of the 
civil war, while the idealism and emerging competence of the Communists had a 
strong attraction for anyone looking for peace.  It is not unreasonable to suppose that 
they had won Wang’s allegiance, while at the same time he felt no obligation to 
abandon his foreign friends.  Could it be that Wang, despite longstanding 
relationships with several foreign missionaries, had not felt able to let them know 
that he had voluntarily taken the hospital staff to work for the PLA?  Wang was a 
Christian, but also Chinese, with a commitment to the country and its future that the 
missionaries, even with the best of intentions, could not share.  In this respect, there 
would always be a gap between missionary and Chinese outlook that could not be 
bridged. 
Whatever the truth of that incident, there is evidence that Wang did not cut his links 
with the missionaries: as an apparent token of affection and esteem, when the time 
came for Still to leave China in late August 1948, Wang presented him with two fine 
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scrolls from his cherished collection of Chinese paintings.  And BMS missionaries 
continued to refer to Wang with warmth and admiration long after they departed 
from Shandong.748   
We do not know where the truth lies.  Should Pan Jingnian’s message and the two 
published accounts of the history of the hospital be read predominantly as a 
confirmation of the power of history used as a weapon of the state?  Rubie Watson 
writes of ‘situations where alternative understandings of the past are tantamount to 
treason’, and the early years of the PRC are known to have created such a 
situation.749  Wang’s case raises other broad questions about what else of the subtext 
of the events of these years is missing from the missionary archive and makes clear 
how much the history of the period is open to reinterpretation.   
Rebuilding the hospital in Xi’an: the Tilehouse Street 
gift 
This section explores the continuing urge of Baptist church members in Britain to 
support missionary work in China.  It considers their reasons for doing so, and the 
extent to which it indicated an unwillingness to surrender mission dominance in the 
Chinese church.  An examination of the rebuilding of the hospital in Xi’an also gives 
an indication of missionary attitudes to continuing to exert control. 
At the end of the Second World War, the members of Tilehouse Street Baptist church 
in Hitchin raised almost £2,700, which they decided to give to the BMS, in memory 
of eight members of their congregation who had been killed during the war and as a 
thanksgiving for seventy-seven members who had returned safely.750  Both the 
church members and the Mission Board in London felt that such a significant gift 
should not be absorbed into general funds but should be dedicated to a particular 
project.751  One of the church members, William Upchurch, was working with the 
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BMS in Shaanxi at the time, and they decided that it would be appropriate to give the 
money to the BMS hospital in Xi’an, the Jenkins Robertson Memorial Hospital, 
which had been badly damaged by bombing in 1939.   
After the bombing, the hospital had continued to provide out-patient and in-patient 
services in improvised premises in the suburbs of Xi’an until the end of the war with 
Japan.752  Many of the missionaries in Shaanxi left China for furlough immediately 
after the war, but two missionary doctors remained working in the hospital.  Local 
income had been maintained and, despite inflation, the hospital remained self-
supporting and continued offering free treatment to patients who were unable to 
pay.753  The departing Americans of the 14th US Air Force, stationed in Xi’an since 
1942, had passed on a quantity of valuable drugs; and fresh supplies of hospital linen 
were purchased with funds contributed by the British Red Cross.754  By the end of 
1946, however, the hospital was having to dig into savings to get through the winter 
months, and was also experiencing shortages of equipment.755 
BMS plans for the development of the hospital were held in abeyance until the return 
from war service of the senior foreign doctor, Menzies Clow.  The Communist 
presence in Shaanxi was strong and by November 1947 when Clow returned, Xi’an 
was cut off from Shanghai except by air or by the circuitous road from Chongqing.  
On his arrival, Clow promptly sent home a report on the hospital and his plans for 
it.756  Income from paying patients had increased by about 8% during the previous 
year, but the price of wheat had risen sixteen times and the wage bill had risen ten 
times to roughly £500 monthly.  
Were it not for very generous grants of drugs and equipment 
from the Red Cross I do not think we could carry on.  As it is 
we have to sell those drugs to those who can pay to maintain 
the hospital.757   
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Clow reported an increase in hospital staff, including graduate doctors and medical 
students in training.  This was in keeping with the recommendations made to 
Clement Chesterman by P.Z. King, Director of the Chinese National Health 
Administration, who suggested that mission hospitals should be used as training 
institutions for doctors, nurses and midwives, and as centres for preventive medicine. 
‘I can assure you’, King had advised, ‘that the health authorities in China will give 
full support and cooperation to the medical missionaries in carrying out these 
programmes.’758 
The Nationalist Government had pledged to provide assistance to help re-start 
mission hospitals after the war, and had indicated that it hoped that the missionary 
societies would continue to staff and maintain as many hospitals as before the war, 
that is approximately half the total number of hospitals in China at the time.759  
Mitter argues that this pledge was driven by the otherwise insuperable gulf between 
the Government’s plans for a national system of health care and the almost total 
absence of financial resources at its disposal in the post-war era.760  He notes the 
‘profundity’ of Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-imperialism, and suggests that 
to propose the delegation of such important elements of a 
health system to these transnational entities [the Christian 
missions], whose ultimate control lay beyond the power of a 
government in Nanjing, was a small but real cession of 
sovereignty in a nationalist time.761 
Whatever conflicting influences prompted Chiang’s invitation to missionary 
organisations to cooperate with national health provision, it is clear from the BMS 
archive that cooperation at an informal level was in place well before the end of the 
war in 1945.  The involvement of the BMS with Mme Chiang in spear-heading the 
movement to eradicate opium addiction by establishing clinics for addicts in 1934, as 
part of the New Life Movement, has been noted.762   
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Nationalist Government assistance to mission hospitals in its post-war provision was 
a source of great encouragement to the missionary societies.  Ronald Still was quick 
to claim the resources on offer when he began devising ways and means to re-build 
the war-damaged fabric of the Foster Hospital, Zhoucun. 
I was informed by Dr Han Li-min (a graduate and former 
staff member of Cheeloo [Qilu] Medical School, and now in 
the National Health Administration in Nanking) that the 
Provincial Health Departments had funds available for the 
repair of Mission hospitals.  I therefore made an appeal on 
behalf of the Foster Hospital to Dr Wang Fu-I, Director of the 
Shantung P[rovincial] H[ealth] D[epartment].  He told me 
that he had $400 million at his disposal for the whole 
Province, of which he had instructions to devote $40 million 
to Mission Hospitals, and of this sum he has given us $25 
million for the Foster Hospital.  Dr Wang (who is also a 
Cheeloo graduate) is concurrently Medical Director of 
CNRRA for the Province.763 
Still’s reference to the fact that these two prominent officials in the National Health 
Administration had received their medical education at Qilu University is an 
indication of the contribution missionary societies had made to the training of 
Chinese practitioners in Western medicine.  Mitter suggests that it was China’s 
‘desperate’ poverty and a ‘lack of funding’ that prompted the Nationalist 
Government to turn to missionary societies for help.  Another factor, however, was 
undoubtedly the expertise that the mission hospitals could provide, and the regard in 
which this expertise was held by many of those in positions of authority in the 
National Health Administration.  In 1947 the use being made of the Jenkins 
Robertson Memorial hospital in Xi’an for training purposes is one illustration of this. 
As well as advising the Mission Board of this important training activity, Clow’s 
letter included the proposal that the hospital should be rebuilt in the city, rather than 
in its existing position in the suburb.  If the hospital remained in the suburb it would 
be less attractive to Chinese staff:   
Our Chinese staff are unanimous in wanting to move back. 
[…] If we are to have a hospital which we can hand over to 
our Chinese colleagues, it must be in the city.764 
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Clow’s comment reflects his expectation that the hospital would be transferred to 
Chinese management in the not-too-distant future.  He went on to say that he 
considered a hospital staffed predominantly by foreigners ‘a retrograde step’.  He 
also argued that a central location would be more convenient for patients, which 
would ensure that out-patient numbers were maintained.  As well as rebuilding the 
hospital within Xi’an’s city walls, Clow was keen to build a new out-patient block, 
but considered this impossible because of the costs involved and the difficulty in 
obtaining building materials.  The estimated cost for the new in-patient facilities, 
which included a flour mill, beancurd mill, carpenters’ shop and extensive new 
residential accommodation for staff members, came in at £7,200.  Clow requested 
£6,000 from the Home Committee and asked for a cabled response to enable building 
work to begin immediately.765 
Getting money into and around China presented problems during this period, but 
British sterling regulations meant there were also problems getting it out of Britain.  
In 1948 British missionary societies had been faced with a 25% cut in the amounts 
they were allowed to send overseas.766  Clow suggested that the £6,000 might be 
transferred by arrangement with friends who worked with the Shell company in 
Xi’an, and that this could be done legally but without sacrificing part of the Society’s 
precious allocation of funds to China.  The Committee’s response illustrates the 
importance which the missionary societies placed on working strictly in accordance 
with British Government policy: 
Unfortunately we are all scared of doing something which 
might eventually turn out to be irregular and would cause not 
only a scandal but prejudice future relationships with the 
Treasury.  Mr Ernest Brown, who still feels heavy 
responsibility for our country resting on his shoulders, is very 
adamant about being quite above board, and he proposes to 
see the Treasury officials and perhaps Sir Stafford Cripps 
again. […]  I am awfully sorry about this delay.767 
Clow responded firmly to the suggestion that the issue should be taken up with the 
Treasury: ‘I think the matter should be dropped. I had no intention of doing anything 
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contrary to the Government’s financial policy’, and agreed that any money sent out 
should come through all the regular official channels.768  It was considered 
irresponsible to ignore the advice of the Treasurer, Ernest Brown, whose presence on 
the BMS General Committee was an indication of the close links the Society had 
with political and social elites. Brown was leader of the National Liberal Party 1940-
45 and Minister of Health 1941-43 and ‘one of a considerable number of Baptists 
who have sat in 20th century parliaments’.769   
The Home Committee included a further request in their letter: 
The Building and Equipment Committee […] were interested 
in the ground plan for the out-patient block.  As we have a 
few professional men on it they wanted an elevation also.  I 
feel this is quite unnecessary, but if we have these 
Committees then we must display the window dressing to 
them.  If therefore you have time …770 
The pressures under which Clow was working, and the terrible impact which 
inflation was having on mission budgets in China, must have meant that this request 
for ‘window dressing’ came as an irritant, if not a serious blow.  Missionaries were 
familiar with the concept of ‘window dressing’.  It was expected that articles for 
missionary magazines, and talks to church groups by missionaries on deputation, 
would present their narratives in such a way as to engage the sympathies – and open 
the purses – of church members in Britain.  It was spelt out in the instructions in the 
Manual that each mission station’s annual report should contain ‘interesting 
incidents’.771  It is an indication of the care with which missionaries on the field 
attended to the views of the church constituency at home, and the wishes of the 
Home committees, that Clow did not demur and promptly complied with the request 
for elevation plans, which he had drawn up by a local architect.772 
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Clow had raised money for the work on the in-patient unit through a local 
subscription list, to which the Provincial Governor contributed CNC$30,000,000 
(approximately £30), and a substantial grant was secured from the China Relief 
Mission of the American State Department.  Unfortunately, soaring inflation meant 
that the original grant from the China Relief Mission, paid in CNC$ and supposed to 
represent the sum of US$16,000, had lost half its value by the time it was received by 
BMS staff in Xi’an a month later.773   Meanwhile, when exploring means to finance 
the rebuilding of the in-patient block, Chesterman had written to Clow about the gift 
from the Tilehouse Street congregation, suggesting that it should be retained ‘for 
something more definite than rehabilitation and removal’.774  By May it had been 
agreed that the money should be used for building the new out-patient block, ‘but we 
do not quite see how we can get the £2,500 to you as there is no reply yet from our 
application to the Treasury for extra capital grants’.775  
Building work proceeded with despatch: the move to the rebuilt hospital took place 
early in August 1948, and the new out-patient department was opened a few weeks 
later.  The hospital bed total was now 120, and ‘[a]s if to meet this need a 
consignment of actual iron beds, theatre trolleys, enamelware and dressings arrived 
for us from Chungking on 28th August’.776  Out-patients in the new unit numbered 
900 daily.  Free treatment was given regularly to one in three of these patients, who 
were unable to pay for the services they received. 
The successful completion of the new buildings would have been a significant 
achievement at any time, but was all the more remarkable when the economic 
situation in China was worsening on a daily basis, and the country seemed to be 
‘plunging toward utter collapse’.777  The inflationary spiral reached grotesque levels 
during the spring and summer months of 1948, the very time the hospital building 
programme was taking place.  The Government’s introduction of price controls in 
August 1948, alongside the Gold Yuan Reform, made matters worse.  In the newly 
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rehabilitated and extended hospital, price controls affected hospital finances very 
badly, curtailing income without significantly reducing expenditure.  As Clow 
reflected: 
We were very busy at the time and without the controls 
should have been able to lay aside a balance to carry us over 
the winter.  Not only was this not possible but the large 
numbers of patients depleted our stock without improving our 
income.778 
Meanwhile, the military and political situation was changing rapidly.  In February, it 
was widely reported that a Swedish woman missionary had been beaten to death by 
Communists in south Shanxi, and this underlined that there were very real dangers 
for missionaries remaining in China.779   
The deep-rooted ambivalence of some Chinese Christians towards foreign missions 
was brought into the open in a challenging article published in April in the new 
weekly magazine Tianfeng (天风) by Y.T. Wu (吴耀宗; Wu Yaozong), a leader in 
the YMCA movement who had received his theological education in the United 
States.780  The article, ‘The Present-Day Tragedy of Christianity’, concluded with 
conciliatory statements about the ‘many honourable persons and many noteworthy 
accomplishments’ within the Christian church, and the ‘many Christian institutions 
which serve mankind in the spirit of freedom, equality and love.’781  Wu’s core 
message, nonetheless, amounted to a ‘declaration of war against foreign missions’.782  
Anti-foreign feeling was greatly increased in May 1948 when the United States 
government undertook to grant $100 million towards the rehabilitation of the 
Japanese economy.783 
                                                
778 BMSA, CH/56, Clow to Williamson, 10.November.1948. 
779 BMSA, CH/78, Williamson to Williamson, 23.February.1948. 
780 Tianfeng was founded and edited by Wu, and combined political dogma with articles framing 
Christianity in terms of Communist ideology.  See Francis P..Jones, “The Christian Church in 
Communist China”, Far Eastern Survey, Vol.24.(12), Dec.1955, 187. 
781 W.C..Wallace and F.P..Jones, Documents of the Three Self Movement, National Council of the 
Churches of Christ in the United States of America (New York, 1963), 5. 
782 Gao, “A Christian Leader”, in Bays, Christianity in China. 
783 Pepper, “The Student Movement”, 721-2. 
 
   234 
In mid-July, the British Ambassador in Nanjing reported to the Foreign Secretary 
that the military situation ‘could scarcely be worse’.784  The autumn of 1948 had seen 
the most intense fighting of the Civil War, the decisive Liaoshen (辽沈) and HuaiHai 
(淮海) campaigns, which clinched the military superiority of the PLA.785  Major 
Nationalist strongholds had been toppled, including Jinan in Shandong and Shenyang 
in Liaoning.  The threat of a Communist takeover intensified.  Chinese staff in the 
Xi’an hospital had begun to leave because of the unsettled conditions and it seemed 
likely that more would leave if the situation deteriorated.  Clow sounded out the 
remaining senior Chinese doctors for their views on the future management of the 
hospital in the event of the foreigners leaving.   
There is considerable hesitation on the part of any of them to 
take responsibility if we all left, and Dr Chang who has 
always been a standby in the past has definitely said he will 
not be willing to take over. […]  [A]t the moment the opinion 
is that if I leave the institution would break up at once.786 
When he wrote to London again, Clow had made up his mind to remain as long as 
possible, whatever the military or political situation.  He was determined to keep the 
hospital going and to do this he felt he had to remain himself:  
My Chinese colleagues are not willing to carry on the 
hospital through a political crisis without any missionary 
here, and in view of this I have decided to stay here through a 
turnover if it is possible.787 
The unwillingness of Clow’s Chinese colleagues to take on his responsibilities as 
medical director of the hospital suggest that it was a role nobody wanted, probably 
because it was considered politically-compromising, but perhaps also because it was 
insufficiently remunerated.  In these circumstances, Clow was unwilling to leave. 
The collection in aid of the Xi’an hospital by members of Tilehouse Street Baptist 
Church had done well.  The minister of the church declared, following a special Gift 
Day, that ‘never had money come in so readily’.788  When, nearly two years later, the 
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time came to send the money to the Mission House, Mr Russell, the Church 
Secretary wrote to the Home Committee: 
As a church we feel thankful to God for putting this project 
into our minds and giving us the privilege of carrying it 
through.  Our hearts thrill to the thought that we have a share 
in the beneficent work of the hospital. […]  China has a great 
place in our thoughts and prayers.789 
A difficulty arose, however, as to how the gift should be memorialised in China.  A 
key part of the project was to remember the contribution of the Tilehouse Street 
Baptists who had died or served in the war, and it seemed important to the church 
members that this should be recorded in a tangible way.  They hoped that plaques 
could be installed both in their own church and in the new building in China.   
Dr Ellen Clow, sister to Menzies Clow of Xi’an, who had months before returned 
from China to take up the position of China Secretary in the Mission House, was 
troubled by this suggestion: 
I did not think these were days to put up notices in hospitals 
in China having any suggestion of foreign association, as it 
might endanger the whole hospital and staff in any 
turnover.790   
With China only months away from the CCP takeover, Ellen Clow recognised that it 
might be necessary for mission hospitals to distance themselves from their Western 
origins.  She commented that Dr Williamson disagreed with her.  He did not consider 
it would be problematic to acknowledge publicly the gift of foreign money used to 
build the new wing.  Here, it seems, is another indication that Williamson did not 
recognise the significant changes that had taken place in China since he worked there 
ten years earlier.  
It is not clear from the archive just how the matter was taken up with the Tilehouse 
Street members, but a further letter from the church secretary, Mr Russell, to Ellen 
Clow at the Mission House makes it clear that they were made aware of the problem: 
It is not necessary for me to say that nothing would be further 
from our wishes, than to cause our friends at Sian to run the 
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slightest unnecessary risk in times that seem dangerous in all 
conscience. […] Obviously wiser to leave this matter to the 
judgment of those on the spot.791 
The British Baptists in Tilehouse Street were sincere in declaring that ‘China has a 
great place in our thoughts and prayers’.792  A deep sense of affection for China had 
been nurtured by almost a century of missionary letters and visits to the church by 
missionary speakers on deputation and, occasionally, by Chinese Christians visiting 
Britain.  It would have been hard for the church members to understand that a public 
declaration of these warm feelings could endanger the lives of others, still harder to 
appreciate the significance of the accusations of imperialism being levelled at the 
foreign missions.  When these warm feelings combined with memories of heroism 
and sacrifice on the part of those of their own numbers who had served in the war, 
the project assumed a particular sensitivity.793  It was perhaps even harder for British 
donors to appreciate the feelings which may have been engendered by many years of 
dependence on gifts from elsewhere. 
Their suggestion of leaving the decision ‘to the judgment of those on the spot’ 
indicates the church members’ willingness to subordinate their wishes to those of 
their ‘friends at Sian’, even if they could not fully comprehend them.  A plaque was 
installed in the vestibule of the church in Hitchin (Figure 14), inscribed with the 
names of those from the congregation who had died and in whose memory ‘the 
church has erected a Tilehouse Street Memorial Wing of the rebuilt hospital in 
Sianfu [Xi’an], the ancient capital of China’.794  To this day, the plaque remains on 
display in the church building. 
                                                
791 Ibid, Russell to Clow, 23.December.1948. 
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794 Come Wind Come Weather – a history of the Tilehouse Street Baptist Church, produced on the 
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Figure 14: Memorial plaque in Tilehouse Street Church, Hitchin795 
 
In Xi’an, during the remaining time when BMS missionaries were involved, the new 
Out-Patient building was known as ‘the Hitchin Block’. 
When the modern successor of the Xi’an hospital was visited in April 2013, there 
was no recognition that foreigners had been involved in constructing the building 
which had predated it within the city walls.  There were records, however, of the 
foreign hospital having operated in the suburbs.  It has, perhaps, suited the PRC 
historiography to link the foreign contribution only to an institution now clearly dead 
and gone, rather than a thriving modern hospital. 
This section has drawn attention to the fact that it was possible for foreign 
missionaries to work along with the local Chinese authorities in post-war 
reconstruction.  British supporters of Mission, however, had difficulty appreciating 
the changed climate of the times.  While the Tilehouse Street members continued to 
regard fellow-Christians in China affectionately as ‘brothers’, and members of the 
same Christian ‘family’, public expressions of such sentiments might be unwelcome 
at a time when Chinese links with foreign ‘imperialists’ were beginning to be 
regarded with disfavour in China.  
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Policy with regard to Mission work under a 
Communist regime  
The situation in which missionaries found themselves in Qingzhou, and the 
experiences of the hospital staff in Xi’an, suggested that before long a fundamental 
matter of principle would have to be addressed both by the Society and by each 
missionary.  In the event of a Communist victory, and Communist control of the 
country, under what circumstances and conditions would the Society expect its 
missionary staff to continue their work and would they be willing to do so?   
Attention has been drawn to the emphasis placed by the Baptist denomination on the 
fact that there was no hierarchy of membership: ‘There are no priests as distinct from 
people; all alike, in fact, are priests.’796  Another important principle was that each 
member should have freedom to obey his own conscience, and be ‘protected in doing 
what he believes his duty against the influence of authority, and majorities, custom, 
and opinion.’797  Faced with impending decisions about whether or not to attempt to 
continue work under a Communist regime, how did the BMS plan to balance its 
responsibilities as an organisation, for its work and the safety of its foreign staff, 
against the freedom of its individual members to obey conscience? 
At the meeting of the BMS General Committee in September 1946, Fred Russell, 
home on furlough from China, referred to the fact that Communists were ‘in almost 
complete occupation’ in North China, and ‘their attitude to the preaching of the 
Gospel was believed to be antagonistic’.798  Russell asked to know ‘the mind of the 
Committee’: 
Would they be content with a purely social, educational and 
medical presentation of the Christian message, or was the 
Gospel to be preached at all costs? 
One respondent declared ‘that the Church must, in all cases, insist on the right of 
Christian men and women everywhere to worship and witness’.  He anticipated that 
maintaining that principle ‘would probably involve the Church in as big a fight as 
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any in which it had ever been engaged.’  Henry Cook, presumably engaged at that 
very time in writing his book on Baptist principles, was also present at the meeting 
and suggested that ‘no concrete policy for China was possible’.799  Williamson, 
apparently expecting a Nationalist victory, concluded the discussion, 
The work in Communist areas must be continued, and, if a 
political settlement came about, the religious question would 
probably be settled with it, for the influence of the Christian 
Church was strong in the Nationalist Government.800 
However, when it became evident that, contrary to Williamson’s expectations, a 
Communist victory would be the outcome, individual missionaries were faced more 
urgently with the decision as to whether they would be prepared to work under a 
Communist regime.  The Home Committee declared in January 1948 that they 
wished the decision to be taken ‘by the missionaries on the spot who were conversant 
with more factors than the Committee at home’ and underlined repeatedly ‘that they 
[the missionaries] should be supported in every case in whatever decision they made 
whether to remain or evacuate.’801   
There were issues of personal safety involved (whether the missionaries were 
prepared to risk danger and possible arrest) but there were also matters of 
conscience.  What was the right, as opposed to the comfortable or safe, thing to do?  
The Home Committee felt that it could not make the decision, with regard either to 
safety or to conscience, on behalf of the missionaries.  Both had to be left to the 
individual missionary, but the Committee undertook to support each missionary 
whatever their decision.  In so doing, the Committee acknowledged the principle of 
individual conscience.  At the same time, it guaranteed the security of official 
support in whatever decision was taken. 
Several letters in the correspondence files of individual missionaries in the BMS 
archive address the issue.  George Young wrote one of his general letters to 
supporters in March 1948, when the Communists held most of Manchuria, North 
Korea and much of north China with the exception of some large cities and a few 
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railways.  A month earlier, British and American consuls had requested their 
nationals in Central China to evacuate to the coast.802  ‘Now’ wrote Young, ‘we are 
facing what is the most difficult question of a missionary – to flee or to stay?’ 
It is not simply a question of doing one’s duty but of 
considering the effect of your personal decision on the lives 
of others. […] Should we as a mission decide to stay and 
carry on under a Communist regime, […] we should be cut 
off from financial support and become a burden and even a 
danger to our Chinese Christian friends. […] On the other 
side […] it would be cowardly to leave the Chinese Church to 
face this trial alone.  I myself feel that I would rather stay… 
but do the Chinese want me to do this?  Would it not be 
selfish of me to endanger others who would need to support 
me?  Is the day of foreign missionaries ended in China, and 
has the time come for the Chinese church to face the conflict 
alone?803  
Young’s final words are interesting.  It may be that this showed paternalistic doubt as 
to whether the Chinese church had the maturity to deal with difficulties.  In this 
context, it seems more likely that he felt the urge and the responsibility to stand by 
fellow Christians in special danger. 
At the end of December 1948, when the need for decision became more urgent, the 
missionaries in Shaanxi (pictured in 1947 in Figure 15) took part in a conference at 
which they discussed the issue fully with their colleagues in the Chinese church.  
They were unanimously assured by church members that any who decided to stay 
would be welcomed and gladly supported by the church members should this be 
necessary.  Keith Bryan described the discussion which followed this assurance:  
One by one we stood up and in true sincerity gave reasons 
why we felt called of God to go or stay.  Then […] each went 
out of the room […] whilst the remainder of the group 
discussed the decision we had made and expressed its 
approval or otherwise. The amazing thing about it all was the 
sympathy, love and understanding given to each individual 
case.  There was not the least trace of discrimination between 
those deciding to go or stay, the one thing that concerned us 
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803 BMSA, CH/67, Young to friends, 16.March.1948. 
 
   241 
all was to know God’s will for each individual. […] It was as 
right for some to go as for some to stay.804 
Of the missionaries then serving in Shaanxi, eleven elected to stay and four to 
leave.805 
Figure 15: BMS Missionaries in Shaanxi, June 1947806 
When this was reported to the China Sub-Committee, it resolved: 
to assure all the Shensi missionaries, both those who elected 
to evacuate in the event of Communist occupation, and those 
who elected to remain, of their support and their affection and 
prayers.807 
This was an important test of the Baptist principle of freedom of conscience.  It was 
also an important illustration of shared decision-making by Chinese and foreign 
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church members.  From the last weeks of 1948 until the last of the BMS missionaries 
left China in 1952, the issues at stake were rehearsed a number of times by the 
missionaries and by those involved in missionary work in Britain.  This is at the 
centre of the chapter which follows. 
Conclusions 
Zhang Sijing described conditions in Shandong on the eve of the civil war as ‘a 
thousand times more serious’ than during the Japanese occupation.808  This chapter 
has shown that his fears were well-founded.  It was a time of generalised turmoil and 
uncertainty and much personal suffering.  Much of the fabric of Chinese society was 
torn apart.  It would have been impossible for missionaries, even if they had wanted 
to, to continue the roles and routines of pre-war generations. 
Wang Juntang had a close and long-standing relationship with the BMS missionaries 
in Shandong, and had played an important part in the leadership and maintenance of 
the institutions founded by them.  At the same time, he had introduced these 
foreigners to Chinese culture, the Chinese classics and Chinese art, and had 
demonstrated his belief that Christianity was not incompatible with his national 
heritage.  His openness to new political developments in China was consistent with a 
desire to find a way forward for the country beyond its current divided and unsettled 
state. 
However, the missionaries’ fundamental distrust of communism coloured their 
attitude to the communists they encountered locally, and their Chinese colleagues 
would have been able to recognise this.  In this situation, it is possible that Wang did 
not want to let the foreigners know that he had voluntarily taken members of the 
Qingzhou hospital staff to provide medical services to the PLA in its Shandong 
campaign in July 1947.  As the subsequent hospital records show, Wang continued to 
seek ways to reconcile his Christian beliefs with the goals of the new government 
after the founding of the PRC.   
                                                
808 BMSA, CH/23, SP Shantung, Zhang to Williamson, original in Chinese, 14.June.1946, translated 
by Gao Yan,1984. 
 
   243 
The enthusiasm of the members of Tilehouse Street Baptist church, in Hitchin, to 
make a gift to the China mission as a memorial to those of their members who had 
died in the war, and in thanksgiving for those who had returned safely, demonstrates 
the importance they attached to missionary work in China.  It also demonstrates their 
warm feelings towards the Chinese people, as they had come to know them through 
missionary accounts of their work.  They were almost certainly unaware of the sense 
of dependency which the Chinese might feel after many years of being the recipients 
of such gifts.  Their initial expectation that a plaque acknowledging their gift could 
be installed in the newly-built hospital in Xi’an was unrealistic in the context of the 
changed political climate in China, and this was recognised by those missionaries, 
and those in the Mission House, who had recent experience of living and working 
there.  While not necessarily understanding all the implications, the Tilehouse Street 
members were willing to accept the advice of missionaries on the spot as to what was 
in the interests of the future of the hospital. 
These examples provide an insight into the complex relationships between British 
Baptists in their home churches, the Mission Board and its members in London, the 
missionaries working in China and the members of the Chinese Baptist church.  They 
suggest that even when there was apparent affection on both Chinese and British 
sides, and a genuine wish to understand each other, social and cultural differences 
put in place significant, perhaps insurmountable, barriers.  These, along with the 
tensions and rifts within Chinese society at the time, made complete trust and totally 
open communication extremely difficult. 
Nevertheless, the careful discussion of Shaanxi missionaries with their Chinese 
colleagues, about whether they should stay or leave, suggests that they continued to 





Chapter Six: The BMS in China, 1949-1952 
‘Things were so much better than we ever dared hope […] 
and we were carried away in the first three months, as we 
were meant to be’.809 
This chapter brings this research to the end of its chronological scope, and brings it 
also to a question central to its overall purpose: why did the BMS leave China when 
it did?  Did its members believe that the Chinese church was ‘able and willing to 
assume the responsibility’ for its own affairs, as had been the goal established at 
Qingzhou in 1927?810  Evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that they 
were not convinced that this had been achieved.  The Civil War was making it 
extremely difficult to keep open the churches in Shandong; Jing Yihui was struggling 
to maintain medical work in Qingzhou; Menzies Clow had been advised that the 
Xi’an hospital would break up if he left.811  Alternatively, was the BMS pushed out 
of China by the CCP after the establishment of the People’s Republic?   
The standard answer is that there was no place for them in the Communist state.  
Within this explanation, however, there are a number of alternative emphases.  Mitter 
recently reiterated the conventional explanation: the missionaries ‘were of course 
expelled from China by the Communists after 1949’.812  Ling emphasises a different 
point: the missionary departure was prompted by the realisation that Chinese 
Christians had rejected them and had requested them to leave.813  Ashmore argues 
that they might have stayed on, had they been willing to modify the manner in which 
they worked and their approach to others.  ‘It was widespread refusal to adapt, as 
much as the Communists’ hostility, that precipitated the missionary exodus of 1949-
1952’.814  Others point out that it was this very requirement to adapt which led 
missionaries to choose not to remain: they were not happy with the conditions under 
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which they would have to work within a Communist regime.  One BMS missionary 
declared that ‘she [could not] envisage service in Communist China, particularly in 
view of the inevitable frustration of her desire to preach the gospel.’815  Other 
missionaries were heavily influenced by the danger their presence posed to Chinese 
Christians.  ‘The sooner foreign personnel are not around, the easier it will be for 
church leaders to make a stand on a purely religious basis.’816   
The gradual steps by which Chinese Protestantism was absorbed into the 
organisation and control of the PRC are described by Daniel Bays.817  This chapter 
examines the process as it was experienced by BMS missionaries.  Material from the 
Baptist archive brings into the open some of the realities and uncertainties of the 
missionary experience, and this will be dealt with in five parts.  The chapter opens 
with a discussion of some of the reasons why there has been ambiguity about the 
experience of foreigners in China at this time, and why missionary accounts have 
seemed at times unsatisfactory.  Next, correspondence from Shaanxi missionaries in 
the immediate aftermath of the Communist victory forms the basis for an analysis of 
their initial interactions with members of the Communist military and the new 
government.  There follows a similar study of the BMS experience in Shandong.  
The next section charts the steps taken during the early years of the PRC which 
enabled the CCP to take control of the Chinese church and, as a result of which, the 
church’s links with the foreign missionary movement were severed.  The chapter 
ends with brief comment on the challenges which the BMS, and its individual 
missionaries, faced as the work in China came to an end.  
Shandong was the first of the three provinces in which the BMS worked to fall to the 
Communists.  Zhoucun and Qingzhou, two important centres of BMS activity, had 
fallen in March 1948, but Jinan and Qingdao had remained in Nationalist hands for a 
few months longer.  The whole of the province, after almost three years of heavy 
fighting in the country areas, finally fell with the capture of Jinan on 24 September 
1948.  At that time, Fred Drake was the only member of the BMS in Jinan.  The 
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battle for Jinan lasted nine days.  At the outset, Nationalist forces had barricaded 
themselves within the Qilu university campus.  The campus was then heavily shelled, 
first by the Communists and later by the retreating Nationalists.  Almost every 
building was hit, some several times, shattering roofs and windows.818  In the city 
itself, two days of running battles on the streets were followed by heavy shelling of 
railway workshops and factories, leaving much of the city in ruins.819  
BMS staff evacuated Shanxi in July 1948 when Taiyuan came under siege from the 
PLA.820  PLA tactics employed to such devastating effect in Manchuria were applied 
to Taiyuan: the city was gradually surrounded and ‘became a hunger trap for the 
KMT armies, civilian inhabitants, and refugees.  The PLA shut down the food 
supply… and waited.’821  Although two missionaries returned to Shanxi for a brief 
period in autumn 1948, the BMS had no presence there after that and, after Taiyuan 
fell to the Communists, access to news from the province was minimal.  
In early 1949 twelve British Baptists remained in Shaanxi.  Three British doctors and 
one missionary nurse were working in the newly reconstructed and enlarged mission 
hospital in Xi’an; three were engaged in educational work and five were working as 
evangelists.  Mission work had continued without major disruption, although the city 
had been under constant threat for almost a year, as Communist guerrilla attacks 
gradually wore down the Nationalist forces in the outlying areas.822  When, in May 
1949, the Communist takeover eventually came, it was, as it had been in Beijing, 
‘systematic, undramatic and bloodless’ and ‘no violence was called for, because the 
city was plucked like a piece of ripe fruit.’823 
As shown in Figure 16, by June 1949, only a very small number of BMS 
missionaries were continuing work in Baptist mission stations in Shandong and 
Shaanxi, none remained in Shanxi.  Four were still working for the CCC within the 
                                                
818 Corbett, Shantung Christian University, 258. 
819 BMSA, CH/57, Drake to Williamson, 26.October.1948. 
820 BMSA, China Sub-Committee Minutes Vol.12, 24.April.1950. 
821 Anthony Oberschall and Michael Seidman, “Food Coercion in Revolution and Civil War: who 
wins and how they do it”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.47.(2) (April 2005), 399.  
For a harrowing description of the PLA siege of Chanchun, Manchuria, see Dikötter, Tragedy, 3-8. 
822 Chassin, Communist Conquest, 168. 
823 A..Doak Barnett, China on the eve of Communist takeover (New York, 1963), 343. 
 
 247 
Border Service Mission; others had been evacuated to work with the Qilu university 
staff in Hangzhou; some were working for other missionary societies in other 
provinces.  The remainder were engaged in administrative work for the Mission in 
Shanghai or were waiting for the opportunity to move elsewhere in China or return to 
the UK.824 
Figure 16:  Location of BMS missionaries in China, June 1949825 
 
Barriers to understanding the BMS China experience 
The preceding account of events in the three provinces in which the BMS had a 
presence illustrates the different ways in which the Communists came to power in 
different parts of China.  People’s expectations of what the future held under the new 
government were inevitably influenced by these earlier experiences.  For Oiki Ling, 
missionaries all over China reached a common view of what to expect, and thereby 
failed to understand the national mood and political climate during and immediately 
after the Communist take-over.826  She argues that missionaries ‘deluded 
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themselves’, ‘made unfounded assumptions’, ‘misjudged their position, ‘ naively 
believed’, ‘failed to take into account’, ‘assumed’ or ‘refused to see’ the real nature 
of communism.827  She takes at face value the accusations levelled at missionaries at 
the time of their departure from China. 
For many years a veil of ignorance and uncertainty hung over the understanding in 
Western churches of what really happened in China during the Communist takeover.  
One important reason for this was the missionaries’ self-imposed silence.  Fear that 
restrictions would be placed on missionary activities if any open hostility was shown 
to Communist activity, or that Chinese Christians would face negative repercussions 
if their associations with foreign missionaries became known, led missionaries to be 
very guarded in what they said in their letters.  Again and again, the letters contain 
words along the lines of, ‘it is not possible to explain fully in letters’, and ‘please do 
not make any reference to matters mentioned in this letter if you are writing to 
China’.828   
Margaret Kiesow left Jinan on 8 August 1953, the last foreigner to leave Qilu 
University.829  She continued to correspond with friends in Britain during her last 
months in China, including her Qilu colleague, Gladys Seymour, one of the last BMS 
missionaries to leave.  The first letter Kiesow wrote after her arrival in Europe 
contains this telling paragraph: 
All the letters I have written for the last three years have been 
addressed, not only to you, but also to the Tsinan [Jinan] 
Police, through whose security they had certainly to pass.  
What I wrote, though always quite true, was therefore only 
one side – the good side – of the picture.  It is important to 
remember that there is a good side, but to see that side only is 
wrong.830 
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Kiesow went on to write about the meaning in practice of such phrases as ‘freedom 
of religion’, about her experience of campus life under the Communists, and about 
the impact of Communist controls on her relationships with Chinese students and 
colleagues in the university. None of this information appears in letters that she 
wrote while still living in the PRC.  The later picture is very different from the earlier 
one.  In a personal letter to Seymour written on arrival in Europe, she gave a glimpse 
of her real feelings, ‘Oh, the relief to be free from fear again! […] It was a very 
lonely life and a very hard one.’831 
It was not until much later that the consequences of receiving such restricted 
information from China began to be appreciated.  In 1959, Harold Wickings of St 
Andrew’s College, Selly Oak, wrote to Rev. F. Short, of the Conference of British 
Missionary Societies, suggesting that there was a need for ‘an informative book’ 
about China.  
For 8 years we have loyally said little about the Chinese 
church, lest any word of ours might cause trouble for our 
friends and colleagues in that country.  We are surprised that 
some of the folk in the churches ask odd questions.832 
The background of violence, distrust and fear pervading much of China during the 
early years of the Communist take-over is barely mentioned in the missionary 
correspondence. It comes to life, however, with brilliant economy in a single 
sentence in Fred Drake’s careful seventeen page report of the work of the English 
Baptist Mission in Shandong for the year 1949, which is discussed later in this 
chapter.  
It is not possible to describe in detail here the conditions in 
which the University found itself during the year; but they 
may be surmised by reference to Luke 10:30.833   
Drake refers to a passage in the New Testament, which reads: ‘A man was going 
down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and 
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beat him, and departed, leaving him half-dead.’834  Even well-trained and well-
educated Communist censors were likely to miss this discreet reference. 
Taking Drake’s report at face value, and failing to pick up the understated reference, 
might lead a reader to assume, as Ling does, that missionaries were quite unaware of 
the violent and oppressive behaviour of which the CCP had shown itself capable.  
Even without this insight, reference to almost any BMS correspondence from China 
towards the end of 1948 or during the early months of 1949, right up until the last 
BMS missionaries left in December 1951, suggests that they were not blindly 
optimistic.  Letters from Tom and Connie Allen in Shandong and Young in Xi’an, 
written in 1949 within two weeks of each other, both indicate the tentativeness and 
uncertainty with which they faced the future.  The Allens wrote weeks after Jinan 
had fallen to the Communists.  ‘We are not as free as we thought. […]  Days are dark 
[…]  It is impossible to see what will happen we know so little’.835  Xi’an had not yet 
fallen when George Young wrote to Ellen Clow in the Mission House:  
I hear you are a bit pessimistic about the future of Christian 
missions in China.  Well I don’t think any of us can say 
whether there will or will not be a place for Christian 
missionary work under the Communist regime.  All we can 
do is try and then we will know.836 
Missionaries such as Young persevered not because they did not have concerns or 
questions about the future place of missionaries in China, but because they wanted to 
go forward with their work while it was possible to do so.  Ellen Clow, surveying the 
scene from her vantage point in Britain, was not optimistic: ‘I continue to play the 
part of chief pessimist about openings for missionaries in China in the next five 
years.’837 
Another factor in the way of Western understanding of the situation in China, which 
missionary silence did nothing to dispel, is the way information was deliberately 
manipulated by the Communist State.  Brady uses the example given by the Chinese 
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journalist and former diplomat, Lu Ning, who likened Western analysis of the PRC’s 
foreign affairs to five blind men trying to understand an elephant by each feeling a 
different part of it, mangren mo xiang.  Each man only gets one piece of the truth, 
never the whole picture.  
The reason for this is not, as Lu implies, that foreigners are 
incapable of understanding China’s foreign affairs system, 
waishi xitong, rather it is that the Chinese Government 
deliberately withholds information about what has always 
been, and remains, a highly sensitive subject.838   
The CCP leadership made both its own functionaries and its opponents, whether 
nations, organisations or individuals, second-guess what they were thinking.  This 
was an important weapon in their armoury of control: when things went wrong, the 
leadership could deny responsibility or could change direction without admitting 
error or being tied to previous commitments.  Jonathan Howlett analyses the way that 
Mao Zedong used this policy to hold off Western governments who were making 
overtures with regard to recognition.  By remaining secretive and keeping his 
intentions hidden, he could avoid being manipulated.  Being ‘unknowable’ in this 
way, gave him freedom to manoeuvre.839  Carrying out his terror campaigns, Mao 
was deliberately vague, ‘forcing his underlings to pore over every one of his 
numerous remarks, speeches and directives for guidance on how to carry out the 
terror.’840 Drake recognised this technique in his own experience in working with the 
Party machinery in Shandong:  
We have found that the present government does not like to 
indicate directly its will to institutions, but likes them to 
anticipate its will and accommodate themselves voluntarily to 
its policy.  Those who fail to do this find themselves 
increasingly involved in difficulties from which it is hard to 
extricate themselves.841 
Both of the above factors – missionaries deliberately withholding information, and 
the manipulation of information by the CCP – have to be taken into account in 
studying the archives and trying to understand this particularly contentious phase of 
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the history of missions in China.  Close reading of correspondence and other records 
is necessary when trying to gain an insight into the missionaries’ thinking.  
Communists take over Xi’an 
The acute sense of despondency which overtook the BMS missionaries in Shaanxi at 
the time of their eventual departure from China can be explained in part by their 
experiences of the Communist takeover.  A dramatic change occurred in the tone of 
Baptist missionary correspondence from Shaanxi in the summer of 1949.  Letters 
earlier in the year had been characterised by tension and alarms, descriptions of a 
‘rapidly deteriorating situation’, a ‘whirlpool of fear’, and urgent pleas for cash to be 
made available for evacuation purposes.842  In early May, ‘the Communists 
announced that they were very busy in the south and apologised that they would not 
be able to “liberate” Sian for another two months’.843  Two weeks later, on 20 May 
1949, Xi’an fell to the Communists.  It was ‘very peaceful […] very different from 
what we imagined and a very pleasant difference.’844  The mood of the missionaries’ 
letters changed.  Not only was the foreign community relieved of the threat of being 
directly caught up in military conflict, but many of its members began to develop a 
new respect for the conquering army.  One missionary, in a letter to supporters, went 
so far as to eulogise the incoming Communist soldiers as ‘lean, bronzed and wiry 
crusaders’.  This was too much for a member of BMS headquarters’ staff in London, 
who deleted the phrase before allowing the letter to be circulated.845 
Over the next six months, admiration for the new regime is apparent particularly in 
the letters of George Young and Menzies Clow.  Describing the commendable 
manner in which the Communists had conducted themselves, Young exclaimed, 
‘What a radical change has taken place in Sian!’  He was relieved at the ‘friendly 
attitude of the Communists towards the church’, and welcomed the fact that it was 
now possible to travel freely to the country churches ‘provided we have a pass which 
is easily obtainable from the police’.  On one occasion, Young and two missionary 
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colleagues invited two Communists, one of them ‘a high official in the party whom I 
have known for six years’, to a meal in their home, when they ‘enjoyed four hours of 
frank and friendly discussion’ and ‘a most stimulating exchange of ideas and 
experiences’.  On an almost lyrical note, he wrote, ‘Some of our happiest memories 
this summer are of evenings spent sitting out in courtyards sipping tea and talking 
with Communist men and women soldiers about all sorts of things…’846  
As superintendent of the BMS hospital in Xi’an, Clow was particularly concerned to 
understand the attitude of the new regime to the work of the hospital.  Here, he was 
greatly reassured: 
The local Government has sent two men recently to make a 
fairly detailed study of our hospital to improve their own, and 
they said that this hospital was the best in the city. […] I get a 
lot of medical consulting work amongst the senior officers.847  
 
As regards our hospital, one of their political workers said to 
me, “We do not tolerate your hospital work, we welcome it 
and will do all we can to facilitate it”.848 
Clow went so far as to surmise that the new government may ‘have the makings of 
the best government China has ever known’.  He went on to suggest that there was 
‘no reason why medicals [medical missionaries] should not come out [to China]’ and 
that there was ‘plenty of opportunity for [the] technically qualified’.  The 
predominant emphasis in Clow’s letters was on the ‘cordial’ nature of his 
relationships with the new authorities.  ‘The police’ he wrote, ‘have been especially 
friendly and we can take such problems as arise to them and discuss them frankly’.  
He had made ‘many new friends’, ‘many good friends’, amongst the Communist 
military.  He enjoyed meals with Communist officers, and commented that 
Communist students were also ‘very friendly’.  The military, he wrote, were ‘very 
polite and cooperative’, and it is ‘a pleasure to look after them’ when they come to 
the hospital for medical care.849  
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Brady’s book exploring the management of foreigners in the People’s Republic of 
China, and particularly the chapter on friendship, is instructive when considering the 
missionaries’ exuberant descriptions of their relationships with the new 
government.850   
In the language of the CCP, friendship is political […]  In 
Chinese political language, friendship (youyi 友谊) has the 
meaning of a strategic relationship; it does not have the 
meaning of good or intimate personal relations.851 
Clow and Young, like many other experienced BMS missionaries, were both good 
linguists and familiar with Chinese social norms.  In their repeated use of the words 
‘friend’ and ‘friendly’, however, they were almost certainly describing experiences 
which they considered indicative of warm personal regard between people.  There is 
no suggestion that they saw their friendly interactions with members of the new 
authorities in any other light.  It seems likely that they would have considered it 
cynical if anyone had suggested otherwise.   
Brady also describes the strategic principle known as ‘treating strangers well in order 
to win their hearts’ (怀柔远人 huai rou yuanren).852  This resonates with details 
Clow provided of his early interactions with local Communists, including this 
example of an occasion when he was asked to attend two patients in a military 
hospital in Xi’an:   
They said my waterproof looked very disreputable (which is 
quite true) so I told them I am a poor man and they offered to 
issue me with a set of army padded clothes!853 
Brady identifies another factor which may have affected missionaries’ reactions, 
citing Kaidi Zhan’s book, The strategies of politeness in the Chinese language.  
Attempts to bring the addressee closer underlie many of the 
positive politeness strategies of Chinese speakers.  Hence 
often people will say things because they are pleasing, rather 
than sincere and will focus on finding common points.854 
                                                
850 Brady, Making the Foreign Serve, 7-66. 
851 Ibid, 7. 
852 Ibid, 15. 
853 BMSA, CH/56, Clow to Clow, 4.December.1949.  
854 Kaidi Zhan, The strategies of politeness in the Chinese language (Berkeley, 1992), x, in Brady, 
Making the Foreign Serve, 14. 
 
 255 
In retrospect, and in the light of this kind of analysis, it is tempting to dismiss the 
missionaries’ early reactions as naïve, although, as discussed later, within a few 
months they had begun to recognise the underlying intention of the CCP to exercise 
control. 
Elsewhere, Brady refers to Zhou Enlai’s encouragement to Party members to 
cultivate the ‘five diligences’, (wuqin):  diligent eyes, ears, mouth, hands and feet.  
By ‘diligent feet’, Zhou means ‘be active, make friends everywhere, don’t stay at 
home waiting for people to come and find you’.855  It is striking how closely this 
behaviour reflects the style of the Communists Young described in this extract from 
one of his letters: 
Communists are all around us – busy purposeful officials, 
keen Spartan soldiers, enterprising merchant traders, and 
zealous political workers. […] They are our neighbours; they 
sometimes wander into our homes to see how we live; a few 
come to our churches to hear what we preach; many come to 
our hospital for medical help; and in all these friendly 
contacts we and they are finding out that the other fellow is 
not as bad as he appeared to be from a distance.856 
It seems that the behaviours described above were adopted with the explicit purpose 
of buying time and misleading potential opponents. 
It was not just the foreign missionary community which was the target of the CCP’s 
strategies.  Howlett uses CCP records to demonstrate the careful planning and 
extensive training which CCP cadres were given in anticipation of their entry into 
new urban areas, and the impact this had on the business community.857  According 
to Westad, city entrepreneurs in Tianjin were sent new year cards by the CCP, in 
anticipation of an early capture of the city, ‘wishing them long life and prosperous 
business.’858  ‘If we should take the city in this new year, do not be alarmed.  We 
shall restore order quickly and welcome your business.’859  During the takeover of 
Beijing, the in-coming chief of the Military Control Commission, General Ye 
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Jianying, was careful to flatter those from whom he took control by addressing them 
with self deprecating words: ‘We’ve been living in the hills […] we know much less 
than you gentlemen about municipal government.  Henceforth we must learn from 
you.’860  Barnett comments, ‘This sort of humility was characteristic of the 
Communists’ line in taking over many organisations’.861  Even in Beijing, the old 
leadership was pleasantly surprised by the first official contacts with the new 
authorities, and ‘reacted like a small puppy which, when told to roll over, turns over 
meekly.’862 
The CCP approach went further than careful manipulation of social interactions, and 
a few winning words.  In her examination of the demise of private sector charity in 
Shanghai during the early years of the PRC, Nara Dillon describes the use the new 
government made of a carefully staged strategy to draw on the resources, 
organisation and expertise of the elite members of Shanghai’s indigenous voluntary 
sector, before gradually exercising controls and imposing its own agenda.863  Thus, 
by a policy of recruiting this powerful and wealthy group, and then attacking its 
legitimacy, the CCP was able to achieve the lasting institutional change which was 
its objective.  The parallels with the treatment of the missionary hospitals and the 
Chinese Christians are reflected in what follows. 
In Xi’an, the BMS missionaries made a point of communicating and cooperating 
with the new regime wherever possible.  At the same time, the CCP local leadership 
made use of the professional facilities offered by foreigners at a time when their own 
provision was comparatively undeveloped.  Menzies Clow reported that his medical 
services were in demand by Communist military officers, noting that ‘sleeplessness, 
mental strain and low blood pressure seem to be their chief complaints.’864  He taught 
medical classes at the government North West University, and the hospital staff 
participated fully in communal activities such as vaccination campaigns, flood relief 
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and work as air wardens.  In big civic demonstrations, the hospital regularly sent a 
medical party ‘in case anyone gets injured or faints’.865   
Alongside this co-operation with the new regime, normal hospital work continued 
without interference.  Although most hospitals were badly hit by taxes, Clow was 
able to carry on, thanks to the popularity of the hospital and a good supply of drugs 
acquired from the Red Cross.  He was even able to expand medical work, opening 
dispensaries in two country districts.866  He ensured that the BMS hospital in Xi’an 
complied in every way it could with government requirements.  He started a Hospital 
Affairs Committee with representatives from the whole hospital staff, doctors and 
nurses, lab technicians, coolies (unskilled labourers), and students.  He reported that 
the first meeting of the Committee was ‘a great success […] lasted five hours but 
every minute of it was worthwhile. […] It carries real weight and [the staff] have 
developed a sense of responsibility.’867  
During this period, it seemed that there was scope not just for Christian medical 
services to be recognised by the new Government, but for the activity of the Church 
itself to be incorporated into the national reconstruction efforts.  George Young 
wrote that ‘[t]hey do want the Christian church to come right into this people’s 
movement, to share our resources and work together for a new China.’868  Young 
was enthusiastic about the part that Chinese Christians might play in China’s national 
regeneration.  He reported that church work carried on without disruption.  
Unusually close contact with the military authorities took place when one of the 
church pastors was accidentally knocked off his bicycle and killed by an army lorry.  
The church pleaded for the release of the accused drivers, and their discharge was 
celebrated in a ‘feast of thanksgiving and reconciliation between church leaders and 
army officers’.869  
As this section has shown, those BMS missionaries who remained in Shaanxi 
following the ‘turnover’ believed that there was still work for them within the PRC.  
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This honeymoon period continued into the early months of 1950.  Looking back with 
hindsight in September 1950 on his first impressions, Clow wrote, ‘Things were so 
much better than we ever dared hope (and they still are), and we were carried away 
in the first three months, as we were meant to be.’870 
Shandong churches under the CCP 
Unlike Xi’an, the CCP takeover of Jinan in late September 1948 had been hard 
fought and violent.  Once the Communist victory was confirmed, however, although 
the tone of the correspondence from BMS missionaries did not match the exuberance 
of that of their colleagues in Xi’an, a note of optimism became apparent in their 
letters.  In early October, Fred Drake, the only BMS missionary who had remained 
during the fighting, commented on the ‘great courtesy and consideration’ being 
shown by the incoming army and civil authorities.  He reported that ‘important 
contacts’ were being made with incoming personnel. 
We cannot foretell what changes may take place in the future, 
[but] we are hopeful that these contacts will have some effect 
on the course of events, and perhaps lead to better mutual 
understanding.871 
These promising conditions were in marked contrast to those which had prevailed 
during the civil war.  For most of the civil war years, the country areas in Shandong 
had been controlled by Communists, who carried out a campaign against the 
churches and initiated the first stage of the Party’s Land Reform policy.872  Christians 
in Shandong had first-hand knowledge of the ruthlessness with which the CCP 
implemented its policies.  Churches were closed down and church pastors 
persecuted.  Many Christians were left destitute by the fighting, and even the most 
prosperous church members ‘had been reduced to the lowest possible level during 
the past lean years’.  Much church property had been destroyed, and, wrote Drake, 
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‘the church members here are therefore looking wistfully to the church at home for 
some help’.873 
Encouragement came from an unlikely source when, in September 1948, the CCP 
authorities in Zhoucun approached the church about reopening the mission hospital.   
The Mayor of Chouts’un has asked repeatedly why the 
foreign missionaries do not return to Chouts’un, and in 
particular do not reopen the Foster Hospital, as conditions are 
quiet and protection is assured.874 
In response to this enquiry, Zhang Sijing, who had resumed his role as leader of the 
Shandong Baptist Union, and Dr. Chao, a Chinese doctor who had been approached 
about taking on responsibility for medical work in the Foster Hospital, went to see 
the Chief Party Secretary and the Military Commander in Zhoucun.  Both the latter 
officials expressed ‘in very strong terms’ the hope that the hospital would open, ‘and 
promised all support in their power, even to the loan of funds for initial expenses’.875   
This suggested that, at this stage, the Communist authorities were willing to work 
with the Chinese church leaders and look to the foreign missions for practical help.  
Just as in Xi’an, the new authorities had enlisted a thriving mission hospital to 
provide medical services to supplement their own, so in Zhoucun, the CCP took an 
initiative in inviting foreigners to resume an apparently abandoned project, and 
offering to work in partnership with them and with Chinese Christians in doing so.  
This merely replicated the experience of the foreign business community, which, in 
Shanghai, was essential to preserving civic amenities in the absence of CCP 
resources.876  Howlett notes that the British traffic manager of the British Tram 
Company was approached four times to dissuade him from his plans to return to 
Britain.877  It is of interest to note, however, the positive spirit in which the church 
members prepared to ally themselves with the new government in their efforts 
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towards reconstruction.  Here is a reminder of the way Wang Juntang was willing to 
look for ways of cooperating with the Communist leadership in Qingzhou. 
The CCP’s invitation came at a time when no BMS medicals were available to take 
up work in the Foster Hospital.  Two experienced missionaries, James Harris and 
Ronald Still, the latter previously medical superintendent of the Foster Hospital, 
(pictured with SBU colleagues, Figure 17), had returned to China during 1946 with a 
view to reopening work in Zhoucun.  Their movements had been critically restricted 
by the turbulent military conditions, and they had returned to Britain shortly before 





Figure 17:  SBU Education Committee, June 1947878 
Before word of the Zhoucun invitation reached the Mission House, Still had decided 
not to return to China in the immediate future, on account of the needs of his young 
family, despite having been invited by the Chinese leadership to join the permanent 
staff at Qilu University Hospital.879  He submitted his resignation to the BMS in early 
1949.880  Although two new medical missionaries had been recruited for China since 
the end of the Second World War, at the beginning of 1949, with limited language 
skills and little experience of conditions in China, they could not take on the 
challenge of rebuilding the Foster Hospital at this critical time.881  
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The Hospital was reopened by the Shandong Synod at the end of 1948, under the 
leadership of Dr Chao, ‘in ruined buildings and without equipment’, but offering out-
patient treatment and ten in-patient beds.882  The staff comprised Dr Chao, a 
dispenser, two nurses, two student nurses and four workmen.  Initially it was not 
used as much as had been hoped, and its capacity to survive was therefore in 
question.  In pre-war days it had attracted serious cases from the city and surrounding 
areas, but now its lack of equipment made it impossible to take on the most difficult 
cases.  The modest services the hospital offered for minor complaints came into 
competition with the many new dispensaries which were more conveniently located 
in the city itself, while widespread and chronic poverty meant that many people 
could not afford treatment even for the most commonplace problems. 
On the non-medical side, there are strong indications that the commitment of the 
Shandong Baptist church towards self-government and self-propagation was 
undiminished despite the hardships of the previous ten years.  By May 1950, when 
Drake completed his annual report for 1948-1949, he was able to celebrate the fact 
that the central organisation of the Shandong Church had been restored under the 
leadership of Zhang Sijing as Executive Secretary, who had resumed his position 
‘reluctantly at first, but with great energy and prophetic and creative power 
afterwards’.883  The total number of pastors and evangelists in the province had been 
increased from thirty-four in 1949 to forty-five in 1950.  Four young men who had 
joined the ageing group of clergy had emerged as possible church leaders of the 
future and were working with Zhang at the church headquarters in Zhoucun.  After 
years of disruption and prohibition, nearly every church of the Shandong Baptist 
Synod had been granted freedom to hold services, although this masked underlying 
practical difficulties.  The church property in Qingzhou, for example, had been 
progressively occupied by government organisations, and the church itself was 
commandeered every week-night as a cinema.884 
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The Shandong church leaders made plans for a new organisational structure to 
replace the ‘mission stations’ of the past.  A ‘Christian Service Centre’ was set up in 
Zhoucun, and three other such centres were planned elsewhere in the province.  The 
idea was to form communities of Christian people, living and working together, 
centres for ‘church leadership, Christian instruction, mutual help in Christian living, 
training in rural industries, in public health, and in ways of serving the local 
community’.  They were to be ‘wholly Chinese in conception and control’, but the 
contribution of foreign missionaries was not ruled out: ‘there is no reason why in the 
future foreign missionaries of the same outlook and simplicity of life should not 
share in such communal living’.885   
The maturity of the indigenous Shandong Baptists is apparent in this Zhoucun 
initiative, while their wish to remain in association with foreign missionaries is 
suggested by their invitation to like-minded missionaries to take part.  It seems that 
William Carey’s 1796 vision of Christian converts living in community and 
supported by the labours of their own hands was now to be fulfilled.886  The 
emphasis on the new centres being ‘wholly Chinese in conception and control’ made 
the social and cultural barriers, which had long stood in the way of Carey’s vision, no 
longer relevant.  At the same time, the Chinese Christians’ statement that foreign 
missionaries were welcome, at the invitation of the Chinese, was a significant 
progression from the BMS regulations of 1885 which allowed that ‘such other 
Brethren as may be deemed suitable, being recommended by the Missionaries in 
China […] may become full members’ of the BMS Field Committees’.887  With a 
development of this kind in place, the BMS might have been justified in considering 
their work in Shandong complete. 
By the time Drake wrote his 1949 report, the Zhoucun Christian Service Centre was 
in operation using parts of the former Foster Hospital premises.  Thirteen staff were 
employed, including a warden trained in practical crafts, a carpenter and six others 
with Biblical training as well as practical skills.  The latter were to raise funds by 
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harvesting crops of maize from the hospital grounds, as well as the purchase of wool-
spinning machinery, beehives and ‘Leghorn fowls’. 
Drake remained in close touch with Zhang Sijing and the Mission continued to 
provide a very modest contribution to church expenses.888  The remaining role for the 
BMS in Shandong at the time was in their work as part of Qilu University.  Qilu’s 
two evacuations, first to Chengdu during the Japanese occupation and then to 
Hangzhou during the civil war battle for Jinan, had left a legacy of rancour within the 
institution, and had produced tensions between the university and external 
authorities.  Discontinuities in leadership, disagreements over allocation of funds, 
and discontent with proposals for syllabus reform were all contributory factors.  In 
addition to such on-going problems, the suspicion of collaboration on the part of 
those who had remained during the occupation was never completely absent from the 
minds of those who had left for Free China.889  
By the end of 1949, the Shandong church had come of age, and was operating with 
minimal in-put from BMS personnel.  The church’s initiatives in pastoral work and 
evangelism were the outcome of many years’ steady growth under the leadership of 
the indigenous SBU, with financial support in the early years of the Japanese 
occupation and of the civil war from the BMS.  Efforts to resource the formidable 
outlay required for the BMS-funded hospitals were less successful, and here the 
church showed itself ready to work in partnership with local government.   
CCP moves to control the Chinese Church 
Despite the hopes entertained by the BMS missionaries in Shaanxi and Shandong, 
the period from 1948 would see the CCP assuming control of the Chinese Church.  
The timeline in Figure 18 sets out the framework of political change and the 
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responses of Church and Mission which would define the final stages of the BMS 
presence in China.   
Figure 18: CCP moves leading to the departure of the BMS, 1948-1952 
 
‘There is no doubt in my mind’, wrote Derk Bodde, then a student in Beijing, in his 
diary on 26 January 1950, ‘that the Communists come here with the bulk of the 
people on their side.’890  It is likely that many Chinese Christians were amongst those 
who welcomed the inauguration of the People’s Republic on 1 October 1949.  
Missionaries and Chinese Christians considered it a positive sign that the first 
meeting of the new CPPCC, convened in September 1949 to discuss the 
establishment of the new state, included five members of the Protestant church.891  
These were Government nominees, not elected delegates of the NCC.892  All of them 
                                                
890 Derk Bodde, Peking diary: a year of revolution (New York, 1950), 99. 
891 Williamson, British Baptists, 179. 
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had been sympathetic to Communist proposals for ending the Civil War and 
organising a coalition government.893   
It was this conference which approved ‘The Common Programme’, effectively, until 
1954, the constitution of the PRC, which guaranteed freedom of religious belief.  
This was in contrast to the repressive policy of Communists towards Christians in the 
villages of Shandong during the Civil War.  Then they had been ‘bitterly hostile to 
the Church, and made our pastors one of the main targets of their propaganda.  
Christians were dubbed “reactionary, feudalistic and capitalistic”.’894  Victor 
Hayward, BMS missionary now based in Shanghai with the NCC, was a sceptic: 
In country districts, the initial proclamation of ‘Freedom of 
Religious belief’ has usually been followed by slogans of 
‘down with Superstition’ and subsequently with openly or 
disguised attacks on Christianity.895 
Just as, in Dillon’s study, the leaders of Shanghai’s voluntary sector were co-opted 
under the patronage of New Democracy to engineer their own downfall, it has been 
argued that Chinese Christians were enlisted by the CCP to bend Chinese 
Christianity to government objectives.896  This accorded perfectly with Mao’s 
preferred operational style: the CCP should ‘draw the bow without shooting, just 
indicate the motion’.897  
Like most other social and cultural reforms, the Christian 
Reform Movement was not officially inaugurated by the 
Communist authorities themselves but by a group of 
‘progressive’ Chinese – in this case Protestant laymen who 
had some hope that Christianity might survive in China if it 
cooperated and compromised with the Communists.898 
Following the CPPCC meeting, eighteen leading Chinese Christians sent a letter to 
the Home Boards of all missionary societies.899  The letter was critical of the close 
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connection between Chinese church organisations and Britain and the USA, and the 
consequent implicit association of Chinese Christians with imperialism.  In its final 
section on ‘Future Relationships Between the Chinese Christian Church and 
Missionary Societies’, the letter urged that all policy determination and financial 
administration in Church affairs should be turned over to Chinese hands as soon as 
possible, and urgent steps should be taken towards complete financial independence.  
The letter went on, however, to say: 
There is nothing in principle which makes the future position 
of the missionary untenable, or renders his service 
unnecessary.  On the contrary there is a definite challenge to 
work and serve under adverse circumstances and to bear 
witness to the ecumenical fellowship.900 
The insistence that leadership and administrative responsibility of the church should 
be passed to the Chinese was consistent with accepted BMS policy, and the 
assurance that there was a continuing role for missionaries was welcomed.  
Along with the letter addressed to the missionary societies’ Home Boards, the group 
of CCP-nominated Christians formulated a letter addressed to all Christians in China. 
This letter commended the Christian contribution to Chinese society in the past, and 
urged the church ‘under the Leadership of the People’s Government, to fulfil the 
responsibilities it bears as a People’s Organization, […] energetically pushing 
forward its pioneering work’.901  Such an appeal to Christians to lend their support to 
the vital process of national reconstruction fitted with the widely held aspirations of 
the period and was well judged to persuade patriotic Christians to comply with 
government demands.  Political education was made compulsory in all organisations 
by the end of 1949.  This increased the pressure on Christians to conform to CCP 
policy, but was taken up without undue misgiving as indicated by Menzies Clow’s 
response in the BMS hospital in Xi’an.902  
                                                                                                                                     
the assistant secretary of the General Synod of the Anglican Communion as well as ‘some well-known 
Christian laymen’.  Williamson, British Baptists, 179. 
900 Francis P..Jones and Wallace C..Merwin, Documents of the Three-Self Movement: source 
materials for the study of the Protestant church in Communist China (New York, 1963), 17. 
901 Ibid, 10. 
902 BMSA CH/10, Clow to Clow, 29.October.1949. 
 
 268 
In May 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai invited a small number of Christian leaders, most 
of whom ‘had a reputation as enthusiastic supporters of the new regime’, to Beijing 
to discuss the future of the Protestant church, the ways in which it could contribute to 
national reconstruction and the conditions under which the new Government would 
permit the Church to continue to practise and propagate its faith.903  In Zhou’s view, 
the churches would have no place in the New China unless they could prove that they 
were not connected in any way with imperialism.  To do this, they must terminate 
their economic dependence on foreign funding and must sever all other links with 
foreign missions.904  A first step must be for responsible church leaders to issue a 
statement to Chinese Christians.  Here, again, the CCP leadership would ‘draw the 
bow’ and ‘indicate the motion’.905 
This carefully chosen group of Christian ‘supporters of the new regime’ responded 
by producing a document under the official title, ‘Direction of Endeavour for 
Chinese Christianity in the Construction of New China’, later better known as the 
Christian Manifesto.906  The Manifesto was strongly critical of past links between 
Christianity and imperialism, and called on Chinese Christians to guard against 
imperialist attempts to destroy the Chinese revolution.  It asked them to show their 
support for the New China by working towards a totally independent Chinese church, 
free of foreign influence and personnel, and required them to ‘carry on anti-
imperialistic, anti-feudalistic and anti-bureaucratic-capitalistic education’.907   
The campaign to obtain signatures to the Manifesto marked the unofficial beginning 
of the Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM).908  Although the TSPM was not 
formally approved by the Party until 1954, a Preparatory Council was established 
following the meeting with Zhou, and those church leaders who had met with him 
became de facto leaders of the new Movement.909  The 8 May issue of Tianfeng, 
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which had become the official voice of the new leaders, contained a report by 
Y.T..Wu which dismissed missionary efforts towards self-governance, self-support 
and self-propagation, (自治 自养 自传 zizhi, ziyang, zizhuan) such as those made by 
the BMS, as a ‘false Three-Self Movement’.910  The new Movement must be free of 
all associations with foreigners and independent of foreign financial backing.  As 
such, it would have the support of the new government of China. 
CCP hostility towards America, stoked by the United States’ post-war support for 
Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD, was hugely inflamed by the outbreak of the Korean 
War on 25 June 1950.  Any lingering acceptance of the place of foreigners in the 
PRC ceased.  The Christian Manifesto was circulated widely just at this time, and its 
themes resonated with CCP demands to ‘hate, curse and despise the imperialists’, 
which formed the bedrock of the Resist America Aid Korea campaign (抗美援朝 
kang mei yuan chao).  Christians were aware that failing to sign the Manifesto was a 
sure way to draw attention to a lack of patriotism, just at a time when conspicuous 
demonstrations of national loyalty were called for.  One prominent Chinese Christian 
refused to sign the Manifesto, and others were critical of the Marxist tone of the 
document, but it was eventually signed by more than 417,000 Chinese, almost half 
the total Protestant church membership.911   
Prompted by the tone of the Manifesto, the members of BMS staff in Shaanxi handed 
over all responsibility for the work, funds and property of the mission to the Chinese 
church members.  The formal hand-over took place during the Shaanxi Synod 
meetings of July 1950.  Joan Williamson sent home details of the occasion: ‘This has 
been a happy, fruitful and useful year in church life’, she wrote, going on to describe 
and reflect on the handover: 
This little group [of Chinese Christians] who accepted this 
trust from the BMS […] were not the mighty, or the strong, 
or the very wise, but simple people like ourselves. Not a few 
tears were shed and for a time words were impossible as the 
business of handing over was transacted.  That was because 
of the happy fellowship which has always existed in this part 
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of China between the sending and the receiving church. […] 
From the historical point of view it was a great moment.912 
Williamson’s description of the relinquishment of missionary responsibilities speaks 
of considerable warmth and of ‘a relationship of mutual trust and respect’, such as 
Ling believes was impossible.913  It was a dignified, formal transaction with apparent 
agreement on both sides that it was the right thing to do.  The Chinese members 
formally declared that all the Shaanxi missionaries were ‘genuine friends of the 
Chinese people’.914  The missionaries present welcomed the new arrangement ‘with 
joy as a sign that the goal of all missionary endeavour had been achieved’.915  
From that point, changes in the international situation worked to bring new pressures 
to bear.  Tensions between China and the United States, further heightened in 
October 1950 by the entry of the PLA in the form of Chinese ‘volunteers’ against the 
United Nations forces in the Korean War, led the United States government to forbid 
the transfer of funds to China.916  The CCP retaliated by prohibiting any organisation 
in China from receiving aid from abroad.  Christian leaders were told that all 
Christian institutions receiving money from the United States must be transferred 
forthwith to government control.917  The Christian Colleges throughout China were 
forced to abandon any links with the West.  Even social contacts between individual 
Chinese and Westerners might place the Chinese under suspicion, and as a result 
many Western teachers ceased meeting their classes, and missionaries in some places 
found themselves ostracised by church members who had formerly been friendly.918 
In February 1951, the CCP passed a new law against counter revolutionaries, any 
who had shown themselves to be unsympathetic or opposed to the government, and 
any individuals or organisations that they were able to connect with imperialism.  As 
a result, during the summer of 1951, following a series of mass rallies, many 
thousands were arrested and executed.   
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As the campaign grew in intensity it became brutal and 
terrifying.  For millions of Chinese the violence and 
humiliation of these days effectively ended any hope that 
they would be able to live out their lives peacefully under the 
Communist regime, whatever their past histories might have 
been.919 
Brutality combined with intimidation, and the consequences were far-reaching.   
We all felt fear.  We stopped speaking even to those with 
whom we were normally very close. […]  Everybody was 
denouncing others and was denounced by others.  Everybody 
was living in fear.920 
A few months later, attacks were orchestrated within churches and church 
institutions.  Denunciation meetings were held in cities throughout China, at which 
Christians were encouraged to criticise their leaders and fellow members.921  
Delegates from the Baptist church in Xi’an attended meetings with government 
officials in Beijing.  George Young wrote that Christian pastors at these meetings 
accused their fellows ‘in fiery angry words’ ‘of being “spies” and  “secret servants of 
imperial power”.’.922  The Shaanxi delegates returned to Xi’an following these 
meetings.  It was almost a year after the BMS had handed over all property and 
leadership to Chinese Christians, but now the church members met with their 
missionary colleagues and ‘sorrowfully asked us to terminate our work immediately’.   
Since it was no longer possible for us to preach and teach and 
since our presence was an embarrassment to the Chinese 
church, we had no option but to apply for our exit permits.  
These were courteously and speedily given to us by the local 
authorities.923 
The last of the BMS missionaries in Shaanxi therefore left China in July 1951.   
In Shandong, Peter Nelson, a pharmacist recruited after the war to work in Jinan, was 
one of the last to leave in 1951.  In his memoir, he recounts details of his last days 
there, and describes the ‘constant stream of visits’ from staff and students who came 
                                                
919 Spence, Search for Modern China, 535. 
920 Dikötter, Tragedy,182-3, citing Liu Xiaoyu in Wang Ying, “Gaizao sixiang: Zhengzhi, lishi yu 
jiyi” (Reforming thoughts: politics, history and memory, 1949-1953), unpublished PhD dissertation, 
Beijing: People’s University, 2010. 
921 Bays, New History, 163. 




to wish him well and thank him for his work in the university.924  Two or three days 
before he and his fiancée were due to leave, they had a visit from a group of about 
thirty students bringing a picture on which they had inscribed a thank-you message 
and which they had all signed.  The next day, three of the students returned, this time 
with the student political cadre, himself a member of Nelson’s pharmacy class.  They 
told Nelson that the authorities had expressed strong disapproval of their action and 
they had been ordered to take the present back.  
The following evening, very late, we had a further visit from 
the student cadre.  He said he had come of his own free will 
and asked us not to tell anyone else.  He apologised for the 
disappointment we must feel and virtually admitted that he 
did not approve of the way that the party had acted but he 
said that at least we knew how much our work for the 
students had been appreciated.’925 
Glimpses such as this into details of the missionaries’ experiences in their last 
months in China are rare.  They provide evidence that the publicised narrative of 
alienation between missionaries and Chinese Christians does not tell the full story of 
the missionary departure. 
By November 1951, only two missionaries remained in China, Hubert Spillett in 
Shanghai and Jim Sutton in Chengdu.  Both had applied for exit visas.  Sutton’s was 
granted in December 1951 and Spillett’s in September 1952.926  Two others remained 
in Hong Kong, helping with transit arrangements. 
It had become clear during these final months of their work in China that, within the 
new political dispensation, the time had come for the indigenous church to assume 
responsibility for the future, and that only Chinese Christians could take part in the 
work. 
Departure and decisions about subsequent postings 
We are out of China – that will be good news to many of our 
anxious friends, but it is a heart breaking experience for us.  
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Dismantling the old home, saying such a permanent goodbye 
to beloved friends and fellow workers, stopping the work of 
preaching the Gospel to the Chinese, leaving the old historic 
city of Sian, this has all been a shattering experience.927  
The enormous sense of loss which Young expresses in this letter remained with 
many ex-China missionaries throughout their lives.928  Not only had their work been 
brought to an abrupt end, but they had been cut off completely from their Chinese 
friends and colleagues, with whom thereafter no communication was possible for 
more than thirty years.  As the years went by, groups of missionaries circulated 
amongst themselves compilations of news of former colleagues, in which they were 
able to include, very rarely, general news from China.929  It was not until after the 
death of Mao in 1976 that channels of communication gradually re-opened, leading 
to correspondence between old friends and colleagues, and, eventually, to a number 
of return visits to China.930 
Those missionaries who, on leaving China, felt unable to transfer to mission work in 
another BMS field were faced with acute personal dilemmas about what to do next.  
Their work experience and work patterns as missionaries had been very different 
from anything they were likely to experience in Britain.  One forty-eight year old 
who had spent more than twenty years in China delayed making the decision to 
resign for several years.  He transferred to Ceylon and eventually wrote to the China 
Secretary about his uncertainty: 
At the moment I have merely come to the conclusion that I 
don’t want a pastorate in England.  I am not a 
Denominationalist at all, and my outlook is philosophic 
rather than dogmatic, and I find this hard to fit into the 
denominational mould. […] I really don’t know what to do. 
[…] I need not say how sad we are and how perplexed.931 
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Experience of many years’ co-operation with the ecumenical CCC had made this 
former China missionary keenly aware of his calling as a Christian, rather than 
primarily as a Baptist.  Other adjustments had to be made by medical missionaries 
returning to Britain, who had to accommodate themselves to the change in structures 
and opportunities open to them within the newly established National Health Service.  
One experienced missionary doctor was wary:   
I have not yet formed a very favourable opinion of the new 
Health Service and I am hoping it will be possible to find 
some work that will not be too closely bound up with red 
tape.932 
The BMS itself was faced with logistical problems, trying to make best use of almost 
eighty missionaries who were on its payroll but not immediately suited to work on 
any of its other mission fields.  For American missionary societies, the primary 
principle in redeployment was to continue to serve Chinese people wherever 
possible.  It seemed to make sense to capitalise on the missionaries’ language skills, 
familiarity with the cultural background and affection for the Chinese people.  Some 
funds had in the past been specifically set aside for work in China, and a legitimate 
use had to be made of these.   As a result, by the end of 1952 around 75 American 
missionaries from China had been reassigned to Hong Kong, and another 114 to 
Taiwan, then designated Formosa.  The former director of the Missionary Research 
Library in New York was concerned that this policy created an unhelpful and 
inappropriate imbalance between missionaries and indigenous leaders, ‘even taking 
into account the large number of refugees flooding these places.’933   
The BMS did not follow this route (Figure 19).  Because of its well developed work 
and existing infrastructure in India and Ceylon a majority of missionaries who 
continued working for the BMS transferred there, while a handful of others were 
designated to BMS work in Africa and the West Indies.  The exodus from China was 
seen by some in the Mission House as ‘a providential opportunity to open a new 
sphere of work’.  Latin America offered the prospect of a new and potentially 
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productive BMS field, and one couple was assigned to explore possibilities for work 
in Brazil.934  The Malayan Emergency provided opportunities for those with Chinese 
language skills, and two ex-China missionaries resigned from the BMS to take 
employment with the Colonial Service there.935  Two others who were able to make 
continuing use of their fluent Chinese were Fred Drake, who was appointed to the 
Chair of Chinese at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Edward Phillips who 
took a post with the Foreign Office.936 
Figure 19: Location or Destination of ex-China missionaries, April 1952937 
 
Conclusions 
Much information that would have served to provide a fuller picture of the departure 
of missionaries from China is not available within the missionary archive.  Attempts 
to make sense of this final phase of the missionary presence are undermined if 
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allowances are not made for these gaps, and for the pressures under which Chinese 
Christians were operating.  
This chapter has traced the steps by which BMS missionaries found themselves first 
greeted with apparent warmth, and then ousted by the CCP, following the formation 
of the PRC in 1949.  This is mirrored in what happened to the foreign business 
community at the same time.  What is different is that the BMS sought to find ways 
to hand over their work to their Chinese colleagues, rather than aim to get away as 
soon as they found that their business could no longer be made profitable in China.  
A fresh picture emerges from this research of a well-established Chinese church, 
striving not primarily to escape from missionary dominance but to find a place for 
itself in the context of the changed political scene in China. 
In Shaanxi, formal agreements were reached, first to transfer leadership and assets 
from the BMS to the Chinese church, and later for the missionaries to withdraw 
entirely from China.  In Shandong, a decision made by the Mission years earlier, to 
'surrender the task', finally came to fruition: the predominantly Chinese SBU, already 
set on a path to self-support, self-governance and self-propagation, created 
mechanisms which it hoped would enable it to survive in the new political climate.  
Until it proved impossible to do so, it maintained its links with the few remaining 
Baptist missionaries in the province and drew on the modicum of financial support 
that the BMS continued to make available. 
The vilification of missionaries which was a feature of the Campaign against 
Counter-Revolutionaries does not mirror the way Chinese Christians took leave of 
BMS missionaries at the time of their departure.  The Baptist archive shows evidence 
that relationships between Chinese Christians and missionaries remained cordial, 
even affectionate, at the time the missionaries left China, and, while there was regret 
on both sides at their leaving, there was mutual recognition that the time had come 
for them to go their separate ways.938 
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Nevertheless, the frenzied public repudiation in the PRC of missionaries, and all that 
they had stood for, was keenly felt and had a profound influence on the development 
of missions worldwide.939  
                                                




‘The Chinese Communists were determined to rid China of 
the pernicious influences of feudalism and imperialism, and 
to make Marxism the sole ideological guide for this task. […] 
Christian missionary work in China was eliminated shortly 
after the Communist takeover, and three decades later the 
native Christian church has virtually disappeared from the 
People’s Republic of China.’940 
As this research has shown, Yip, writing in 1980, was correct in his reference to the 
work of foreign missionaries.  Within three years of the Communist takeover, the last 
Protestant missionaries had left China, and after their departure were unable to 
maintain any contact with friends or former colleagues in China.  Yip was not, 
however, correct with regard to the disappearance of the native Chinese Christian 
church.  Daniel Bays suggests a figure of ‘five to six million Protestants and a very 
rapid growth rate, in the late 1970s’.941  Less than ten years later, a ‘reasoned 
estimate’ of Protestant Christian numbers stood at twenty million.942  Subsequent 
reports from China suggest that numbers have continued to grow substantially.  
Estimates vary: the government says twenty-four million; independent estimates 
agree that this is a vast underestimate.  Now a figure of sixty million, once deemed a 
gross exaggeration, is considered conservative.943 
Exploring the years 1937 to 1952 in the context of a thriving twenty-first century 
Christian church in China introduces a new dynamic to the historical analysis.  This 
was a significant period of transition in the history of Christianity in China, when the 
Chinese church separated conclusively from its predominantly western origins, when 
foreigners left and Chinese Christians sought to find their direction in a changed 
political environment.  This research has therefore considered these years not as the 
dying moments of a failed endeavour, but as a period of transition and an attempt to 
bring into being a new organism from the disappearing life of the old.  The focus has 
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not been primarily on what the Mission had or had not done in the past.  Rather, it 
has been on individual missionaries and their interactions with Chinese Christians 
and with secular authorities (Japanese occupiers, civic administration, Red Army, 
GMD, or CCP) as well as with the Missionary Society in London.  It has explored 
whether these interactions assisted or stood in the way of the new developments. 
The preceding chapters have shown that these interactions were greatly influenced by 
the political and societal context in each of the provinces studied.  They were 
coloured by the complicated emotions and loyalties generated both by the Japanese 
occupation of 1937 to 1945, and the Chinese Civil War of 1946-49.  During this 
period, tensions created by the need to find ways to survive within a fractured 
political environment were added to the existing hurdles which came in the way of 
mutual understanding between Chinese people and foreigners.  Baptist missionaries 
associated closely with their Chinese colleagues, but could never enter fully into the 
needs, hopes and practical considerations which influenced them.  There would 
always be cultural differences, patriotic allegiances and peculiar circumstances 
which would separate the missionary from the indigenous Christian. The fact that, as 
far as can be judged from the archival record, BMS missionaries and Chinese 
Christians kept faith with one another, and continued to work together, is worthy of 
recognition, even though during the Japanese occupation and the Civil War neither 
party could fully understand the predicaments of the other.  This has perhaps been 
insufficiently recognised in the secondary literature.944 
Missionaries during this period worked often sacrificially to support the Chinese 
church and enable it to go forward.  Most had a deep respect for Chinese culture, 
Chinese abilities, Chinese intellect.  But they could not enter fully into the 
fundamental aspirations of their Chinese colleagues as Chinese nationals, could not 
fully understand the anger and fear generated by the Japanese invasion, the 
vulnerabilities experienced during the Japanese occupation, the confusion and 
divided loyalties brought on by the Civil War, the urgent longing for peace and 
settled government with which the establishment of the PRC was received.945 
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This thesis is the result both of what has been found and what it has not been possible 
to find.  The knowledge of censorship by outside bodies – the Japanese or British 
military, or the CCP – meant that missionaries withheld from their correspondence 
much information that would have helped to provide a more complete picture of 
events in China during these years.  Historians of mission and of the CCP have had 
purposes of their own in compiling their records.  Uncovering some of the 
discrepancies between the various accounts of the history of the period demonstrate 
that much is open to re-interpretation.  This was illustrated particularly in relation to 
Chinese and BMS narratives of the life of Wang Juntang of Qingzhou, where 
Wang’s associations with the local CCP were understood quite differently by his 
missionary colleagues.946  
By the late 1930s, the Chinese church which the BMS had founded in Shandong was 
reaching towards the independence which had been the goal of the Society from the 
outset.  An organisational structure had been established based on Chinese leadership 
at both local and provincial levels.  In Zhang Sijing the SBU had a leader who was 
capable of acting independently, but who also had a strong relationship with BMS 
missionaries.  His relationship with H.R..Williamson, who in early 1939 assumed the 
influential role of China Secretary at the Mission House in London, was particularly 
important.  The shared desire of the SBU to establish independence from the 
Mission, and the commitment of the Society to withdraw from the province, were 
undermined throughout this period by the impoverishment of the church and the 
desperate living conditions created by the continuation of war and the Japanese 
occupation.  As a result, the church in Shandong was repeatedly thrown back on the 
Society for material support.   
It was poverty and national crisis that prevented the Shandong Baptist Church from 
achieving independence, not, as has been postulated, the insistence of the mission on 
remaining in control.947  At the end of the war, BMS missionaries returned to 
Shandong at the urgent request for help of Chinese colleagues.  This finding makes 
less clear-cut Brook’s conclusion that the aspirations of the Chinese church for 
                                                
946 See Chapter Five, page 214 onwards. 
947 See for example Ling, Changing role, 51. 
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independence, unity and self-support were brought closer to reality by the Japanese 
occupation.948  It is also contrary to Ling’s suggestion that British missionaries 
returned without proper consideration of the real situation in China and the views of 
their Chinese colleagues.949 
By the mid 1940s, the Chinese Baptist church in Shaanxi had not moved as far 
towards independence as its counterpart in Shandong.  As well as providing financial 
backing and some leadership to the church, the BMS continued to support and 
interact with the local community through its institutional provision in the form of 
schools and hospitals.  The work of the Zunde school in Xi’an provided valuable 
lessons in the necessity of working closely with municipal and provincial lay 
authorities.  These lessons would be necessary to the survival of the school under a 
Communist regime.  
The continued commitment of the BMS to its work in China, so long as this was in 
keeping with the wishes and needs of the Chinese church, was demonstrated by its 
persistence in maintaining its workforce there throughout this turbulent and 
inflationary period.  This persistence was accompanied by a recognition that the time 
had come for a fundamental change in the way the Mission organised its work in 
relation to the Chinese church. It was in recognition of this fundamental change that 
in June 1945 the BMS China Sub-Committee recommended the secondment of two 
of its staff members to work in the GMD-sponsored Border Service Department, 
under the management of the Church of Christ in China.   
While this initiative showed awareness of important changes in the relationship 
between church and mission, it also illustrates the fact that senior staff on the Home 
Committees were not at that time taking sufficient cognisance of changes in the 
political climate.  H.R..Williamson’s belief that he enjoyed a happy relationship with 
members of the Nationalist leadership while he was in China during the 1920s and 
1930s made him slow to recognise the decline in the authority of Chiang Kai-shek 
and the GMD party which had taken place by the end of the war with Japan.  
                                                
948 Brook, “Toward Independence”, 319. 
949 Ling, Changing role, 53. 
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Recognition of the different perspectives of home and fieldwork staff, and the 
reasons for this, adds a fresh dimension to the study of the mission record. 
Both before and after the Communists came to power, Baptist missionaries 
welcomed opportunities to engage with them and reached out to them at a personal 
level by inviting them to share meals and engaging them in discussion.  The records 
indicate the wholeheartedness with which the remnant of BMS missionaries who 
were still in China at the time of the Communist take-over attempted to work in 
cooperation with the Communist civic authorities.  Ling dismisses this as naivety and 
self-deception, but a convincing alternative interpretation is that they were open to 
new conditions and willing to embrace change.  These are qualities for which 
missionaries in the past have not always been credited. 
The Baptist archive supports the view that relationships between Chinese Christians 
and BMS missionaries remained cordial, even affectionate, at the time the 
missionaries left China.  The archive demonstrates, too, that the missionaries left 
behind strong Christian communities in both Shaanxi and Shandong and that they 
had been partners with the church in building these up.  Their precipitate departure 
from Shanxi during the siege of Taiyuan leaves the experience of the Chinese Church 
in Shanxi largely unreported in the missionary correspondence in the years that 
followed.  Although the end of the BMS presence in China was neither unplanned 
nor unwelcome, the public denigration of missionaries which preceded their 
departure was painful, and the completeness of the enforced break with former 
friends and colleagues was deeply distressing.  The well-publicised criticisms that 
the Missions went hand-in-hand with imperial aggression, which were painfully 
explored in the retrospective self-analysis of missionaries and missionary societies, 
owe their origins in no small measure to the Communist-inspired accusations of the 
first years of the PRC.  
With regard to wider questions about the foreign presence in China, Mitter has 
written:  
The challenge for the new historiography of China has been 
to bring the imperial presence into the narrative of Chinese 
history, avoiding both a black-and-white condemnation of the 
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imperial presence simply as depradation and plunder, and the 
complacent position that imperialism was essentially a 
‘helping hand’ in bringing China to modernity.950 
These words about the ‘imperial presence’ could equally be applied to the missionary 
presence.  This thesis has attempted to bring missions back into Chinese history, but 
it has also been an attempt to bring missionaries back into mission history.  While 
missionary societies provided the infrastructure and the general directions for the 
work, the Societies’ actual achievements were predominantly the work of individual 
missionaries based in China.  Further strands within this research have therefore been 
the conditions which governed the work of those missionaries and what it meant to 
them to be part of that endeavour.  This has included their personal and familial 
experiences, and factors in Britain which had a bearing on their work and their well-
being.  These broader influences have been missing from earlier commentaries on the 
last years of the foreign missionary presence in China. 
This research has pointed to evidence that personal needs and sensitivities played a 
part in interactions between British and Chinese colleagues, and between individual 
missionaries and the Home Committees.  Developments in Britain also shaped the 
choices and resources open to missionaries and to the BMS as a Society.  Years of 
hardship and uncertainty in China, made worse by conditions in Britain, inability to 
make satisfactory provision for their families, anxiety about wider families and how 
to fulfil their responsibilities to them, all affected the work of BMS missionaries in 
China during this period.  The breadth of the subject matter covered by this thesis has 
meant that there remains scope for further work in this developing area of research 
interest.  Methodological approaches concentrating on events and relationships that 
occur in private arenas, including the home, exemplified in the work of Emily 
Manktelow, would yield much interesting material if applied to this particularly 
traumatic period of mission history.951 
                                                
950 Rana Mitter, “Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China”, The 
Historical Journal, Vol.48.(2) (June 2005), 530. 
951 Manktelow’s Missionary Families. 
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The emphasis in recent research on the history of Christianity in China has been on 
the growth of indigenous Christianity.952  This thesis has provided a glimpse of the 
strong network of indigenous Baptist churches which existed in Shandong in the 
1930s and 1940s, formed through the joint efforts of Chinese and foreigners 
beginning with the arrival of the first Baptist missionaries in the 1860s.  The BMS 
archive indicates that organisation of the Shandong Baptist congregations was highly 
advanced by 1912.953  Further research on the development of the SBU from the late 
1880s would make a valuable contribution to current studies on the growth of the 
indigenous Chinese church.  The experience of the Chinese churches during the latter 
part of the Japanese occupation, when foreigners were absent, is of particular interest 
and has not been a focus of any substantive Western research to date, with the 
exception of that of Timothy Brook.954  
In this context, it is possible that Chinese documentary evidence that is directly 
relevant to an understanding of these early church communities is now scarce or 
currently inaccessible in China.  One recent piece of work by a Chinese scholar on 
the history of the BMS in Shandong relied, disappointingly, almost entirely on 
Williamson’s History.955  Archival evidence can, however, be supplemented by 
archaeological and ethnographic data, as Joseph Lee has pointed out.  Drawing on 
physical evidence such as the remnants of old churches, village walls, watch towers 
and lineage buildings, Lee has sought to reconstruct the social settings within which 
early Christians operated in Chaozhou (潮州).  ‘This approach represents a 
methodological breakthrough by going beyond the writings of Western missionaries 
and Chinese officials to study the local congregational histories.’956  Physical and 
social conditions in the northern provinces in which the BMS worked were very 
                                                
952 For example, Ryan Dunch, Fuzhou Protestants and the making of Modern China, 1857-1927 (New 
Haven, CT, 2001); Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-
1900 (London and New York, 2003); Bays, New History. 
953 Robert C. Forsyth, Shantung: the Sacred Province of China (Shanghai, 1912), 189-284.  Forsyth 
records that already in 1910 there were twelve Baptist churches in the province which were self-
supporting and able to fund their own Chinese pastors, 268. 
954 Bays, New History, 142; Timothy Brook, “Toward Independence”. 
955 Zhang Daming 張大明, “Yingguo Jinlihui zai Hua Huodong Kaocha 英國浸禮會在華活動考察 
(An Investigation of The Baptist Missionary Society’s Activities in China), 1840-1952”, unpublished 
MA Thesis, Shandong University (Shanda 山大), 2010.   
956 Lee, The Bible and the Gun, 169. 
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different from those in Guangdong province, where Lee’s research was based, but his 
emphasis on being open to methodological tools which break traditional moulds 
could prove productive.  There remain, for example, a number of church buildings in 
Shandong which date back to the very early work of the SBU. 
Looking ahead from 1952, there is much scope for research into the ways in which 
local Chinese church leaders like Zhang Sijing and Wang Juntang made, or failed to 
make, the adjustment to the new church order open to Chinese Protestants in the PRC 
as members of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM).  Apart from those who 
became high-profile leaders of the TSPM (for example, K.H..Ting (丁光训; Ding 
Guangxun), formerly Anglican Bishop of Zhejiang province) and those who 
prominently resisted (for example Wang Mingdao (王明道)) this is an area that has 
not as yet been widely explored.957  Bearing in mind Watson’s reference to 
‘situations where alternative understandings of the past are tantamount to treason’, it 
may be too early for scholars in the PRC to attempt to open up this still sensitive 
area.958  For Western scholars with Chinese language skills and the chance to 
undertake fieldwork in China, there is still a small window of time in which oral 
history might yield information and perspectives about the experiences of Chinese 
Christians during this period.  
Travel to China during the preparation of this thesis included visits to Jinan, 
Qingzhou, Xi’an and Zhoucun.  Original Baptist church buildings are in regular use 
by TSPM congregations in all these centres, although during the years of the Cultural 
Revolution they were co-opted for use as canteens, day centres or cinemas.  The 
Guangbei School in Zhoucun, now Zibo No.6 High School, and the Zunde School in 
Xi’an, now Xi’an No.3 High School, have thrived and are held in high regard in their 
respective communities.  The writers of the centennial history of the school in 
                                                
957 See Janice and Philip Wickeri (eds.), A Chinese Contribution to Ecumenical Theology: Selected 
Writings of Bishop K. H. Ting (Geneva, 2002); Philip Wickeri, Reconstructing Christianity in China: 
K.H..Ting and the Chinese Church (New York, 2007); Bays, New History, 176; Stephen Wang The 
Long Road to Freedom: The Story of Wang Mingdao, translated by Ma Ming (Lancaster, 2002); 
Thomas A..Harvey, Acquainted with Grief: Wang Mingdao’s Stand for the Persecuted Church in 
China (Grand Rapids, MI, 2002). 
958 Ching Kwan Lee and Guobin Yang (eds.), Re-envisioning the Chinese revolution: the politics and 
poetics of collective memories in reform China (Washington DC, 2007), 4, citing Rubie Watson (ed.), 
Memory, History and Opposition under State Socialism (Santante, 1994) 9. 
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Zhoucun were meticulous in their efforts to do justice to the BMS contribution, to the 
extent of sending one of their staff to the Angus library in Oxford to search the 
primary sources.959 
Very substantial modern hospitals stand on the sites of all the BMS hospitals.  None 
of the buildings of the former Foster Hospital in Zhoucun remain, but a vast military 
hospital stands in its place.  This is consistent with the immediate post-war 
developments when, by 1948, it was proving very difficult to maintain a hospital in 
Zhoucun, run by either church or mission.  A statue of Norman Bethune is prominent 
outside the modern hospital, although Bethune had no connection with this part of 
China or this hospital.960  Mao Zedong’s essay, In Memory of Norman Bethune (紀念
白求恩), was required reading in elementary schools in China during the 1960s, and 
as a result Bethune is widely revered throughout the PRC.961  The erection of his 
statue in this location suggests that while the CCP is willing to acknowledge a 
Western influence, this must be done on terms which are consistent with the Party’s 
own historical narrative. 
By contrast, the BMS origins of the hospitals in Jinan, Xi’an and Qingzhou are 
clearly displayed in memorial plaques and early photographs, and are acknowledged 
in modern accounts of the hospitals’ history.  The modern specialisms which they 
advertise have a direct link with the recognised expertise of some of the missionary 
staff who worked there: Handley Stockley’s skills in ophthalmology are echoed in 
the focus on ophthalmology highlighted in the publicity brochure of Xi’an No.4 
Hospital, the modern successor to the Jenkins Memorial Hospital where Stockley had 
worked; Gordon King and Ronald Still’s names are both recognised in the history of 
the nationally prominent Department of Obstetrics at Qilu Medical University in 
Jinan.962  
                                                
959百年光被, 周村, Bainian Guangbei, Centenary History of the Guangbei School, Zhoucun, 2007. 
960 See Chapter Three, page 124.  
961 Gao Yan in conversation with the writer in Zhoucun, 20.November.2000. 
962 Gordon King had taken a prominent part in the academic and practical work of the Qilu University 
hospital and medical school from his appointment in 1927 to his resignation in 1940 to take up a post 
as Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology in Hong Kong.  Williamson, British Baptists, 247.  Dr 
Wang Bo (王波), currently Consultant in Obstetrics and Gynaecology at Qilu Medical University, 
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Original hospital buildings have been retained in Jinan and Qingzhou.  Although in 
both locations they are completely dwarfed by multi-storey modern additions, they 
have been maintained to a high standard and are in daily use as administrative 
offices.  There remain associations with the missionary era.  In Qingzhou, these 
include an exhibition of early photographs housed in the present-day nursing college.  
Niu Jianyi (牛建一), currently President of the Qingzhou hospital, recalled that as a 
nine year old in the late 1960s he and a group of friends had explored the old hospital 
buildings.  They had found piles of old documents written in English in the 
basement. What impressed them most was the quality of the paper, especially when 
they discovered it was ideally suited to making paper aeroplanes.963   
Less than twenty years after the missionaries’ departure from China, the painstaking 
records of years of missionary effort appeared simply as discarded papers written in a 
foreign language, fit only for making paper aeroplanes.  Those papers belonged to a 
forgotten world, a world which appeared to have no possible relevance to the new 
China created by the CCP.  Half a century later another generation of Chinese, and a 
new generation of historians, are working to make sense of that world and 
understand more fully its relevance to the world of the twenty-first century. 
                                                                                                                                     
has recently made a short film honouring the work of Ronald Still, who was head of the Department 
of Obstetrics and Gynaecology during 1947 and 1948.  Viewed by the writer in Jinan, 17.April.2013. 
963 Niu Jianyi (牛建一), President of Yidu Central Hospital （山东益都）in conversation with the 
writer, 23.April.2013. 
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Appendix: BMS Missionaries referred to in text, 
including the dates of their service in China 
Allen, Connie (née Greening)  1931-1951 
Allen, Thomas W  1931-1951 
Bastable, Albert E  1945-1950 
Bastable, Joyce  1945-1950 
Bryan, A. Keith  1924-1950 
Bryan, Kitty  1929-1950 
Bywaters, Dr O Nancy  1946-1952  
Clow, Dr Ellen  1928, transferred to HQ 1948 
Clow, Dr J Menzies  1929-1951 
Collins, Edward G  1944-1952 
Collins, Margaret  1944-1952 
Dart, Mrs F E  1929, died 1953 
Dart, Rufus H P  1925-1954 
Drake, Dora  1930-1952 
Drake, Frederick S  1914-1952 
Elder, Arthur C  1940-1953 
Elder, Kathleen  1940-1953 
Emmott, Amy (née Surthwaite) 1920-1950 
Emmott, Hubert A  1924-1950 
Emmott, Winifred F 1925 (died 1947) 
Flowers, Dr Wilfred S  1927-1949 
Greening, A Ernest  1897-1936 
Gunn, W G David  1936-1952 
Gunn, Winifred  1934-1952 
Harris, James S  1908-1948 
Harrison, Vera  1946-1953 
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Hayward, Victor E W  1934, transferred to HQ 1951 
Jenkins, Dr Margaret W  1938-1957 
King, Dr Gordon  1927-1940 
Madge, Edna M  1935-1951 
Madge, Ernest G T  1935-1951 
Manger, Jessie  1908-1938 
Mudd, Charlotte  1911-1949 
Mudd, William  1909-1949 
Nelson, Peter F  1946-1952 
Payne, E Jessie 1907-1947 
Payne, Henry  1905-1947 
Phillips, Edward  1924-1951 
Phillips, Enid  1927-1951 
Price, Brynmor F  1939-1950 
Price, Fred W  1911-1947 
Russell, Frederick S  1913-1949 
Russell, Gertrude  1915-1949 
Seymour, Gladys  1947-1952 
Smith, Christina  1924-1947 
Smith, Eric Sutton  1939-1952 
Smith, John Henderson  1935-1949 
Spillett , Hubert W  1930-1939, 1946-1953 
Still, Gwyneth  1935-1949 
Still, Dr Ronald J  1935-1949 
Stockley, Dr Handley G  1924-1950 
Stockley, Jean  1927-1950 
Sutton, James  1943-1953 
Sutton, Edna  1944-1953 
Tait, Ruth   1924-1950 
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Thomas, Margaret  1909-1946 
Upchurch, William S  1935-1952 
Upchurch, Winifred  1945-1952 
Williamson, H Raymond  1908, transferred to HQ 1939 
Williamson, Joan K  1923-1951 
Wyatt, Dr Harry G  1925-1938 (died) 
Young, George A  1924-1952 
Young, Nora  1923-1952 
 
details from H.R.Williamson, British Baptists, pp363-372 
 
 
